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Abstract: In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning ﬁeld of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie
social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social
neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of
real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is
fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the
theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological
studies, and related ﬁelds to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go
social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.
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“No more ﬁendish punishment could be devised, were such
thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose
in society and remain absolutely unnoticed.”
— William James (1890/2007, p. 293) The Principles of
Psychology
1. Introduction
The burgeoning ﬁeld of social neuroscience has begun to
illuminate the complex biological bases of human social
cognitive abilities (Frith & Frith 2010; Ochsner & Lieber-
man 2001). Many investigations have focused, in particular,
on the neural correlates of our capacity to grasp the mental
states of others. Two neuroanatomically distinct large-scale
networks have gained center stage as the neural substrates
of social cognition: the so-called mirror neuron system
(MNS) and the mentalizing network (MENT). The
former has been taken as evidence for a simulationist
account of social cognition and is believed to give us a
“ﬁrst-person grasp” of the motor goals and intentions of
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other individuals (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). The latter
has been seen as providing evidence for a “Theory
Theory” account of social cognition believed to give us an
inferential, reﬂective, and what might be called a third-
person grasp of others’ mental states (Frith & Frith 2006;
2010). The apparent disparity between these sets of results
may, however, arise from differences in the experimental
paradigms used (cf. Keysers & Gazzola 2007), which run
the danger of presupposing the very theoretical frameworks
they claim to test. Hence, both of these paradigms are inves-
tigating actual but limited domains of social cognition. Both
are, in effect, committed to spectator theories of knowledge.
They have focused on the use of “isolation paradigms”
(Becchio et al. 2010), in which participants are required to
merely observe others or think about their mental states
rather than participate in social interaction with them. Con-
sequently, it has remained unclear whether, and how,
activity in the large-scale neural networks described above
is modulated by the degree to which a person does or
does not feel actively involved in an ongoing interaction
and whether the networks might subserve complementary
or mutually exclusive roles in this case (Schilbach
2010). After more than a decade of research, the neural
mechanisms underlying social interaction have remained
elusive and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing
the “dark matter”2 of social neuroscience.
In this target article we propose an approach to the
investigation of social cognition focused on second-person
engagements. This approach, we argue, will help to throw
light on this “dark matter” and may help social neuro-
science to really “go social.”
1.1. Spectator theories of other minds
Spectatorial accounts of social knowing are not restricted to
social neuroscience, but have been central to the Western
intellectual tradition (Dewey 1950). Psychological accounts
of how people make sense of other people have usually
shared a common format:
1. Each is a detached observer, rather than actively
engaged with the other in some joint project.
2. The information available to each of us about other
people is limited and disorganized, and hence, there is a
gulf between what we can actually observe about them,
and what they themselves feel, intend, or believe.
3. Each of us, therefore, has to engage in some or other
intellectual “detour” to bridge the gap between what can be
immediately experienced about the other person and that
person’s psychological states (see Asch 1952, pp. 144–50).
As Neisser has pointed out, this detached and intellectu-
alist theoretical approach to how people make sense of one
another has been built into the research which was sup-
posed to support that very position: namely, people observ-
ing video-recordings of other people, and making
judgments of what they saw:
The theories and experiments … all refer to an essentially
passive onlooker, who sees someone do something (or sees
two people do something) and then makes a judgment about
it. He […] doesn’t mix it up with the folks he’s watching,
never tests his judgments in action or interaction. He just
watches and makes judgments. … When people are genuinely
engaged with one another, nobody stops to give grades.
(Neisser 1980, pp. 603–604)
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Modern cognitive psychology has retained “methodo-
logical behaviorism” from precisely the psychology it
claims to have undermined (see Costall 2006; Garner
1999; Jenkins 1986; Leahey 1992; Neisser 1997). Accord-
ing to the textbooks, psychologists in their research necess-
arily start from the observation of inherently meaningless,
“colorless behavior” (Hull 1943, p. 25) and can only begin
to make psychological sense of what they observe on the
basis of theorizing. Few modern psychologists, of course,
are Cartesian dualists: They rightly insist that they do not
make an ontological disjunction between behavior and
mind.
Nevertheless, psychologists keep framing their method-
ology, in principle if not in their actual practice, in the
old Hullian, reductionist terms, and hence, keep talking
themselves into a methodological dualism of behavior and
mind. In so doing, they resurrect for themselves the tra-
ditional dualistic “problem” of other minds. And, when
Theory Theorists project this methodology onto other
people and how they make sense of one another, they
often enough also carry the same insoluble problem with
them. In relation to the other domains to which it has
been applied, the “Theory Theory” approach has taken
for granted that the child has already acquired a substantial
practical understanding of the social domain before
attempting to systematize his or her existing knowledge
(such as friction or collisions in the domain of physics,
and reproduction and growth in the domain of biology).
This is not the case for “Theory Theory” of Mind (TToM)
in its original form, for, according to TToM, it is only
once children have developed a “Theory of Mind” that
they have access to any of the necessary psychological
data upon which the theory could be based.
Of course, “Theory of Mind” does not refer to a theory in
the scientiﬁc sense, but denotes an empirical ﬁeld of study
with (apparently) no particular theoretical commitments
(cf. Penn & Povinelli 2008, p. 394). Yet, to the extent
that the most important alternative approach, “Simulation
Theory,” frames the problem of how people make sense
of other people – in terms of how psychologists make a
detour from the observation of “mere” behavior to psycho-
logical states – they both face the same logical impasse.
Indeed, there could be no naturally occurring precursors
to “Theory of Mind,” not even evolved ones, if the
problem of how we really make sense of one another is
framed in terms of this kind of methodological dualism
(see Costall et al. 2006; Leudar & Costall 2008).
1.2. An alternative account of social knowing
Before the rise of recent social cognition research there was
already an important body of theory and research propos-
ing that, typically, when relating to one another, people
are not engaged in a tortuous process of inferences and the-
orizing about one another, but immediately experience the
other as a subject (see Asch 1952; Heider & Simmel 1944;
Runeson & Frykholm 1983; Schutz 1972; Thinès et al.
1991). This approach drew upon Gestalt theory and phe-
nomenology. Here is Solomon Asch’s lucid statement of
this position:
The quality of their actions imbues persons with living reality.
When we say that a person is in pain, we see his body as
feeling. We do not need to “impute” consciousness to others
if we directly perceive the qualities of consciousness in the
qualities of action. Once we see an act that is skillful, clumsy,
alert, or reckless, it is superﬂuous to go “behind” it to its con-
scious substrate, for consciousness has revealed itself in the
act (Asch 1952, p. 158).
This social perception approach is close to the theoretical
perspective we are presenting in this target article. It is not
detached; it is not dispassionate. However, it is nevertheless
committed to an observer epistemology, a spectator theory
of how we relate to other people. Knowing others is limited
to perceiving them. In this target article, we argue for an
approach to social knowing based on interaction and
emotional engagements between people, rather than
mere observation. This second-person approach has
already begun to prove productive within developmental
and social psychology and points toward the importance
of experiencing and interacting with others as our
primary ways of knowing them (see Section 2 for details).
Also, preliminary evidence from neuroimaging and psycho-
physiological studies demonstrates profound differences in
neural processing related to the reciprocity of social inter-
action, which is consistent with our proposal that the
second-person approach can make an important contri-
bution to the neuroscientiﬁc study of social encounters
and could, in fact, lead to the development of a second-
person neuroscience (Section 3). In this respect, we
provide an outlook for future research by describing key
ideas and objectives of a second-person neuroscience and
related objectives in other areas of research (Section 4).
Finally, we argue that the second-person account may
also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric dis-
orders: Although psychiatric disorders such as autism
have been conceptualized as disorders of explicit social cog-
nition, recent evidence suggests that the implicit processes
of interpersonal coordination relevant during second-
person engagements might be more closely related to the
core impairments (Section 5).
2. Second-person engagements
2.1. Overcoming the spectatorial gap
Spectatorial views of cognition have been developed within
the paradigm of standard cognitive science, which under-
stands cognition as information processing in the sense of
a passive intake of information provided by a ready-made
world. Embodied cognition replaces this view by a
concept of perception as an active process executed by an
organism situated in the environment, wherein subjects
are not isolated from but embedded in and coupled with
the perceived world (Thompson 2007). Such coupling
brings to the fore new properties –what Gibson (1979)
calls “affordances” –which depend on the organism’s
speciﬁc potential and actual interaction with the environ-
ment. In this way, cognition is essentially construed as an
activity carried out by an embodied and embedded agent.
In addition to hybrid accounts of “Theory Theory” and
“Simulation Theory” (e.g., Goldman 2006; see Newen &
Schlicht 2009 for a critical discussion), recent debates
have, therefore, led to alternatives which emphasize
various aspects of embeddedness and embodiedness in
social cognition (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; Fuchs
2009; Gallagher 2005; 2008; Hutto 2008; Noë 2009;
Reddy 2008; Zahavi 2005).
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Spectatorial views construe social cognition as something
that could in principle occur in the presence of a one-way
mirror, where a detached observer reads out the mental
states of another person, who, in turn, is not affected by
this and cannot react to it. In contrast to this, our central
claims are that social cognition is fundamentally different
when (sect. 2.1.1) we are emotionally engaged with
someone as compared to adopting an attitude of detach-
ment, and when (sect. 2.1.2) we are in interaction with
someone as compared to merely observing her (see Fig. 1).
2.1.1. Constituents of a second-person approach:
Emotional engagement. A second-person grasp of other
minds, we argue, is, ﬁrst, closely related to feelings of
engagement with and emotional responses to the other.
According to this viewpoint, awareness of other minds cru-
cially hinges upon emotional engagement and a responsive-
ness to another person’s states or actions as compared to a
detached observer’s attitude, which does not include such
responding (cf. Reddy 2003; 2008; Rietveld 2008)
(Fig. 1). Although emotional responses are also inﬂuenced
by one’s own concerns, they constitute an important way of
perceiving and integrating the state of the other by way of
experiencing one’s own bodily responses to her (e.g. Prinz
2003) (Fig. 1B). Mentality – in this view – is thought to
become meaningful as a result of relating new pieces of
experience to a pre-existing network of experiences. On a
neural level, emotional and embodied responses may play
a crucial role in inﬂuencing action control networks of
the brain by modulating processes of sensorimotor inte-
gration, which, in turn, solicit activity and observable be-
havior (Frijda 1986, p. 469; Keltner & Haidt 1999;
Schilbach et al. 2008a) (Fig. 1). Consequently, affective
responses relying upon proprioceptive afferences from
the body and action-based processes are likely to be
closely linked and to interact in complex ways. For instance,
Figure 1. A–D:
Center: Schematic depiction of interaction contingencies for situations of (A) no (or little) social interaction and no (or little) emotional
engagement, (B) no (or little) social interaction, but emotional engagement of person A with person B, (C) social interaction, but no (or
little) emotional engagement, and (D) social interaction and emotional engagement. Dotted lines indicate the absence or relatively
decreased inﬂuence of actions on oneself (vertical arrows) or the other (oblique arrows), temporal sequence is shown from top to
bottom. (Schematic of interaction contingences adapted from Jones & Gerard 1967.) Despite the suggestion of linearity in the
interaction sequence, our account also stresses the importance of interaction dynamics, which may be seen as emergent properties of
an interaction, and possible inter-brain effects of social interaction (see sects. 2.3 & 3.2.2 for details).
Left & right: Schematic depiction of putative differences in the recruitment of brain regions during situations A–D and their functional
connectivity (see sect. 3 for details). Brain regions on the medial surface or deep structures of the brain are shown in italics, brain regions
on the lateral surface of the brain are shown in normal font.
Abbreviations: R: (re-) actions performed by agents.MENT: The “mentalizing network” is a network of brain regions recruited by tests
which tap “the ability to read the desires, intentions, and beliefs of other people” (e.g., Frith & Frith 2008). In line with recent meta-
analyses of functional neuroimaging studies which have investigated mentalizing, we see medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) as the most important nodes of this network, sometimes also referred to as the “cortical midline
structures” (e.g., Northoff & Bermpohl 2004; Schilbach et al. 2012a; Uddin et al. 2007). While a large body of literature exists to
suggest that these brain regions can be differentially engaged by classical mental state attribution tasks (Figure 1A), much less is
known about the interactions within this network and with other brain regions as a function of emotional engagement and social
interaction (Figure 1B-D). MNS: As introduced in section 1 the so-called “mirror neuron system” is thought to include areas of
inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and inferior parietal cortex (IPC) (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). Individual nodes of this network are
known to become active during the observation of goal-directed actions, but their interplay and, in particular, the interaction with
MENT is not well understood (Figure 1B-D; Schilbach 2010). SMC: Primary sensorimotor cortex. DLPFC: Dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (separate from MNS regions). ACC: Anterior cingulate cortex (here thought to be separate from MENT). AMY: Amygdala.
INS: Insular cortex. LatHb: Lateral habenula complex. VTA: Ventral tegmental area. VS: Ventral striatum.
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it would seem plausible that emotional-embodied
responses could facilitate more cognitive ways of under-
standing minds, whereas the absence of such responses
could make this a more effortful process. Furthermore, it
is important to point out that while emotional engagement
may also occur (and could be particularly relevant) during
observation (such as watching an emotionally charged
movie scene or perceiving to be perceived by someone;
Fig. 1B), the opposite may be true for some situations, in
which one actually interacts with someone (such as hastily
buying a bus ticket from a cashier; Fig. 1C).
2.1.2. Constituents of a second-person approach: Social
interaction. Second, we see social interaction as a key con-
stituent of grasping other minds. Social interactions are
characterized by intricate reciprocal relations with the per-
ception of socially relevant information prompting (re-)
actions, which are themselves processed and reacted to
(see Fig. 1, C &D). These reciprocities might be sequential
(as depicted in the schematic of Figure 1), but are often
complex, dynamic and nonlinear (Froese & Di Paolo
2010; Port & van Gelder 1995; Thelen & Smith 1994).
Being in interaction with someone, we suggest, further-
more relies upon a perception of the environment in
terms of the resources held collectively by both interactors
rather than those held by each individual alone (Costall
1995; Marsh et al. 2009; Richardson et al. 2007a; 2007b;
Schilbach et al. 2012b; Sebanz et al. 2006). In social inter-
action, rather than exercising one’s deliberative reﬂective
capacities we exercise our own practical know-how in
dealing with others as interactors (Klin et al. 2003). Here,
interaction and feedback are not only a way of gathering
data about the other person, that is, observing effects one
may have on the other, but rather, as De Jaegher et al.
(2010) have argued persuasively, one’s knowledge of the
other resides – at least in part – in the interaction dynamics
“between” the agents. Thus, taking social interaction
seriously suggests that there may not be an absolute episte-
mic gulf between self and other, which would make an
inferential detour necessary, but rather, that the dynamics
of the social interaction contribute to and – at times – con-
stitute our awareness of other minds (Fig. 1, C & D).
There are at least three different aspects of social inter-
action that are important for research in social neuro-
science. First, interaction involves different roles for the
interactors. At the simplest level, one can be an “initiator”
or a “responder” in an interaction, that is, the same (or
very similar) action can be performed in an attempt to
initiate an interaction or as a response to someone else’s
action. Although such a simple and clear-cut difference in
roles may be rare in dynamic real-time encounters, we
believe that this distinction is important for neuroscience
research, because it implies different motivational conse-
quences and differences in the underlying neural pro-
cesses: An action by an “initiator” may involve stronger
monitoring of the outcome of the interaction, whereas an
action by a “responder” may involve closer attention to
the emotional effects of the action being responded to; a
difference which may be reﬂected in differential involve-
ment of brain regions (see Fig. 1). Second, shared inten-
tions and motivations are newly created within an
interaction, with important consequences for the perform-
ance of joint actions and for the progress and continuation
of the interaction itself. We argue that these processes are
quite different from those involved in merely observing
someone else interact, and must play a crucial role in
shaping activity in the neural networks that underlie
social cognition (see sects. 3 & 5 for further details).
Third, interaction always involves historicity, suggesting
that social phenomena must be understood,– at both the
psychological and the neural level –within the context of
the past and must involve developmental trajectories,
which continue to be relevant throughout the life span.
In order to further clarify the central notions of emotion-
al engagement and social interaction as part of a second-
person approach to other minds and to illustrate that this
view has already begun to prove productive in shaping
research outside the neurosciences, in what follows, we
draw on and review evidence from the ﬁelds of develop-
mental, social, and cognitive psychology.
2.2.1. Developing awareness of minds through second-
person engagements: Evidence from developmental
psychology. Debates in developmental psychology con-
cerned with the processes through which infants and
young children come to recognize the existence and
nature of other minds reﬂect the same assumptions that
have beset the traditional philosophical debates. They
have most often posited two sources of information for
the developing child – that of ﬁrst-person experience and
third-person observation – or, on occasion, an unconvin-
cing amalgam of the two. The possibility of a difference
in awareness in different relations with speciﬁc “other
minds” – which is the central assumption of a second-
person approach to mind knowledge (Reddy 2003;
2008) –was either neglected or explicitly denied (Barresi
& Moore 1996). There has, however, been a dramatic
surge of interest in second-person explanations within
development (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis 2004; Gallagher
2001; Hobson 1991; Hobson 1999; Reddy 1996; 2003;
2008).
Evidence for the second-person argument, namely that
an appropriate development of awareness of other minds
depends on the infant ﬁrst experiencing minds which are
directed towards her, is scattered throughout the develop-
mental psychological literature. Probably the most impress-
ive evidence of infants’ sensitivity to, and preference for,
the infant-directedness of interpersonal actions comes
from recent studies concerning early responses to gaze.
Mutual gaze both reﬂects one organism’s interest in
another’s gaze and signals this interest to the other, with
the potential for creating a situation of intense mutuality.
Between 2 and 5 days of birth, human neonates show a pre-
ference for looking at faces or pictures of faces with eyes
directly looking towards the infant. This preference
reveals itself both in terms of longer looking times and in
terms of more frequent looks (Farroni et al. 2002). Even
earlier than this, within minutes of birth, infants show con-
siderable interest in and respond appropriately to self-
directed facial actions, primarily more noticeable actions
such as tongue protrusion and opening the mouth wide
(Kugiumutzakis 1998; Meltzoff & Moore 1977; Nagy &
Molnar 2004). Also, there is evidence that by 4 months of
age the experimenter’s gaze directed toward rather than
away from the infant leads to a variety of neural reactions
and information processing advantages: higher cortical
arousal (Farroni et al. 2002), enhanced occipital early
gamma response (Grossmann et al. 2007), enhanced
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neural processing of emotional expressions (Striano et al.
2006), facilitated neural processing of objects (Reid
et al. 2004), and differential processing of words (Parise
et al. 2008). By 2 months of age infants already show a
variety of emotional reactions to attention directed to the
self, ranging from pleasure (Wolff 1987) to distress if
unable to disengage (Brazelton 1986) to ambivalence in
the form of coy smiles (Reddy 2000). A large number of
studies have shown that the intricacies of emotional
engagement matter from very early infancy and are the
source of meaning about self and others. Two- to three-
month-olds during face-to-face communication demon-
strate intra- and interpersonal coordination (Fogel 1993;
Lavelli & Fogel 2002; Stern 1985; Trevarthen 1977), are
disturbed by the lack of temporal and affective coordi-
nation (Cohn & Tronick 1989; Legerstee & Varghese
2001; Murray & Trevarthen 1985; Nadel & Tremblay-
Leveau 1999), are affected in their ability to bid for atten-
tion by the history of maternal affective responses
(McQuaid et al. 2009) and learn to prefer the levels of
interactional contingency they are familiar with (Bigelow
& Rochat 2006).
Infant awareness of attention in second-person engage-
ments has been argued to have developmental primacy
over the awareness of attention in triadic and more tem-
porally extended attentional engagements (Reddy 2003;
2005; 2008). Evidence for the causal role of such engage-
ments in developing triadic and more complex reﬂective
awareness comes from developmental psychopathology
(particularly autism) where problems with explicit social
cognition (at the level of triadic joint attention or at the
level of concepts of self or of other) are heralded by pro-
blems in second-person engagements (with establishing
mutual attention and mutual responsiveness with self and
with other; Leekam & Ramsden 2006; Reddy, 2012;
Reddy et al. 2010).
The primacy of second-person engagements creates
serious conceptual and methodological problems for psycho-
logical research: It demands that emotion be taken as central
to an awareness of minds and focuses on emotional
responses rather than reﬂections or constructs. We argue
that such experiences of mind and mentality are ﬁrst and
most intensely experienced within second-person engage-
ments, where the individual is directly addressed by and
responds to an “other” mind. Such second-person experi-
ences of other minds, we argue, are necessary for the
typical development of social understanding and continue
to inﬂuence social understanding throughout life.
2.2.2. Knowing minds in interaction: Evidence from
social and cognitive psychology. In social psychology
and related ﬁelds – in spite of a long history and interest
in “social presence” effects (e.g., Allport 1924; Biocca
et al. 2003; Short et al. 1976; Triplett 1898; Worringham
& Messick 1983; Zajonc 1965) – the need to allow test sub-
jects to leave the “experimental quarantine” of “isolation
paradigms” when studying social processes has only
recently been recognized (e.g., Becchio et al. 2010;
Richardson et al. 2007a; 2007b; Sebanz et al. 2006). This
development appears to be based on the assumption that
cognition is grounded in basic perception and action pro-
cesses and emerges out of the interaction of the organism
with its environment, and that – rather than treating it as
an experimental confound – a social context and social
interaction can be treated as an independent variable of
experimentation. Consistent with this proposal, the
second-person approach sees interaction with other
agents and the ensuing interaction dynamics as crucial for
the knowing of other minds and the expression of that
knowledge.
The role of social interaction for cognitive and social
development has begun to gain center stage in various
scientiﬁc discourses (De Jaegher et al. 2010): The role of
interaction as a vehicle for the acquisition of knowledge
has, for instance, been demonstrated in language develop-
ment. In contrast to the Chomskian idea of a “Language
Acquisition Device” (e.g., Chomsky 1979), the perception
of structure in social interactions has been shown to
guide vocal development and language learning (Bruner
1983; Goldstein & Schwade 2010), both in terms of
speech perception (Kuhl 2007a; 2007b; Kuhl et al. 2003)
or turn-taking (Goldstein & Schwade 2008; Goldstein
et al. 2010a; Jaffe et al. 2001). Whereas children can
extract statistical regularities from any structured material
without awareness or intention using mere error feedback
(Marcus et al. 1999; Saffran et al. 1997), observation of
one’s own behavioral outcomes in interaction may be
crucial for such learning to occur (Goldstein et al.
2010b). Adults also coordinate turn-taking, implicitly
agree upon names for objects (Brennan & Clark 1996;
Brennan & Hanna 2009), approach each other’s accents
(Giles et al. 1992), sway their bodies in synchrony (Shockley
et al. 2003), and visually coordinate their attention through
synchronized eye movements (Richardson et al. 2007a),
suggesting that communication may be grounded by a
shared context, which is actively developed in ongoing
encounters (Clark 1996; Garrod & Pickering 2004).
In other areas of research “interaction” has been investi-
gated by focusing on processes such as involuntary mimicry
(e.g., Chartrand & Bargh 1999; Konvalinka et al. 2010; Nie-
denthal et al. 2010; Schmidt et al. 1990), which leads to
enhanced rapport and liking, but is also inﬂuenced by
differences in afﬁliative motives and interdependent self-
construal (Van Baaren et al. 2003; Baaren et al. 2004).
Social interaction, however, normally also involves more
complex forms of coordination present from early on in
life (cf. Harrist & Waugh 2002). In this respect, Knoblich
& Sebanz (2008) distinguish between “action simulation”
(see also Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010), “joint attention,”
and “shared intentionality” (see also Tomasello & Carpen-
ter 2007). The development of a shared perceptual and
attentional space within early mutual attentional engage-
ments is crucial, because it paves the way for triadic inter-
actions in which we share our mental states about a third
object or person with the other (Tomasello 1995). In
turn, such triadic attentional engagements may be crucial
for developing complex joint actions (Fiebich & Gallagher
2012; Knoblich & Sebanz 2008; Richardson et al. 2007a;
Sebanz et al. 2006).
In spite of a growing interest in this matter, the bulk of
research is still rooted in a mechanistic metaphor of feed-
back loops that inform individuals about the adequacy of
their behavior. In this framework, it is assumed that the
sum of two interacting agents can be expressed in terms
of processes “within” those agents (however, modiﬁed by
the external world, in this case each other). We argue
that interaction expresses a type of knowledge of other
minds that is not entirely reducible to knowledge “inside”
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any two individual agents but exists “between” them (see
De Jaegher et al. 2010). Interestingly, the recently devel-
oped “perceptual crossing paradigm” directly addresses
this aspect (Auvray et al. 2009; Lenay et al. 2011): here,
two participants interact with each other by moving their
mouse cursor in a one-dimensional virtual space. In this
space they can encounter three different types of objects
indicated by tactile stimulation: a ﬁxed object, a constantly
moving object, and the other participant. Their task is to
click the mouse only if they believe to have encountered
the other person’s cursor. Thus, it is only when they meet
each other, that both are stimulated simultaneously.
Using the perceptual crossing setup, it has been shown
that healthy volunteers exhibit a dissociation between task
performance and awareness of this performance with
respect to the detection of reciprocity (though not with
respect to the detection of animacy): Conscious identiﬁ-
cation of the other person (by means of clicks) is limited
to distinguishing both moving objects from the ﬁxed
object (animacy detection), but does not extend to dis-
tinguishing the moving object from the other person’s
object (reciprocity detection). However, participants’ inter-
action dynamics allow us to distinguish not only between
ﬁxed and moving objects, but also between the moving
object and the other’s cursor (Auvray et al. 2009). Crucially,
this demonstrates that unrelated to awareness and strategic
processes, people are sensitive to reciprocal interaction,
and furthermore, spontaneously engage in mutual modiﬁ-
cation of action patterns with an interactor, actively
“seeking the other out.” It is only in this interactive
process that contingencies are simultaneously experienced
and acted upon.
Taken together, recent progress in developmental,
social, and cognitive psychology indicates a surge of interest
in emotional engagement and real-time social interaction as
key constituents for knowing other minds. However,
although this second-person approach has already begun
to prove productive in shaping experimental work, this
has occurred largely outside the realm of neuroscience.
We suggest that the approach promises to do the same
within the ﬁeld of social neuroscience, thereby leading to
the establishment of a second-person neuroscience.
3. Toward a second-person neuroscience
After more than a decade of successful research, “dark
matter” remains in the ﬁeld of social neuroscience
(Fig. 2). As highlighted above, previous research has
often focused on the perception of inert stimuli – consistent
with the idea of a detached observer –whereas, in everyday
life, making sense of others requires both emotional
engagement and interaction (Fig. 1). Consequently, a
second-person neuroscience will help to address
Figure 2. Depiction of the experimental “landscape” of a second-person neuroscience. Cubes shown in this ﬁgure represent categories
of experimental approaches to the investigation of social cognition in accordance with the second-person account. Here, we highlight
cubes 1–5, which in accordance with the text are most informative as to the different aspects of the research landscape: Cube [1], for
example, represents studies that target differences between detached observation as compared to emotional engagement (see sect.
3.1.1). Cube [2] represents studies which use paradigms that allow the participant to directly inﬂuence the stimulus material, that is,
seeing the effect of her actions (e.g., interactive eye-tracking studies; see sect. 3.1.2). Cube [3] represents studies that collect data
from two participants who interact by means of a structured task, including hyperscanning studies that, for example, make use of
game theory paradigms (see sect. 3.2.1). Cubes [4] and [5] represent studies that allow for the investigation of ecologically valid, real-
time interactions (see sect. 3.2.2). More intense shades of grey indicate areas of the landscape that have been left largely unexplored,
representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience.
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differences in the neurobiological underpinnings of social
knowing related to:
(i) a person being a detached observer as compared to
experiencing a social situation with an attitude of emotional
engagement (Fig. 2: “experience”)
(ii) experimental paradigms used to investigate social
cognition allowing or not allowing for interaction (Fig. 2:
“participation”)3
(iii) data collection and analysis taking place at the level
of a single or two (or more) individuals (Fig. 2: “data collec-
tion & analysis”)4
In the following we review evidence from neuroimaging
and psychophysiology to demonstrate the relevance and
applicability of the ﬁrst and second dimension of our con-
ception of a second-person grasp of other minds (sect.
3.1). Additionally, we discuss some of the methodological
challenges associated with addressing the third dimension
and other important milestones in the development of a
second-person neuroscience (sect. 3.2).
3.1. Preliminary evidence from functional neuroimaging
and psychophysiology
3.1.1. Being addressed as you: The neurobiological
correlates of emotional engagement. Based on the
hypothesis of differences in the neural processing of
social stimuli depending upon whether or not they are
directed toward oneself as compared to being directed
toward someone else, we performed a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Schilbach et al. 2006), in
which participants were asked to imagine being part of a
scenario with three other people, only one of whom was
visible (Fig. 3A), and were shown short video sequences
depicting this virtual character who exhibited socially rel-
evant facial expressions or arbitrary facial movements. Fur-
thermore, it was varied whether or not the virtual character
looked directly at the participant (Fig. 3B) or towards
the right or left in the direction of another agent
(Fig. 3C). Participants were asked to rate in all cases
whether they felt that the virtual character had expressed
an intention to initiate a social interaction.
The behavioral results demonstrated that participants did
not have difﬁculties in differentiating socially relevant from
arbitrary mimic behavior. Interestingly, and in spite of the
explicit instruction to “put themselves into the shoes of
the other,” participants demonstrated a bias towards
giving socially relevant facial expressions a signiﬁcantly
higher rating when they were self-directed. In parallel to
this, results of the neuroimaging analysis demonstrated sig-
niﬁcant differences in activation patterns subserving the
perception of socially relevant facial expressions, depending
upon whether these expressions were self- or other-
directed: While self-directed facial expressions led to a
differential increase of neural activity in the ventral
portion of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the (super-
ﬁcial) amygdala (AMY) (Fig. 3D), other-directed facial
expressions resulted in a differential recruitment of
medial and lateral parietal cortex (Fig. 3E). Our ﬁndings,
therefore, demonstrate that while the perception of socially
relevant nonverbal cues from an observer’s point of view
recruits brain regions that have been related to visuo-
spatial processing, the perception of identical, self-directed
stimuli activate brain regions that have been related to
emotional and evaluative processing (Schilbach et al. 2006).
Indeed, the AMY is known to be a crucial subcortical hub
of the limbic system serving various integrative sensory and
emotional functions in attaching biological and social sig-
niﬁcance to stimuli (Gamer & Buchel 2009; Gamer et al.
2010; Muscatell et al. 2010; N’Diaye et al. 2009; Tamietto
& de Gelder 2010). The ventral portion of MPFC is also
known to be relevant for emotional processing and has
been implicated to be involved in “outcome monitoring”
(Amodio & Frith 2006). More generally, emotions are
known to be an important driving force for interpersonal
behavior and a “short hand” that guides decision-making
Figure 3. (A) Virtual scenario as shown in the instructions. (B) Self-directed, socially relevant facial expression. (C) Other-directed,
arbitrary facial movement. (D) Neural correlates of the perception of self-directed facial expressions. (E) Neural correlates of the
perception of other-directed facial expressions. (F) Neural correlates of the perception of arbitrary facial movements. Activation
overlays based on reanalysis of data taken from Schilbach et al. (2006).
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processes (e.g., Damasio 2010; Frijda 1986). Also,
emotions are assumed to be of crucial importance for inter-
personal perception by allowing the observer to share the
feeling state of another individual (Preston & de Waal
2002). Apart from this traditional view of how emotions
might contribute to social cognition, our account views
emotional responses not only as a way of perceiving
emotional states in others, but also as a way of being
engaged with others, which could contribute to the under-
standing of the bodily intentionality of the other in terms of
bodily responsiveness (Rietveld 2008). Being responsive to
the socially relevant, expressive behavior of others in this
way could provide, and bias, possibilities for (inter-)
action by motivating behavior and soliciting activity.
Interestingly, our neuroimaging analysis also demon-
strated that the perception of arbitrary facial movements
recruited the right inferior frontal and inferior parietal cor-
tices (see Fig. 1 & Fig. 3F). These brain regions are com-
monly described as important nodes of the mirror neuron
system (MNS), which has been related to understanding
the (motor) intentions that underlie others’ actions (Rizzo-
latti & Sinigaglia 2010). This ﬁnding, we think, is interesting
in several respects: First of all, it suggests that activity in the
MNS is not related to the particular perspective a human
observer adopts, but more closely tracks the observed be-
havior itself regardless of whether it is “my action” or
“your action.” This seems to be consistent with the domi-
nant interpretation of MNS activity in the literature,
suggesting that the MNS may have evolved to represent
actions in the same way across subjects and that mirror
neurons explain the ability to understand other minds by
giving us a “ﬁrst-person grasp” of the motor goals and inten-
tions of other individuals (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010).
This view has, however, been criticized as over-emphasiz-
ing similarities in self- and other-related processes (Schil-
bach 2010) and under-representing the important
question of where mirror neurons actually “come from”
(Heyes 2010). Here, an important suggestion has been
that mirror neurons may only play a role in situations
when the action and its stereotypic context are highly fam-
iliar (e.g., Brass et al. 2007). In our study, however, brain
regions described as corresponding to the MNS respond
more strongly to arbitrary facial movements than to socially
relevant ones –which appears to contradict the idea that
the MNS only plays a role in familiar situations. On the con-
trary, an arbitrary facial movement –with which one may
be less familiar than with socially relevant facial expressions
which are directed towards another person more fre-
quently – also leads to the recruitment of the MNS. This
ﬁnding could be understood in terms of a prediction
error signal (Pelphrey et al. 2003; Schippers & Keysers
2011) and could be relevant to the associative learning pro-
cesses recently discussed as an alternative account of the
development and modulation of activity in the MNS
(Heyes 2010).
In fact, according to the “associative hypothesis” (Heyes
2010), mirror neurons are forged through sensorimotor
experience of observing and executing actions, and the
MNS, even in adulthood, can be reconﬁgured through sen-
sorimotor learning. Evidence for this comes from a series of
elegant studies which demonstrate that sensorimotor
experience can enhance (Press et al. 2007), abolish
(Heyes et al. 2005), and even reverse (Catmur et al.
2007; 2008) “mirror” activation in human participants.
Consistent with this ﬁnding, a recent simulation study
demonstrated that a reinforcement learning based model
could account for the development of mirror neurons in
gaze following (Triesch et al. 2007). With respect to the
possible sources of sensorimotor experience that may
impact on the MNS, Heyes (2010) has recently emphasized
that much of this experience is obtained through inter-
action with others. We strongly support this position and
argue that the investigation of action observation and
execution in a more ecologically valid, interpersonal
context – as suggested by a second-person neuroscience –
will help to investigate these matters further (cf. Kourtis
et al. 2010). More speciﬁcally, we see a role for the MNS
beyond mere motor resonance: Rather than suggesting
that mirror neuron activity constitutes a simulation
routine which gives us a “ﬁrst-person grasp” of the other
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010), we contend that an under-
standing of the MNS on the enactive view of cognition
would suggest that activity in these brain regions might
be more closely related to the ability to perceive social
affordances. Such affordances can thereby be understood
as the possibilities for interaction provided by others, in
terms of an activation of motor programs that would
allow for interpersonal coordination of behavior (cf. Gang-
opadhyay & Schilbach, 2012). This view is consistent with
the idea of social interactions having a profound impact
on MNS activity and offers a more plausible account for
actions that people perform jointly, as these often involve
complementary or incongruent actions rather than imita-
tive or congruent ones (cf. Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009; Gal-
lagher 2007). Indeed, a study by Newman-Norlund et al.
(2007) found evidence that the MNS is more active
during the preparation of complementary actions, while
other studies demonstrate that activity in the human
MNS can be modulated by social interaction (Kourtis
et al. 2010; Oberman et al. 2007). This is clearly in line
with our suggestion that an essential aspect of apprehend-
ing other minds lies in the kinds of responses their activity
elicits (see Fig. 1).
In a follow-up experiment to our fMRI study, the para-
digm was used while recording eye-movements, pupil
size, and facial electromyography (EMG). The results
show that attention allocation, as assessed by ﬁxation dur-
ation, was speciﬁcally related to the perception of self-
directed stimuli. EMG measurements demonstrated that
facial activity was inﬂuenced by the perception of socially
relevant facial expressions, demonstrating spontaneous,
involuntary facial responses that have been described as
“facial mimicry” (Mojzisch et al. 2006). Although we did
not observe a statistically signiﬁcant interaction effect
here, the difference in EMG activity between self- and
other-directed facial expressions was noteworthy (see Moj-
zisch et al. 2006; Schilbach et al. 2008a for details). Using
the temporal information from the EMG study, we re-ana-
lyzed the fMRI data to investigate the neural correlates of
facial mimicry. This analysis identiﬁed a network compris-
ing the face region of the primary motor cortex, but also
the posterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and the
dorsal midbrain. This is suggestive of a close link between
the perception of facial expressions and their generation
in the observer. Facial expressions might be particularly
prone to engaging such mechanisms as they serve impor-
tant communicative functions. Furthermore, these ﬁndings
demonstrate that situations which lead to emotional
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engagement and invite an element of a motor response,
recruit both fronto-parietal areas, as well as the cortical
midline structures, and differentially activate the limbic
system of the brain (Schilbach et al. 2008a; cf. Buck et al.
1992; see Fig. 1).
Taken together, the results of these studies demonstrate
signiﬁcant differences in the neurobiological mechanisms
of the perception of facial expressions depending upon
emotional engagement. When we are personally addressed
by others, the perception of their mimic behavior relies, in
neurobiological terms, upon tight perception-action coup-
ling with affective and body-based processing feeding into
and promoting the preparation of motor responses as a
way of picking up and responding to the possibilities for
interaction.
3.1.2. Minds made for sharing: The neurobiological
correlates of the reciprocity of social interaction. As out-
lined above, interaction loops must be considered as impor-
tant constituents of second-person relations. Thus, within
social interaction, interactors mutually and directly inﬂu-
ence each other and may hold different roles during the
interaction (as introduced in sect. 2.1; see Fig. 1, C & D).
To establish a paradigm that allows participants to be part
of a social interaction in the constrained fMRI setting, we
have developed a novel technique that makes use of eye-
tracking data obtained from participants inside the
scanner to control a virtual character’s gaze behavior in
real-time making it “responsive” to the human observer’s
gaze (Wilms et al. 2010). This setup, therefore, allows par-
ticipants to experience their own eye-movements to have
an effect on the gaze behavior of a (virtual) other, similar
to how this occurs in real-life situations. Importantly,
such a setup allows for the investigation of cognitive
phenomena which are at the interface of automatic and
controlled processes, because eye-movements are known
to be closely related to both (e.g., Hikosaka & Isoda
2010). Also, the setup allows us to investigate phenomena
whose emergence necessarily depends upon social inter-
action, its reciprocity; and whose underlying psychological
processes and neural mechanisms may differ depending
upon the roles interactors hold during interaction, namely
those of being “initiator” or “responder” in the interaction.
With respect to the phenomenon of joint attention, that
is, attending to something together with someone and
being aware that “we both” are attending, the difference
between being “initiator” or “responder” in the interaction
appears to be highly relevant: Joint attention can occur
either as a result of following someone else’s gaze toward
an object (“responder”) or as a result of directing
someone else’s gaze toward the object (“initiator”). Clini-
cally, children with autism, in fact, show less pronounced
impairments in their ability to respond to a person’s gaze
shifts (by following the gaze) than in their spontaneous
drive to initiate the sharing of attention (by trying to
make someone look at something; Mundy & Newell 2007).
Based on the hypothesis that differences in the neural
basis of joint attention could be related to the reciprocity
of social interaction (as compared to previous social neuro-
science attempts to investigate the neural correlates of joint
attention by means of tasks in which participants are mere
observers of gaze cues (e.g., Materna et al. 2008; Williams
et al. 2005; see also sect. 2.1), the setup described above
was used to perform an fMRI study, in which participants
interacted with the virtual other while undergoing neuroi-
maging (Schilbach et al. 2010b). Experimental variations
consisted of initiating versus following the gaze of the
virtual character when ﬁxating objects shown on the stimu-
lus screen (Fig. 4A). Our results demonstrate the recruit-
ment of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC) for joint attention to an object,
regardless of whether or not this was initiated by the par-
ticipant or the (virtual) other (Fig. 4B). Conversely,
looking at an object different from the one inspected by
the virtual other led to the recruitment of a lateralized
fronto-parietal network (Fig. 4C). While the latter closely
Figure 4. (A) Screenshot depicting an anthropomorphic virtual character and three objects (grey squares). (B) Neural correlates of main
effect of joint attention. (C) Neural correlates of non-joint attention. (D) Neural correlates of other-initiated joint attention. (E) Neural
correlates of self-initiated joint attention. Activation overlays based on a reanalysis of data taken from: Schilbach et al. (2010b).
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resembles the neural network which has been related to the
control of attention and eye-movements (Corbetta et al.
2008; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al. 2004), the former regions
closely match those which have been described as belong-
ing to the “mentalizing network” (MENT) (Frith & Frith
2006; Kampe et al. 2003), overlapping with others that
have become known as the “default mode of brain func-
tion” (Raichle et al. 2001; Schilbach et al. 2008b; Schilbach
et al. 2012a).
In spite of participants always ﬁxating on an object on the
stimulus screen, the underlying brain activity appears to be
markedly different depending upon whether or not the par-
ticipant is doing this “together” with a virtual other. Doing
so in coordination with the virtual character resulted in a
differential increase of neural activity in a network which
has been related to the human ability for grasping
another person’s mental states and her communicative
intentions, and for using an internally oriented mode of
cognizing to contextualize aspects of a situation (Amodio
& Frith 2006; Bar 2007; Buckner & Carroll 2007; Kampe
et al. 2003; Schilbach et al. 2008b). Here, it is important
to stress that the MENT was activated as a result of partici-
pants simply and naturally coordinating their gaze with that
of the other without any explicit instruction to assess the
mental states of the virtual other. This is consistent with
the observation of activations of dorsal MPFC when
study participants were addressed by their ﬁrst names or
by faces looking directly at them (Kampe et al. 2003).
Our ﬁndings, therefore, seem to contradict the proposal
that the MENT is responsible for reﬂective and more expli-
cit social cognition (Keysers & Gazzola 2007). In essence,
we are able to show that this network is activated as a
result of interpersonal coordination in social interaction,
which was also experienced as more pleasant and less
effortful than doing the opposite of what the virtual charac-
ter was doing (cf. Schnell et al. 2011). Follow-up studies
using modiﬁcations of our novel paradigm will investigate
putative connectivity differences between areas of the
MENT during social interaction and observation, and will
explore how a cooperative or competitive context inﬂu-
ences the neural mechanisms of a gaze-based interaction
(Fig. 1; see sects. 3.2 and 5 for further details).
Our ﬁndings, therefore, raise the intriguing possibility
that activity changes in the MENT can occur as a result
of (gaze-based) social interaction (cf. Allen & Williams
2011). To us it is tempting to think of this ﬁnding as paral-
leling the suggestions of Heyes (2010) with respect to the
MNS, giving rise to the hypothesis that similar associative
mechanisms might play a role in the case of the MENT.
In a similar line of thought, Behrens and colleagues have
demonstrated that social prediction error signals –when
learning from the behavior of or advice provided by
others – are coded by MENT components, which they
describe as evidence for the argument that higher-order
social cognitive mechanisms may rely on simple associative
processes (Behrens et al. 2009). Crucially, the elegant com-
putational approach taken by Behrens et al. to investigate
reward-based learning and decision-making uses a genera-
tive model, allowing the consideration of the learning
history to predict changes in neural activity over time. Simi-
larly, we suggest, future research in social neuroscience
should investigate the development and changes in neural
networks, that is, the neural plasticity related to and
induced by real-time social interactions, thereby helping
to understand how particular functions actually develop
in particular areas of the brain or in brains of interactors
(cf. Westermann et al. 2007; see Fig. 1 and sect. 5 for
more details).
Furthermore, our neuroimaging ﬁnding of a differential
increase of neural activity in the MENT is particularly rel-
evant, because it is observed during joint attention: Onto-
genetically, joint attention is known to be a most
important precursor of explicit social cognitive abilities
and predates these conceptual abilities by years: A recent
study was, indeed, able to show that children have an
implicit “know how” of what others experience when they
encounter them in joint engagement, long before passing
false-belief tasks (Moll et al. 2007). Based on our ﬁndings,
it can be assumed that joint attention in social interaction
already relies upon the brain regions of the MENT
before children pass tasks that require an explicit knowl-
edge of others’ mental states (cf. Grossmann & Johnson
2010). Rather than being a network that is exclusively
devoted to reﬂective social cognition, this network might,
therefore, be trained up by participation in social inter-
action in terms of basic mechanisms which allow the use
of analogies and associations to generate predictions
(Friston 2008; Mitchell 2009). During later stages in devel-
opment this network may then be brought into the service
of explicit social cognition (Frith & Frith 2008; Knops et al.
2009), which – at the level of the brain – could be reﬂected
in differences in the functional or effective connectivity
between individual brain regions, rather than functionally
segregated effects (e.g., Daunizeau et al. 2010a; 2010b;
Sporns et al. 2004). In these terms, the progression from
perceiving and being motivated to respond to relevant
social stimuli to understanding them may be a result of
the matching of top-down and bottom-up expectations.
Importantly, bi-directional relationships between different
levels of neural processing may remain relevant throughout
life (Teufel et al. 2010; see Fig. 1).
Returning to the results of the fMRI study on joint atten-
tion, it is of crucial importance that differences in the
neural correlates were also observed depending upon
joint attention being self- or other-initiated: While follow-
ing someone else’s gaze to engage in joint attention
resulted in the recruitment of the anterior portion of
MPFC (aMPFC; Fig. 4D), known to be involved in the
enhancement of stimulus-oriented attending (Burgess
et al. 2007), directing someone else’s gaze towards an
object activated the ventral striatum (VS), a part of the
functional neuroanatomy of reward processing (Fig. 4E).
In light of ratings of subjective experience also obtained
from participants during a post-scan questionnaire –
which indicated that they enjoyed looking at objects more
“together with” the virtual other – the latter ﬁnding,
indeed, appeared to be related to the hedonic aspects of
experiencing self-initiated joint attention (Schilbach et al.
2010b). This seems to be in line with the idea that social
interaction may involve collaborative and afﬁliative
motives, the realization of which is experienced as reward-
ing, possibly relying upon an “intrinsic” motivation of
humans for sharing of experiences (Tomasello 2009; Tre-
varthen 1980). Furthermore, these ﬁndings demonstrate
how basic motivation- or reward-related signals may play
a key role in the establishment and maintenance of social
relations (e.g., Panksepp et al. 1980), which appears to be
a crucial area for future research in social neuroscience
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(see sect.5.2 for further details). Most importantly, our
results provide clear evidence that the neural circuitry
used during social interaction differs from the circuitry
recruited during “individual” social cognition, when one’s
behavior does not have effects on the “object” of one’s cog-
nition (cf. Materna et al. 2008; Schilbach et al. 2010b; Wil-
liams et al. 2005).
3.2. Methods for a second-person neuroscience
Advancing research in social neuroscience as suggested by a
second-person approach requires both – upon a reﬁnement
of conceptual issues – the derivation of concrete hypoth-
eses, as well as the development of adequate methods to
address these questions. It is to the discussion of the
latter that we turn in the following section. Concrete
ideas for experiments based upon our conception of the
constituents of a second-person approach as outlined in
section 2 are discussed in detail in section 4.
3.2.1. Top-down and bottom-up investigations of social
interaction. In the joint attention paradigm, participants
interact with anthropomorphic virtual characters, who
they believe are controlled by other human participants
(Wilms et al. 2010). In this paradigm, we are in a position
to investigate the behavioral and neural correlates of inter-
action contingencies and responses that are characteristic
of various forms of social encounters (see Figs. 1 & 2).
Future studies will make use of this setup to explore the
interaction of explicit and implicit processes in social cogni-
tion and how this may depend upon being able to “get into
the action.” Here, one could speciﬁcally ask whether the
difference between social cognition from an interactor’s
as compared to an observer’s point of view merely adds
an action component or whether this actually changes
other psychological processes. In terms of the underlying
neural substrates such differences might be characterizable
in terms of overlapping versus distinct neurocircuits or
could be related to differences in connectivity between
“social brain” regions (Fig. 1). Also, the question could be
addressed whether ostensive cues exchanged between
interactors (e.g., mutual gaze; Csibra & Gergely 2009) are
equally effective from an observer’s point of view as com-
pared to situations when one is personally addressed.
Furthermore, paradigms are being developed in our lab-
oratory which will help to understand differences between
social cognition from an interactor’s as compared to an
observer’s point of view with respect to reward-based inter-
actions (cf. Pessoa & Engelmann 2010). Based on the
assumption that social interaction per se may be experi-
enced as motivating and rewarding, it appears plausible
to devise paradigms that implement a social context, in
which task performance may be modulated depending
upon whether or not the motivation to interact socially is
parallelized with or contrasted with performing the task
(see sect. 5.1.1 for further details). Another extension of
the above described joint attention paradigm could
consist in using virtual characters whose facial expressions
and whole-body movements could also be manipulated.
This setup would allow the investigation of how partici-
pant-directed gaze behavior of the virtual character would
inﬂuence the perception of, for example, reaching or grasp-
ing movements in peri- and extrapersonal space (cf. Cag-
giano et al. 2009). Here, an interesting possibility would
be to parametrically vary the degree to which a virtual char-
acter is responsive to a human observer’s gaze in real time
to investigate how this may lead to differential recruitment
of the MNS and MENT of the brain (Brass et al. 2007; de
Lange et al. 2008; Santos et al. 2010; Wheatley et al. 2007).
Also, the presentation of real-world objects that can be
attended to both by the virtual character and the partici-
pant could be helpful to manipulate neural activity in
those large-scale neural networks.
Another fundamental question for a second-person
neuroscience – closely related to the “problem” of other
minds – consists in asking which factors actually determine
that we perceive an interaction as an exchange, with a
mindful rather than a machine-driven agent. To this end,
a “nonverbal Turing test” can be devised, in which partici-
pants engage in gaze-based interaction with an anthropo-
morphic virtual character, whose gaze behavior is either
controlled by another participant or by a computer
(Fig. 2; Pfeiffer et al. 2011). These investigations are
likely to be informative with respect to the impact of
valence (whether or not an interaction subjectively feels
positive or rewarding) as compared to contingency (the
degree to which the virtual character objectively follows
or does not follow one’s gaze). Furthermore, one can
address the question of the congruency of the behavior
shown by the virtual character during the interaction –
that is, whether following or not following the participant’s
gaze has an impact on ratings of sympathy and trustworthi-
ness, as well as subsequently evoked prosocial behavior
shown towards the person one has interacted with.
3.2.2. From interaction loops to interaction dynamics. In
the early years of social neuroscience, attempts had already
been made to investigate two brains in interaction through
“hyperscanning,” which was hailed as a break-through tech-
nology (Montague et al. 2002). Although the application of
this method has, indeed, provided invaluable insights into
the neural basis of social cognition in conditions of health
and pathology (e.g., King-Casas et al. 2005; 2008), the
approach never really caught on. At least in part this is
due to the fact that using it to its full potential would
have required establishing more ecologically valid ways
for two or more participants to interact (cf. Redcay et al.
2010). Most hyperscanning studies, however, have relied
upon experimental paradigms from game theory, which
allow for a highly structured, tit-for-tat kind of interaction.
The latter can be elegantly formalized mathematically, but
can also be criticized for not recreating the interaction
dynamics of everyday-life social encounters (Engemann
et al. 2012). Also, paradigms from game theory are
deeply entrenched in a cognitivist view of the subject as a
(rather) rational and (rather) passive recipient of infor-
mation, which may not fully capture many aspects of natur-
alistic social interaction, including the ways in which
interactors co-regulate their behavior (cf. Bacharach
2006; Hertwig & Erev 2009; Schonberg et al. 2011).
However, ﬁrst steps are now being taken to investigate
the neural mechanisms of interaction dynamics (Fig. 2:
cubes [4] & [5]). Similar to our approach of using gaze be-
havior to allow for direct social interaction (Schilbach et al.
2010b; Wilms et al. 2010), the recent work of Saito et al.
(2010) capitalizes on the idea that inter-subject synchroni-
zation at the neural level might occur during eye contact.
Using a similarly minimalist and yet naturalistic setup
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allows the experimental control of bandwidth, that is, the
degree of complexity of the interaction, which may be
helpful in focusing on its temporal dynamics (cf. Auvray
et al. 2009). For their ground-breaking study Saito et al.
have devised a setup in which they not only use hyperscan-
ning, but also allow participants to interact in real-time by
exchanging gaze behavior. To this end two MRI scanners
were equipped with infrared eyetracking systems and
video cameras. Thereby a live video image of the respective
interaction partner’s face could be broadcast into the
respective other scanner to generate a mediated face-to-
face situation (Fig. 5).
In a simple task, participants were instructed to either
look at (or away from) targets (blue or red balls) when a
change in color indicated to do so or to follow (or not
follow) the interactor’s gaze toward a target. Using this
setup for neuroimaging purposes, it was shown that
“paired” subjects showed higher correlations than “non-
paired” subjects in an area of the MNS, as assessed by
performing an inter-brain correlation analysis of the
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal time courses
as a measure of functional connectivity. Future investi-
gations could use measures of effective connectivity to sys-
tematically explore both models of eye-movement control
as well as measures of inter-brain synchronization (e.g.,
Anders et al. 2011; Schippers et al. 2010). While we
appreciate that the exploratory study by Saito et al. had to
rely on a highly structured task, we see a signiﬁcant
number of possibilities for modifying and extending the
paradigm and ingenious setup used by the authors.
Indeed, it is only very recently that researchers in social
neuroscience have moved on to investigate (relatively)
unconstrained real-time social interaction while measuring
neural activity in both interactors (Fig. 1, C & D; Fig. 2:
cube [5]). Dumas et al. (2010) set out to investigate the
inter-brain correlates of mutual adaptation processes in
social interaction by recording with a dual-video and
dual-EEG setup while interactors were asked to spon-
taneously imitate each other’s hand movements. Results
demonstrated that states of “interactional synchrony,” that
is, states during which the hands of the two participants
started and ended a movement simultaneously, correlate
with a synchronized inter-brain network in the alpha-mu
band in centro-parietal cortex. Interestingly, the alpha-mu
band has been considered as an electrophysiological corre-
late of MNS functioning, and speciﬁc frequencies of this
band have been discussed as a marker of social coordination
(Tognoli et al. 2007).
Against this background, we posit that a crucial achieve-
ment of future research in social neuroscience will consist
in the investigation of the neural correlates of mutual adap-
tation and the reciprocity of human-human social inter-
action at the intra- as well as the inter-brain level (see
Figs. 1 & 2). Beyond the speciﬁc methodological challenges
regarding synchronized collection and integrated data
analysis, a most fundamental challenge involved in this
endeavor concerns the implementation of ecologically
valid and at the same time highly controllable experimental
settings, suitable both for behavioral and neural investi-
gations (cf. Wilms et al. 2010; Zaki & Ochsner 2009). The
state of the art in neuroimaging provides severe limitations
to studying free-running interactions using the full range of
verbal and nonverbal channels. Most likely successful
studies will need to identify and isolate salient communica-
tive subsystems. As referenced throughout this article,
human gaze is certainly a most interesting candidate for
this type of approach as it is a highly social cue, it can be
unobtrusively measured and processed in real-time using
modern eyetracking technology, and it can be easily exper-
imentally controlled and dynamically displayed via artiﬁcial
characters. Advantages of using virtual representations of
human interlocutors in computer animations instead of
real-life-interactions or video have long been discussed
(see Bente 1989; Blascovich et al. 2002). Early studies
using computer-animated characters in observational
studies concerned with nonverbal behavior conﬁrmed
their external validity, for example, when comparing
impressions of animated characters with video recordings
of real people (Bente et al. 2001), and also demonstrated
the enormous degrees of freedom in experimental
control: for example, when overlaying the same nonverbal
behavior on actors of different gender (Bente et al. 1996)
or neutralizing cultural stereotypes by using standardized
animation “dummies” (Bente et al. 2010). However, it is
only recently that the advent of sophisticated capture
devices for gaze, facial expressions, and body movement,
as well as real time animation tools, allow for full character
control in the framework of truly interactive research para-
digms (Bailenson et al. 2003; Bente et al. 2008b). Using
these technologies in such an interactive paradigm, Bente
et al. (2007a; 2008a) used motion capture devices, data
gloves, and eyetracking devices to capture the nonverbal
behavior of two interlocutors and transmit this information
in real time to the partner’s screen where it was executed by
an animated character. The whole setting thus established a
“virtual video conference” (see Fig. 6).
Although movement was left unmodiﬁed, gaze was con-
trolled by a computer program that systematically varied
the duration of direct gaze. This kind of “blended inter-
action” allows for most realistic and lively displays of inter-
action while exerting strict experimental control over the
speciﬁc cues under investigation. Furthermore, the compu-
ter program can be used to show speciﬁc responses con-
ditional on the partner’s behavior (e.g., to follow the
partner’s gaze or not, as in Schilbach et al. [2010b], to
nod after sentence completion, and to show averted or
directed gaze after speciﬁc key words or nonverbal
signals). Beyond these unprecedented possibilities, ani-
mated characters are open for experimental manipulation
and they also help to solve problems that arise from the
application of complex technologies: Showing the inter-
action partner lying in a scanner or wearing an EEG cap,
carrying reﬂectors for movement or face tracking, might
decrease ecological validity more than meeting an avatar
Figure 5. Illustration of the combined hyperscanning and dual
eyetracking setup used by Saito and colleagues (Taken from:
Saito et al. 2010).
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in a virtual environment. Measurement devices, however,
do not only obscure our view of the interlocutor and
provide an awkward image of the other; they also restrict
the behavioral repertoire of the actors; for example, the
locomotion radius when using a remote eye tracker or
the mobility of extremities and head in the fMRI scanner,
where actions are often limited to simple key presses. By
providing options for an elaborate action repertoire
within the constraints of neuroimaging settings, virtual
reality or augmented reality setups are, therefore, likely
to advance the investigation of the neural underpinnings
of joint actions (Knoblich & Sebanz 2008; Kokal et al.
2009; Newman-Norlund et al. 2007; 2008). On the other
hand, the use of (more) mobile data-collection devices,
such as low-density EEG setups or methods such as func-
tional near infra-red spectroscopy (fNIRS), could also
help to overcome some of the bandwidth problems and
create more ecologically valid situations, in which partici-
pants can use the full range of communicative behavior
(e.g., Suda et al. 2010; 2011). Further, using mobile data
collection and analysis devices could help to provide real-
time visualizations of brain states and investigate how
such interactionally presented neuromarkers might con-
tribute to and impact on ongoing social interactions.
Finally, another important matter is to investigate which
insights can be gleaned from quantifying inter-brain
effects of social interactions and to assess whether two
interacting brains provide more information about the
interaction than the sum of the individual brains (cf.
Hasson et al. 2012; Konvalinka & Roepstorff 2012).
Taken together, our review highlights the importance
and potential of exploring the neurobiology of social cogni-
tion from an interactor’s point of view and stresses that the
use of more ecologically valid, truly interactive setups will
help to address the neural bases of interpersonal coordi-
nation and responsiveness in interaction, which may
underlie our seemingly effortless ability to apprehend
other minds.
4. Key topics and objectives for future research
The characterization of differences in social cognition from
an interactor’s point of view as compared to from an
observer’s point of view, the differential recruitment of
underlying processes and neural mechanisms, and the
investigation of interacting individuals appear as key
targets of a second-person neuroscience (Figs. 1 & 2). In
section 3.2 we have focused on the methods necessary
for this. The current section highlights how a second-
person neuroscience may spark important new questions
and can help to shed new light on well-known issues.
Here, developing approaches for data collection and analy-
sis from two interacting persons (and possibly two brains) is
relevant, as is revisiting and modifying established exper-
imental paradigms to incorporate an emotionally
engaged, interactive perspective (see sect. 2). This means
that, in our view, a second-person account does not
replace ﬁrst- and third-person accounts, but bookends
them to a large degree. Consequently, the resulting
research questions are concerned with the degree to
which the accounts differ, and how they interact with
each other (see sect. 4.1). Furthermore, how is it that
largely automatic, implicit forms of interaction develop
into explicit social cognitive capacities and how does explicit
mind knowledge contribute to ongoing interactions (see
sects. 4.2.1 & 4.2.2)? Also, if one considers interaction as
developmentally prior to mentalizing or mirroring, then
the question remains: What drives interaction? Here, we
focus on the importance of reward signals and motivational
processes relevant for participation in social interaction (see
sect. 4.2.3). Finally, we address how insights from a second-
person account could be put to use in future research using
computational neuroscience techniques and in the emer-
ging ﬁeld of social neuroendocrinology (see sect. 4.3).
Overall, the section 4, therefore, serves to consider poten-
tial new avenues that research might take by embracing a
second-person approach.
4.1. Addressing differences between social interaction
and observation
The comparison of processes involved during social cogni-
tion from an interactor’s versus from an observer’s point of
view is a central target of a second-person neuroscience.
Basically we see three options to address this within the
context of measuring a single brain: (1) studies contrasting
Figure 6. Basic version of an avatar-based interaction platform (screen shot during calibration; virtual characters shown on screen are
mirroring the interlocutors own behavior).
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the information one can obtain when being in interaction
with versus observing someone (learning studies); (2)
studies contrasting the effects of being in interaction with
versus observing someone on subsequent judgments and
behavior (priming studies); and (3) studies that establish
whether we are susceptible to different contextual inﬂu-
ences when we are interacting versus observing.
One way to address the ﬁrst and perhaps the second type
of studies is to look at whether being in an engaged inter-
action provides the same information as observation, and
if not, how this differs. For instance, one could imagine
people interacting with a virtual character whereby they
have to make judgments on the character or adapt their be-
havior to her. The question would then be whether differ-
ences in participants’ learning rates and behavior exist
depending upon interacting with the virtual character
themselves as compared to seeing someone else interact
with the virtual character, and what the neural bases of
such differences could be. Here, an important hypothesis
to pursue is that neural plasticity differences could exist
in task-speciﬁc neural networks, based on one’s own invol-
vement in interaction as compared to situations when we
merely observe others (cf. Cooper et al. 2012). Also, it is
conceivable that different routes may lead to the activation
of a neural network: For example, in the case of high-func-
tioning autism, patients have failed to show activation
differences as compared to healthy controls (Gilbert et al.
2009), which might be related to their ability to activate
“social brain” areas when asked to make a conscious
effort to do so. Nonetheless, important differences could
exist in situations of naturalistic, fast-paced social encoun-
ters and can only be assessed by providing such situations
as a test bed. Another important future extension of inter-
active paradigms will consist in making it possible for two
participants to engage in a task and to interact in an exper-
imentally controllable way in a mediated environment.
Such a paradigm would enable one to control and change
the bandwidth of the interaction and could help to system-
atically perturb an ongoing interaction, for example, by
replaying responses of the other interactor from a previous
interaction, and to investigate participants’ ability to tell
apart “whether the other can see me (or not).” One way,
we suggest, this could be done would be to make use of a
dual eyetracking setup, in which two interactors can be vir-
tually present and perform a task together (e.g., Carletta
et al. 2010; Jermann et al. 2010). Furthermore, such dual
eyetracking paradigms might help to assess intra- and inter-
subject parameters during real-time interactions, which
could be used to analyse neuroimaging data obtained
from one or two brains.
Concerning the second type of studies, we suggest that
using the established possibility of exploring joint attention
in the scanner may help to understand the neural underpin-
nings of other (possibly more explicit) social cognitive tasks:
For instance, it has been suggested that being actively
engaged in triadic interaction may have an impact both
on the perception of the other person (e.g., her trustworthi-
ness and attractiveness), as well as on the perception of an
object (e.g., its value) that may be jointly attended (Heider
1958). To the best of our knowledge, there are no neuroi-
maging studies that have targeted the neural correlates of
the perception of jointly attended objects. Such studies
might be extremely informative, however, with respect to
identifying the neural correlates of different formats or
varying degrees of shared intentionality and could also
shed light on the complex relationship between implicit
and explicit processes involved in social cognition (Frith
& Frith 2008; see also the next subsection). Other appli-
cations of the method could include investigations of how
interactive gaze cues shown by a virtual character impact
upon object-related decision-making or memory perform-
ance. Furthermore, the gaze-based interaction setup
could enable us to investigate how being involved in an
interaction, during which an agent has a high probability
of reacting congruently to my gaze behavior by following
my gaze, impacts on subsequently presented social cogni-
tive tasks: One particularly intriguing case would be to
explore how interaction-based experiences modulate per-
formance during a subsequently presented task, in which
the mental states of the agent one has interacted with
(e.g., her desires or beliefs), have to be be assessed or expli-
citly reported. Also, exploring the impact of minimal forms
of social interaction on self- and other-related person judg-
ments and the tendency to show prosocial behavior would
be particularly relevant and interesting. Apart from asking
which processes and tendencies might be primed or
enhanced by social interaction, it is also important to inves-
tigate which cognitive capacities might be perturbed or
which processes are interfered with during social inter-
action. Here, an interesting avenue to pursue is how
being a participant of a social interaction might lead to
differential effects on mnestic processes, such that associat-
ive components might be favored as compared to declara-
tive memory.
In order to address the third type of studies, i.e. those
dealing with contextual inﬂuences, one may ask how the
situational constraints of a social situation may interact
with more abstract rules that one can acquire as illustrated
by high-functioning autism (HFA). When performing
social cognition from an observer’s standpoint, one might
be more inclined to take into consideration cues that
inform us about the psychological traits or dispositions of
other persons, which may be less closely related to the
person’s current psychological state and to what the
person is actually doing in the precise moment of obser-
vation (cf. Jones & Nisbett 1971). On the other hand, the
integration requirements of direct social interaction may
be such that –while trying to form an impression of the
other –we simultaneously have to adjust and respond to
the other person’s actions; which means responding
to the concretely given and pragmatically relevant aspects
of the current situation. While social cognition from an
observer’s point of view is, therefore, likely to rely more
upon situation-independent formats of information (e.g.,
stereotypes), social cognition from an agent’s point of
view might rely more on making use of situational infor-
mation in order to make sense of the other’s behavior.
4.2. Social interaction and the relationship of implicit
and explicit processes in social cognition
4.2.1. From implicit interaction to explicit mentalizing? In
establishing the relationship between social cognition from
an interactor’s as compared to an observer’s point of view,
the question of implicit and explicit processes in social
cognition gains further importance. Till now it is largely
unclear what the neural signatures of implicit as compared
to explicit social cognition are (Frith & Frith 2008). There
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is a theoretical as well as an empirical side to this issue, both
of which can potentially be elucidated within a second-
person account. In theoretical terms, it is not always clear
what is meant by “implicit social cognition” and how this
is actually related to awareness, on the one hand, and auto-
maticity versus control, on the other. It is never spelled out
whether “implicit social cognition” is just what we reason
consciously about, minus awareness, or, if this is not the
case, how exactly the former relates to the latter. For
instance, social interaction may be conceptualized as a
prime example of implicit learning, as is language, the
development of both being closely intertwined (see sects.
2.2 and 2.3). As with implicit language learning, an impor-
tant question is how we develop an explicit and symbolic, or
rule-based grasp of language and social interaction based
on implicit, predominantly associative learning of statistical
regularities. If indeed such explicit knowledge is the result
of exposure to increasingly complex social contexts, it
remains unexplained how, and what the neural bases of
such changes could be. For instance, how do behavioral
precursors to TToM develop into a capacity to pass
classic TToM tasks?
Ontogenetically, becoming an “expert” in social cogni-
tion may be, we suggest, primarily a question of social inter-
action, whereas later competencies of more detached,
reﬂective social cognition might be a result of reactivating
the networks forged during social interactions and re-
describing these interaction-based capacities (cf. Cleere-
mans 2008; Cleeremans et al. 2007; Karmiloff-Smith
1992; Timmermans et al. 2012). In this respect, our propo-
sal links up with theories about the functional structure of
the brain, which take the “re-use” of neural circuitry for
various cognitive purposes to be a central organizational
principle (e.g., Anderson 2010). According to these the-
ories, it is common for neural circuits to be established
for one purpose and then to be put to different uses. Cru-
cially, rather than seeing such a re-description as an intern-
ally generated, qualitatively different representation of
discrete knowledge about the world, our second-person
approach frames such a re-description as an ongoing learn-
ing process driven by increasingly complex interactive con-
texts, for example, when moving from dyadic to triadic
interaction, which creates the possibility and need to
somehow communicate with respect to an external, third
object or person (see also Carpendale & Lewis 2004). Fur-
thermore, the involvement of reward signals closely related
to ongoing social interaction might also be relevant in this
respect (Pasley et al. 2004). In the light of section 2.3,
language in this context might not only be shaped by
social interaction, but the other way around as well, with
the gradual development of language providing a scaffold-
ing that allows implicit social know-how to develop in expli-
cit social knowledge. Indeed, as Hutto (2008) suggests, the
development from early nonverbal responding to others’
mental states –which, according to Hutto, is essentially
non-contentful – into explicit, contentful thinking about
others’ mental states is probably linguistically mediated.
Future research in social neuroscience will have to ﬁnd
ways to systematically investigate how activity both in the
parieto-frontal cortex and the so-called mentalizing
network may be shaped and modulated by the degree to
which human observers perceive themselves as participants
of social encounters, and by actual exposure to social inter-
actions; and to understand how this relates to recruiting
these networks during observation (Schilbach 2010, cf.
Wang et al. 2011).
Apart from investigations of real-time dyadic and triadic
interaction in healthy persons, we also see great potential
for investigating real-time social interaction during devel-
opment and in diagnostic groups. In spite of the impor-
tance of joint attention in ontogeny and a growing
number of neuroimaging studies in this respect, the
neural correlates of this signiﬁcant phenomenon and how
it unfolds in real-time are incompletely understood.
Given that our paradigm does not rely upon verbal infor-
mation and higher-order reasoning about others’ mental
states, but relies upon naturally occurring social behavior,
it might prove to be particularly useful in this respect and
could help to address how human infants come to enjoy
the sharing of experiences. Furthermore, a characterization
of the neural signature of mutual and joint attention in
infancy could be related to the development and neural
bases of other social cognitive abilities that develop later
in life, to investigate commonalities and differences in a
longitudinal setup. Such an approach could help to directly
test whether interaction-based network modulations are
later co-opted and reused for higher-order, explicit
processes.
A litmus test for the second-person approach in onto-
geny would be to investigate infants’ responses to acts of
mentality (e.g., intentional actions, attention, emotional
facial expressions), depending upon the infant’s ability to
respond to them when they receive them. Contrary to a
simulationist reading, which would predict that infants
need to be able to do the actions themselves, and to
“mind-reading” accounts, which hold that the infant
needs to be able to observe and conceptualize patterns in
order to be able to grasp actions meaningfully, the
second-person approach suggests that acts of mentality
should be meaningful to infants depending on the infant’s
ability to respond to them when they receive them, regard-
less of whether the infants can do the actions themselves.
Thus, a second-person neuroscience is concerned with
the question of how direct social interaction with others –
and the implicit processes inherent to this –may inform
and modulate more detached, explicit perspectives on
them. Evidence from developmental psychology has been
taken to suggest that reﬂective (or “meta-cognitive”) com-
petence emerges through the infant’s social interactions
with others by relating one’s own states with those of
others (e.g., Rochat & Striano 2002). However, a more
radical approach holds that it may be only via social inter-
action and in virtue of the fact that we are constantly
trying to model other minds in interaction that we learn
to be conscious and develop both an understanding of
ourselves and a conscious percept of the world at all
(Cleeremans 2011; Timmermans et al. 2012). A study by
Bahrami et al. (2010) further indicates that such inter-
action-based improvements of introspective abilities con-
tinue to be effective during adulthood.
4.2.2. From mentalizing and mirroring to automatic
interaction? A question equally important to an ontogen-
etic account is how we manage to engage in interaction
on a daily basis, without referring to explicit knowledge.
Instead, we interact and “go with the ﬂow,” all the while
retaining the capacity to reﬂect upon our interlocutor and
ourselves afterward. It is exactly here that neurobiological
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evidence of TToM-related activations has given rise to the
idea of “implicit TToM” or “implicit social cognition.” But if
this “implicit TToM” is essentially something different
than, say, what we consciously deploy in False Belief
tasks, then what does it represent? It is here that the
most immediate empirical questions may be raised: Are
the implicit and explicit processes that occur in interaction
actually the same processes as those that occur during
observation? We suggest that this may not be so, in that
interaction-based processes involve at least two aspects.
First, they involve an automatic inference component
based on previously acquired knowledge, which is also
present during observation, and which is largely impervious
to explicit modiﬁcation. Second, they also require an
action-control component, which can be fast (<350msec)
and based on the previously acquired knowledge, or slightly
slower (>350msec) and potentially available to control
(Khan et al. 2003; Pisella et al. 2000; Rossetti et al. 2003;
Sartori et al. 2009). As such, whereas during interaction
implicitly activated knowledge seems to be immune to
explicit interference (Ambady et al. 2000; Choi et al.
2005), automatic processes are – due to their action com-
ponent – susceptible to explicit modiﬁcation, or interfer-
ence (you drive a car or play a musical instrument
without thinking about particular movements contributing
to it, but you can to some degree bring them under con-
scious control –which under normal circumstances will
hamper ﬂuent performance). However, such awareness of
action is related not only to action preparation (motor
signal), but is additionally prone to strong reconstructive
effects of the sensory consequences of one’s actions
(Haggard 2009; Haggard & Tsakiris 2009; Pacherie 2008;
Sarrazin et al. 2008; Sato & Yasuda 2005). In an observa-
tional context such factors simply do not come into play,
whereas in an interactive context, this means that the reac-
tions of the other co-determine the degree to which one
becomes conscious of one’s actions, to which anyone who
ever committed a serious gaffe in public will readily testify.
An illustration of how the reasoning described above
might lead to novel approaches lies in psychiatric disorders:
For instance, autistic persons have been described as
having problems with implicit or intuitive social cognition.
However, in terms of elementary processes, several
studies have been unable to ﬁnd problems with implicit
learning (Brown et al. 2010), action representation
(Sebanz et al. 2005), or even mirroring (Southgate &
Hamilton 2008). Thus, one empirically veriﬁable possibility
would be that, at least in HFA, both low-level and high-
level processes are relatively intact, but that the application
of this implicit know-how versus explicit knowledge is dis-
turbed, in that persons with HFA apply explicit, high-
level TToM in situations where healthy controls “trust a
gut feeling.” This then could lead to the hypothesis that
HFA persons lack the know-how or knowledge that
would subtend such a gut feeling (their explicit knowledge
not being rooted in interactive know-how), or, alternatively,
that they fail to recognize and trust such a gut feeling and
instead, in any task allowing explicit reasoning, will opt
for such explicit rules instead (failure of automatic appli-
cation of knowledge, whether know-how or explicit knowl-
edge). Crucially, the notion of how these potentially
different capacities, implicit learning and automatic behav-
ior contribute to autism – and healthy controls – remains
elusive in passive spectatorial settings.
4.2.3. Motivation and the spark to interaction: Putting
reward signals into social cognition. Another important
feat will be to address how motivation- and reward-
related signals could be differentially engaged during par-
ticipation in social situations as compared to observation
of others’ interaction and might interact with brain
regions relevant for action control (cf. Oullier & Basso
2010; Pessoa & Engelmann 2010; Schonberg et al. 2011;
Fig. 1). This directly follows from our conception of
“active” social perception strongly relying upon affective
and reward-based contingencies that result from being per-
sonally addressed and from prompt responses which feed
into ongoing social interaction. Being in the presence of
someone, human beings cannot help but interact with
each other (e.g., Zwickel & Vo 2010), which may be due
to an evolutionary heritage of depending upon others for
survival; possibly having rendered social interaction “intrin-
sically” rewarding (Coan 2008; Tomasello 2009). Conse-
quently, being a participant (as compared to being an
observer) of social interaction, we speculate, might also
lead to an expectation of reciprocation that is more in
line with cooperative than competitive behavior and
motives (Pfeiffer et al. 2011). Furthermore, human
beings appear to be extremely sensitive to having an
impact on conspeciﬁcs and seem to enjoy exerting such
inﬂuence from early on in life (Fiske & Dépret 1996;
Gergely &Watson 1996; Schilbach et al. 2010b). Relatedly,
human beings not only enjoy being imitated by others (as
long as this is done covertly), but this also increases feelings
of afﬁliation and rapport (Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Con-
sistently, experiences or even hints of social exclusion
(even third-party exclusion) increases afﬁliative imitation
(Over & Carpenter 2009). One of the factors that makes
exerting an inﬂuence on other persons so rewarding,
might be their agentive nature: First, it vastly increases
the action possibilities of the other, and hence, the uncer-
tainty of what the effect of my action will be (compared
to when I interact with, say, a vending-machine); second,
it might be that simply knowing that the other is an inde-
pendent agent having other options than reacting to you,
makes a contingent response very rewarding.
To investigate interactions of motivation- and reward-
related signals with activity in action control and social cog-
nition networks during participating in social interaction,
we have devised a non-verbal Turing test, which is based
on the interactive eyetracking paradigm used to investigate
joint attention described in sect. 3.1.2. In this setup partici-
pants engage in gaze-based interaction with an anthropo-
morphic virtual character, whose gaze behavior is said to
be controlled by another participant or by a computer,
while, in fact, it is always controlled by a computer algor-
ithm. Using this setup, the character’s gaze reactions
were systematically varied along a continuum from a
maximal probability of gaze aversion to a maximal prob-
ability of gaze-following during brief interactions, thereby
varying congruency and contingency of the reactions. We
investigated how these variations inﬂuenced whether par-
ticipants believed the character to be controlled by a
person or a computer. In a series of experiments, the con-
federate was either introduced as “naïve” to the task, “coop-
erative” or “competitive.” Results demonstrate that the
ascription of agency increases with higher congruency of
gaze reactions when participants are interacting with a
“naïve” partner. In contrast, agency ascription was driven
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by the degree of contingency (i.e., the probability of the
virtual other reacting) irrespective of congruency
(whether or not the behavior shown in response was the
same or different than the participant’s) reactions when
the confederate was introduced as “cooperative.” Conver-
sely, during interaction with a “competitive” confederate,
judgments were neither based on congruency, nor on con-
tingency (Pfeiffer et al. 2011). These results offer important
insights into what renders the experience of an interaction
truly social: Humans appear to have a default expectation of
reciprocation as evidenced by the naïve condition, which
can be inﬂuenced drastically by the presumed disposition
of an interactor to cooperate or compete. This ﬁnding,
we assume, could be related to our neuroimaging results,
which were accrued by making use of the same kind of
paradigm, and highlight the involvement of reward-
related neurocircuitry during congruent interactions (Schil-
bach et al. 2010b). The use of the Turing test paradigm for
neuroimaging purposes is likely to advance our understand-
ing of the neural bases of social interaction: For example, it
can be hypothesize dthat gaze-based interactions with a
naïve confederate might lead to an increase in neural
activity in areas of the so-called mentalizing network,
whereas conditions with highly congruent reactions might
lead to an increase in reward-related brain areas. Although
competitive interactions might also lead to an increase of
neural activity in mentalizing areas, it will be interesting
to investigate whether a competitive context could lead to
a decrease of activity in reward-related neurocircuitry.
Moreover, the question can be targeted whether the pres-
ence of a shared goal (as in the cooperative context), leads
to a decrease of activity in the mentalizing system, while
concomitantly an increase of activity might be observed
in regions that have been implicated in coordinated behav-
ior. Furthermore, it will be interesting to investigate
whether changes in activity of the brain’s reward system
in response to positively contingent gaze-reactions could
generalize to contingent reactions irrespective of their
valence depending on the situational context. Finally, neu-
roimaging studies, which make use of this paradigm, may
help to investigate putative connectivity differences
between relevant brain areas during social interaction
(Fig. 1). This could help us to understand the neural
bases of opposing effects between imitative behavior and
understanding of others’ minds (Stel et al. 2009).
Recent evidence suggests that different reward types
recruit the reward system of the brain, which has given
rise to the suggestion of a ‘“common neural currency’”
for rewards (Izuma et al. 2008). The neural mechanisms
of differences in the susceptibility for different types of
reward, however, remain unclear. Also, it is not well
known how different reward types may compete and can
act as a surrogate for one another (e.g., using food
rewards when other rewards are unavailable) or how
social inﬂuences may serve as a control mechanism to
reward dependency. In order to probe the reward system
of the brain while at the same time allowing for the use
of different reward stimuli, the interactive eyetracking
paradigm could be adapted to serve as a reward-based
saccade paradigm. In such a paradigm, participants would
be asked to generate and be rewarded for successfully com-
pleting saccades to visual targets. Rewards could be varied
to include monetary, food, and social rewards (congruent
gaze reactions of an anthropomorphic virtual character
also shown on the stimulus screen). On the behavioral
level, higher reward probability for a given target is
expected to lead to a decrease in saccade latencies (e.g.,
Milstein & Dorris 2007), the magnitude of which may
depend upon the speciﬁc reward type. On the neural
level, the correlates of this reward-related bias and possible
reward type-speciﬁc differences in controls and patient
groups characterized by social impairments (such as
patients with autism and schizophrenia) are not well
known. Research in nonhuman primates suggests that mid-
brain dopamine neurons involved in motivated saccade
tasks receive inputs from many brain areas including the
ventral and dorsal striatum, the subthalamic nucleus,
the amygdala, the lateral hypothalamus, the dorsal raphe
nucleus, and the lateral habenula (Bromberg-Martin et al.
2010; Matsumoto & Hikosaka 2009). A comparison of
different reward types could not only allow us to investigate
overlap and differences in the underlying neural correlates,
but could also enable the calculation of a scaling factor (i.e.,
an “exchange rate”) between social, monetary, and food
rewards for each subject.
4.3. An applied second-person neuroscience
4.3.1. Computational social neuroscience. Although
computational neuroimaging studies inspired by game
theory and other approaches that use generative models
for data analyses have already taken up the investigation
of competitive scenarios and are beginning to address coop-
erative games (e.g., Yoshida et al. 2008), human beings’
unparalleled abilities for cooperation in real-time social
interaction have largely been left unexplored. Here,
extending computational social neuroscience approaches
to reciprocal and adaptive two agent-interactions holds
great potential for future research and may enable us to
investigate how differences in perspective towards others,
that is, social cognition from an agent’s versus from an
observer’s point of view, may inﬂuence the reliance on
different computational mechanisms. For example a
study by Hampton et al. (2008) demonstrates the impor-
tance of representing the possible inﬂuence one may
have on others in direct interaction. Similarly, recent ﬁnd-
ings from model-based neuroimaging studies already do
provide evidence for differences in the neural mechanisms
of experienced as compared to observational learning
(activity changes in ventral striatum being selective to
instrumental actions; Cooper et al. 2012). Computational
approaches are particularly powerful in helping to address
the history of an ongoing social interaction, how learning
may occur and how it could be related to a social reward
prediction error. In doing so, model-based analysis of neu-
roimaging data could help to investigate the development
of neural networks and their structural and neurofunctional
underpinnings during social interaction, thereby helping us
understand how particular functions develop in particular
areas of the brain or, speciﬁcally, the brains of interacting
minds. One example of how a computational social neuro-
science paradigm may help to assess and quantify the
impact of (gaze-based) social interactions is the following:
By combining a cooperative game such as the “stag hunt”
game developed by Yoshida et al. (2008) with a gaze-
based social interaction manipulation (Schilbach et al.
2010b), it becomes feasible to test computational models
under more ecologically valid conditions. In light of our
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hypothesis and preliminary ﬁndings, which suggest that
social interactions may prompt collaborative motives, we
expect that congruent gaze behavior exhibited by the
virtual character in our joint attention manipulation may
promote cooperative behavior in the “stag hunt” game,
whereas gaze aversion of the virtual character may have
the opposite effect. Using fMRI while participants are
involved in gaze-based interactions and in the stag hunt
game may also allow to use correlational approaches and
multi-variate pattern analysis to predict the level of
cooperation in the stag hunt from neural activity observed
during gaze-based interaction.
Alternatively, future studies could use more elaborate
models to control the behavior of a virtual character (con-
versational agents) in more complex ways (e.g., Broz et al.
2013; Kelso et al. 2009; Triesch et al. 2006; 2007; Fairhurst
et al. 2012). The meaningful use of conversational agents
(i.e., completely computer generated artiﬁcial social enti-
ties) in interaction studies, in contrast to avatars, would
require the implementation of basic social skills in the
agents, serving the perception, processing and production
of interactive behavior (see Vogeley & Bente 2010). Such
implementations are feasible if the scope of behavior is
constrained with regard to channel bandwidth (e.g., to
eye gaze), as well as with regard to the task affordances
(e.g., ﬁxation of objects, gaze following, etc.). However,
the available technologies are far from allowing for broad-
band interactions in open conversational situations. Using
such an approach might provide a most informative com-
plementarity to recent investigations, which have focused
on using computational models to predict neural responses
in a human observer or interactor (e.g., Behrens et al. 2009;
Cooper et al. 2012) and could help in exploring the expla-
natory power of mutually adaptive modeling approaches.
4.3.2. Genotype-speciﬁc effects and hormonal inﬂuences
of the neural basis of social interaction. Recent evidence
suggests that important hormonal inﬂuences exist which
can speciﬁcally affect social behavior and its underlying
neuroanatomical and neurofunctional correlates (e.g.,
Chura et al. 2010; Hermans et al. 2010; Volman et al.
2011), giving rise to the notion of a ﬁeld of “social neuro-
endocrinology” (cf. Bos et al. 2012). Interestingly, it has
been suggested that certain hormonal responses only
occur in ecologically valid situations (e.g., Henckens et al.
2009), which is consistent with the assumptions of the
here proposed second-person approach. Therefore, it
seems likely that using the types of interactive and ecologi-
cally valid paradigms endorsed by the second-person
account may also help to advance the investigation of the
complex interplay and inﬂuence of hormones on the
“social brain.” In addition, efforts are also being undertaken
to understand genotype-speciﬁc differences in prosocial
hormones and brain anatomy and how they impact on
social behavior (e.g., Chen & Johnson 2012; Tost et al.
2010). Furthermore, we see great potential in elucidating
how such genotype-speciﬁc differences might be related
to differences in reward-based processing (e.g., Chakra-
barti & Baron-Cohen 2011) and could predict differential
responses to pharmacological challenges or therapeutic
interventions. In the following, we therefore go on to
discuss the possible implications of a second-person
approach to other minds for our understanding of psychia-
tric disorders.
5. Impact
5.1. Psychiatric disorders as disorders of social cognition
It has increasingly been recognized that we can conceive of
psychiatric disorders as disorders of social cognition (e.g.,
Crespi & Badcock 2008; Vogeley & Newen 2009).5 While
there is great merit to be found in this endeavour, the
above-described conceptual and empirical developments
may be taken to suggest that previous research inspired
by this assumption may have over-emphasized explicit
forms of social cognition, whereas recent work, we
suggest, indicates that related impairments might be
more closely linked to difﬁculties in skillfully engaging in
social interaction (Schilbach et al. 2012b).
5.2. The case of high-functioning autism
“Direct interaction always leads to complications.”
— Patient M. V.6
5.2.1. The impact of social gaze on action control and
interpersonal coordination in high-functioning autism.
Autism is characterized by qualitative impairments of social
interaction and communication. Here, the distinction
between implicit and explicit processes has recently been
emphasized: Contrary to popular explanations, what
seems to be impaired in high-functioning autism (HFA)
is not the ability to use explicit mentalistic inference, but
rather, the implicit processes that contribute to participat-
ing in social interaction and that allow us to orient towards,
and automatically integrate, relevant social cues in more
complex situations (Becchio et al. 2007; Kuzmanovic
et al. 2011; Senju et al. 2009). Individuals with HFA are
neither impaired in explicit social cognition – as they, in
fact, consciously remind themselves to think about the
mental states of others in an attempt to compensate for
interaction difﬁculties – nor in their capacity of implicit
learning in general (Brown et al. 2010). Instead, they may
lack the more basic skills to respond intuitively to socially
relevant information by generating “adaptive actions upon
salient aspects of the environment” (Klin et al. 2003).
The discrepancy between the ability to solve explicit
social cognitive problems and the inability to meet the
demands of everyday life social interactions in HFA has
been highlighted by methods which enable probing invo-
luntary aspects of behavior. The difference between expli-
cit and implicit social cognition is also nicely captured by
descriptions of subjective experiences that persons with
HFA provide. Here, individuals with HFA emphasize a
preference for being in an observational stance towards
others as this allows them to “logically compute,” “contem-
plate,” and “think through” aspects of the situation in a con-
scious and cognitively effortful way. Furthermore, being an
observer also allows one to think about what one may know
about a given situation and the constraints this may entail
for a person who is actually in it. On the contrary, the situ-
ation becomes remarkably different and more complicated
for a person with HFA when the person she has quietly
been observing turns towards her and tries to engage her
in interaction. Here, patients describe “being ﬂooded” by
information, an “inability to keep up,” and “not knowing
when and how” to respond to what others do possibly
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due to the imperfect contingencies inherent in social inter-
action (Klin et al. 2009).
We suggest that the impairments of being able to respond
intuitively to socially relevant information could be closely
related to the ability to perceive social affordances, that is,
the possibilities for interaction provided by others. In order
to investigate the impact of social cues on mechanisms of
action control, we therefore made use of a stimulus-response
compatibility (SRC) paradigm, in which control and HFA
participants were asked to generate spatially congruent or
incongruent motor responses to changes in a face, and to a
face-like and an object stimulus (Schilbach et al. 2012b).
Results demonstrate that whereas in control participants
being looked at by a virtual other leads to a reduction of reac-
tion-time costs associated with generating a spatially incon-
gruent response, this effect is not present in the HFA
group. We suggest that this modulatory effect of social
gaze on action control in control participants might be
related to social cues triggering motor preparatory programs
that may help to coordinate one’s actions with those of
someone else, rather than providing a mere “resonance”
mechanism. It is conceivable that participants thereby auto-
matically adjust to the “perspective” of the virtual agent by
making sense of the situation in pragmatic terms (Sebanz
et al. 2006). Hereby, an action that is deemed spatially
“incongruent” from an allocentric observer’s point of view
might end up being “complementary” to an action that the
participant perceives the (virtual) other perform. In other
words, being in the presence of someone else (even a
virtual other) may change our perception of the environment
towards perceiving it in terms of the resources or possibilities
for actions held collectively (“we-space”), rather than indivi-
dually (e.g., Krueger 2010).
Indeed, consistent with this interpretation of social cues
leading to a recruitment of motor-preparatory and action-
monitoring-related processes, an fMRI study from our
lab using an abridged version of the social SRC paradigm
in a group of healthy participants demonstrated that per-
forming incongruent actions in the presence of a virtual
other (as compared to performing them in response to a
nonsocial stimulus) leads to a differential increase of
neural activity in the brain regions known to be involved
in action monitoring and response inhibition (anterior cin-
gulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus), and also in areas
previously implicated in social cognition (dorso-medial pre-
frontal cortex; see Schilbach et al. [2010a] for details). Fur-
thermore, reaction time differences between the social and
nonsocial condition appear to be closely related to activity
changes in the reward system of the brain as measured
by BOLD fMRI: Participants who demonstrated more pro-
nounced activations of the ventral striatum – often related
to hedonic or rewarding experiences – also found it more
difﬁcult to disengage from the face stimulus in order to
generate incongruent motor responses, which is consistent
with suggestions of an important inﬂuence of reward-
related processes on mechanisms of action control (cf.
Pessoa & Engelmann 2010). Taken together, these
results highlight that performing actions in a – albeit
minimal – social context signiﬁcantly affects mechanisms
of action control (Schilbach et al. 2010a; Schilbach et al.
2012b; Gangopadhyay & Schilbach 2012).
Our ﬁndings are consistent, therefore, with the proposed
difﬁculties in the automatic integration of social infor-
mation in HFA, whereas more explicit measures of social
cognition may be intact as a result of compensatory strat-
egies (Senju et al. 2009; Kuzmanovic et al. 2011).
Whereas control participants respond to the virtual
agent’s gaze by recruiting motor-based processes, which
lead to a performance beneﬁt as and by recruiting the
brain’s reward system, which is likely relevant for the
hedonic experience of social stimuli, our results seem to
suggest no such differences in HFA. In other words, indi-
viduals with autism may not lack a theory of how other
minds work (“knowing that”), but the relevant know-how
for dealing with others in direct interaction (cf. Zahavi &
Parnas 2003). Also, important differences are likely to
exist in the degree to which social interactions can evoke
comparable responses in reward-related neurocircuitry in
patients with HFA (cf. Schultz 2005).
In line with the second-person approach, future research
should, therefore, investigate impairments of social cogni-
tion in autism as reﬂecting difﬁculties in skillfully interact-
ing with others, as those might be at the very heart of the
problems faced by patients in everyday social encounters.
We suggest that the investigation of the neural mechanisms
underlying these clinically relevant differences in high-
functioning autism will beneﬁt substantially from using
more ecologically valid paradigms that look at how people
actively engage and interact with one another in social
encounters. Furthermore, it will be important to relate
known differences in structural (Catani et al. 2008) and
functional connectivity in autism (Kennedy et al. 2006) to
interaction abilities. Here also, connectivity differences in
the mentalizing or default mode network (see sect. 3) and
the anti-correlated fronto-parietal network, as well as inter-
actions of both networks with the reward system of the
brain (Camara et al. 2008), appear as primary candidates
for such studies. Using paradigms that enable control of
the bandwidth of the social interaction may help to titrate
levels of perceptual complexity and differences in the tem-
poral structure of an interaction, in order to adapt to the
differences in functional and structural connectivity and
concomitant interaction requirements. Also, using
mediated social interactions could help to provide
additional cues for patients, which help them to engage
in interaction.
5.2.2. Language use in high-functioning autism. According
to the view of “language-as-action” or of language as a “tool
for social interaction” (Tylén et al. 2010), language proces-
sing can be regarded as a joint activity which results in
entrainment and synchronization between partners on
various levels (Pickering & Garrod 2004). Furthermore,
this “grounding” view of language suggests that words do
not contain their meaning, but that linguistic labels can
be highly negotiable and that interlocutors ﬂexibly seek to
understand them against the background of a “common
ground” (Clark 1996). To this end interlocutors produce
and monitor paralinguistic cues and one another’s instru-
mental behavior to ensure that they, indeed, understand
each other. This view of language processing in dialogue –
whereby a partner’s contribution plays a dual role by pro-
viding the other person with evidence of how the previous
utterance has been understood – resonates with our propo-
sal of a second-person approach to other minds, which also
highlights the importance of reciprocal relations and their
partially constitutive role in interpersonal understanding.
Here, the various feedback from interaction partners and
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bouts of interpersonal synchronization shape and structure
the “interaction space” and the denouement of the social
encounter.
In high-functioning autism several language-related
abnormalities are present, which, we believe, can be best
understood in terms of the “grounding” rather than the
“message model” view of language processing: Individuals
with high-functioning autism – in spite of their elaborate
linguistic code, and the absence of developmental language
delay in Asperger’s syndrome – have profound difﬁculties
in understanding irony and insist on the use of the literal
meaning of words, for which a more “objective,” rule-
based, situation-independent and “correct” usage can be
determined. Consequently, the language in high-function-
ing autism is characterized by pragmatic and semantic def-
icits with patients being less likely to integrate contextual
information (Groen et al. 2010). Consistently, patients
seem to have particular difﬁculties in adapting to the
changes in linguistic labels in reference to an immediately
given social context (Nadig et al. 2009). Whereas in
normal controls language promotes interpersonal coordi-
nation by helping to coordinate attention even in the
physical absence of an interlocutor (Richardson et al.
2007a; Tylén et al. 2010), the same does not appear to
be true for individuals with high-functioning autism.
Patients commonly describe difﬁculties in maintaining
telephone conversations on account of the fact that
they ﬁnd it nearly impossible to know when to speak in
the absence of visual cues. In summary, while the predo-
minantly information-based functions of language (as
described by the “message model” of language) seem to
be intact in high-functioning autism, it is the socially con-
structed and interactionally coordinative functions of
language, which operate on a more implicit and auto-
matic level, that appear to be most impaired (Pexman
et al. 2011).
5.2.3. Meeting the interaction requirements of patients
with high-functioning autism. From a clinical perspective,
individual reports of patients with HFA from our outpati-
ent clinic are also noteworthy, in that patients describe
not having any signiﬁcant impairments of social interaction
and communication when they interact with other persons
diagnosed with HFA, which stands in striking opposition to
the difﬁculties that systematically occur when they interact
with persons without this diagnosis. While also raising
issues about the normative aspects of psychiatric diagnoses,
these anecdotal reports emphasize that successful inter-
action and communication are crucially a matter of inter-
personal adjustments and (possibly) an awareness of the
interactional requirements of another person. Investigating
these issues in patients with autism, we suggest, might help
to improve not only psychotherapeutic interventions, but
could also help to substantially raise public awareness,
thereby promoting ﬂexibility and openness to diversity in
styles of social interaction. This is especially crucial for
the case of HFA: As we are normally not aware of our intui-
tive, nonverbal capacities that are automatic in nature, we
do not even have the chance to take notice of the speciﬁc
deﬁcits in the communicative behavior of HFA patients.
With respect to the focus of this article, namely, the scien-
tiﬁc investigation of real-time social interactions, it is
most interesting to contrast dyads of neurotypical per-
sons with neurotypical-patient and patient-patient dyads.
Investigations of the latter type might help to shed light
on the neural mechanisms that enable successful inter-
actions between persons known for their social interaction
impairments. Also, the study of differences in social inter-
action dynamics could prove to be a promising route and
might be developed into a tool for helping differential diag-
nosis in psychiatric disorders.
6. Concluding remarks
In this article we have argued for the conception of a
second-person approach to other minds, suggesting that
interpersonal understanding is primarily a matter of social
interaction and emotional engagement with others. We
suggest that this account –well-grounded in current philo-
sophical considerations – provides a different route to the
investigation of intersubjectivity by emphasizing aspects
of social cognition speciﬁcally related to the procedural
nature and experiential aspects of social interactions. Fur-
thermore, we have argued for the application of this
approach to the neurobiological investigation of social cog-
nition based on our analysis that “dark matter” in social
neuroscience remains, due to difﬁculties in investigating
and conceptualizing real-time social interactions. A
second-person neuroscience will, therefore, make use of
innovative experimental setups to investigate social inter-
action and its relationship to social cognitive abilities in
more ecologically valid ways. Such developments will not
only help neuroscience to really “go social,” but may also
be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders
construed as disorders of social cognition.
Although preliminary neuroscientiﬁc evidence suggests
that social cognition is, indeed, fundamentally different
when we are engaged with others, embedded in social
interaction, many questions remain unanswered. Studies
are needed to directly compare social cognition from an
interactor’s versus from an observer’s point of view. How
do putative differences with respect to the reliance on
underlying mechanisms relate to the large-scale neural net-
works that are known to be involved in social cognition?
The use of ecologically valid paradigms to probe social cog-
nition, we suggest, will help to elucidate their putatively
complementary roles as a function of the pragmatic
requirements of social interaction and may also help to
understand how activity might be shaped by the dynamics
and “history” of an ongoing interaction. Here, the inter-
action of gaze and other action-related cues will be of
paramount importance. Also, studying cooperative and
competitive interactions in an ecologically valid, emotion-
ally engaged way will be important to spell out the func-
tions of active participation and reciprocity in social
interaction and how they relate to our perception of the
human status of an agent. We do not know as yet, what
the relative contributions and neuronal bases of implicit
and explicit ways of understanding others in interaction
as compared to observation are, nor how this may relate
to cases of psychiatric disorders, which can be thought
of as disorders of social cognition. Finally, the precise
role of reward signals in social cognition needs to be inves-
tigated, since they could constitute an important driving
force for participation in social interactions and could cru-
cially inﬂuence other aspects of cognition and processes of
self-regulation.
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By taking social interaction and a second-person
approach to knowing minds seriously, future investigations
in and outside the ﬁeld of social neuroscience are likely to
provide radically new insights into the psychology and neu-
robiology of how we know other minds and will produce
evidence for an interactive account of social cognition
that emphasizes the constitutive role of participating in
the social world.
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NOTES
1. Authors Leonhard Schilbach and Bert Timmermans have
contributed equally to this article.
2. In sensu stricto, the term dark matter is used in physics and
astronomy to describe matter, which is inferred to exist, but which
has not been directly observed and may not even be observable.
We use the term metaphorically to denote an important lacuna
in current areas of research in social neuroscience, which have
been more difﬁcult to investigate and where, therefore, less is
known, but which can at least in principle be explored empirically.
To index this particular usage of the term, “dark matter” is consist-
ently used in quotation marks throughout the paper.
3. Here, it is important to note that from a conceptual point
of view we do not see the differences between the dimensions
of “experience” and “participation” as being strictly categorical
in nature. Also, it is important to emphasize that we are, here,
referring to the characteristics of experimental paradigms, which
do (or do not) elicit a sense of emotional engagement and which
allow (or do not allow) a human subject to participate in social
interaction.
4. From our perspective, making experimental paradigms
more interactive and ecologically valid will allow the assessment
of differences in the neural correlates of social cognition from
an observer’s as compared to from an interactor’s point of view
in an individual’s brain (see Fig. 1). In addition to that,
however, another important question to investigate is whether
more insights can be gleaned from quantifying inter-brain
effects of social interactions and to assess whether two interacting
brains provide more information about the interaction than the
sum of the individual brains (e.g., Hari & Kujala 2009, Hasson
et al. 2012, Baess et al. 2012, Konvalinka & Roepstorff 2012;
see also sect. 3.2.2 in our article).
5. While an in-depth analysis of this particular issue is clearly
beyond the scope of this article, we would like to note that from
our standpoint the suggestion of a second-person approach to
other minds is consistent with an integrative account of psycho-
pathology, which takes into account and weighs data gathered
by means of various methods, including observation of and in
interaction with the patient and those around her in an attempt
to explore convergences of naturalist and normative reasoning.
6. This is a direct quote from one of the author’s patients, who
was seen in the Adult Autism Outpatient Clinic at the Department
of Psychiatry at the University Hospital of Cologne.
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Abstract: This commentary situates the second person account within
a broader framework of ecological validity for experimental paradigms
in social cognitive neuroscience. It then considers how individual
differences at psychological and genetic levels can be integrated within
the proposed framework.
Social interaction is more than the sum of its parts. The clarion call
for a second person approach in neuroscience by Schilbach et al.
provides an opportunity to deﬁne a parameter space for ecological
validity in studies of social cognition (SoCog). The operative deﬁ-
nition of SoCog studies for this commentary includes all such
studies that use any stimuli that can reasonably be identiﬁed as
belonging to a conspeciﬁc. This commentary then considers a fun-
damental question about the integration of individual differences
within this framework of studying social interaction.
Stimuli generally used in SoCog experiments range from
minimal/schematic representations (Bayliss & Tipper 2005; Fox
2000) to real-world social interactions (Chartrand & Bargh
1999). Paradigms that involve observing static stimuli without
interacting (e.g., watching static photographs of facial expressions
of emotion) have played pioneering roles in social cognitive neuro-
science (Blair et al. 1999; Morris et al. 1996; Whalen et al. 1998).
However, since ecologically valid signals of social interaction are
dynamic in nature, a ﬁrst parameter in this framework is that of
stimulus dynamics. Accordingly, brain regions responding to
static facial expressions show greater activity in response to
dynamic expressions of emotion (LaBar et al 2003). However,
the nature of stimulus motion critically inﬂuences whether
people perceive it as a social/biological stimulus, and how they
respond to it (Kilner et al. 2007).
Chaminade and colleagues tested two dimensions of stimulus
variation, by systematically manipulating anthropomorphism and
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motion type (artiﬁcial vs. biological) in a range of stimuli charac-
ters (Chaminade et al.2007). This demonstrated that the motion
type was a strong predictor of whether participants found the
stimuli to be “biological” or not, across all stimulus forms. In con-
trast, if the motion type was recognised as biological, there was
little difference in biological/artiﬁcial ratings across a range of
stimuli forms. This provides an important insight for designing
dynamic stimuli for experiments suggested in the target article,
since the nature of interaction changes considerably if the
stimuli are perceived to be artiﬁcial/artiﬁcially controlled (Pfeiffer
et al. 2011).
Form and dynamics thus constitute important stimulus dimen-
sions for ecological validity of SoCog paradigms (as illustrated in
my Figure 1, speciﬁcally in cases where P1 is a virtual character/
avatar). Once the stimuli are perceived to be social/biological
(either explicitly, or implicitly, e.g., by believing that a given
dynamic stimulus is being controlled by another agent; Weibel
et al. 2008), the stage is set for an ecologically valid social inter-
action –whose parameter space (comprising engagement and
interaction) has been laid out in Figures 1 and 2 of the target
article. Although social interactions have characteristics in
addition to those of individual interactors, these are, nonetheless,
inﬂuenced by individual differences. Interactions of a highly intro-
verted person with a range of different strangers will have a
certain common quality, which is possibly more due to individual
differences than the interactions per se. It therefore is necessary
to devise a set of experiments that parse out the inﬂuence of indi-
vidual differences on the interactional parameters. Paradigms that
use well-controlled (albeit, artiﬁcial) stimuli can address this to
some extent. However, in more real-world social interactions
(see my Fig. 1, where both P1 and P2 are humans), individual
differences of both interactors can have a signiﬁcant impact on
social cognition (Zaki et al. 2008). The quantiﬁcation of interac-
tional parameters therefore needs to be sensitive to individual
differences. Possible questions for such analyses include the
extent to which the individual characteristics of P1 and P2 (in
Fig. 1) and their mutual relationship (quantiﬁed as their discre-
pancy, or correlation) determine the magnitude of the interac-
tional parameters.
At the psychological level, one such dimension of individual
differences is autistic traits. The level of these traits can determine
how sensitive an individual is to rewarding social stimuli (albeit,
across a spectatorial gap), and thus, how s/he responds to these
(Kohls et al. 2009; Sims et al. 2012). By this account, individual
differences in social motivation can have a considerable impact
on at least one of the key interactional parameters (engagement).
Similarly, at a genetic level, one such dimension of individual
variability is sequence variants in genes involved in social-
emotional behavior (Chakrabarti et al. 2009). In separate
studies, we demonstrated that individuals carrying speciﬁc var-
iants in the cannabinoid receptor (CNR1) gene were likely to
show a greater ventral striatal response to happy faces, and look
longer at them (Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen 2011; Chakrabarti
et al. 2006). The second person account raises key questions for
the interpretation of these paradigms: Would these differences
in social reward sensitivity be seen if the spectatorial gap is
closed by making more ecologically valid, interactive paradigms?
If yes, then it will be necessary to quantify how much of these
observed differences are due to the interaction per se. If not,
the utility of paradigms involving “inert stimuli” in SoCog
studies will need to be systematically re-evaluated. The target
paper raises these important testable possibilities.
In sum, this commentary situates the second-person account
within a broader parameter space for evaluating SoCog paradigms
(represented in Fig. 1), and raises the issue of integration of indi-
vidual differences within the proposed framework.
Social cognition is not a special case, and
the dark matter is more extensive than
recognized
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Abstract: The target article’s approach is applauded, but it is suggested
that the “dark matter” may be much larger than even the current
authors suspect. Cartesian and mechanistic assumptions infuse not only
the discipline of cognitive psychology, but all societal accounts of the
person. A switch to dynamical accounts in which lawfulness is observed
within a given systemic context is suggested.
The basic idea underlying Schilbach et al.’s proposal to establish a
second-person neuroscience is profound. People are incompre-
hensible without recognizing that experience arises, and behavior
unfolds, in context. The context, for humans, is massively con-
ditioned by our fellow humans – the physical environment
having been reduced by-and-large to smooth, easily navigable,
surfaces with essentially no danger of predation. The suggestion
that nervous system activity might be likewise interpretable only
with due recognition of the role of the social context in which it
takes place, might even be considered revolutionary, if it were
not that very many converging sources of evidence seem to be
aligning to force the recognition that our best account of our
lives, experiences, and actions are not provided by a solipsistic
and mechanistic model of a hermetically sealed cognitive
system, tragically isolated from its world, and implemented in
the currency of nervous system activity (Gallagher & Zahavi
2008; Varela et al. 1991).
The considerable change in perspective of the scientist that is
required to fully acknowledge this insight will not come easily,
and it is clear in the present article that the authors too struggle
to free themselves from a vocabulary that is built on a foundation
of (methodological) Cartesian psychology, where causes lie
hidden, the world is inferred, and others are a problem to be
solved. For there is more to be overturned here than the excesses
of individualistic and mechanistic cognitive psychology. The
Figure 1 (Chakrabarti). A schematic parameter space for SoCog
paradigms. Schilbach et al. propose two key parameters for
quantifying social interaction (middle box). These are situated
within a broader framework that includes the characteristics of
the two interactors (P1 and P2). In cases where one of the
interactors (e.g., P1) is a virtual character or an “avatar,” then
characteristics such as form and dynamics are crucial in
determining the nature of any interaction. In cases where both
P1 and P2 are humans, the interaction parameters need to
account for the variation explained by individual characteristics
of P1 and P2. Individual characteristics of P1 and P2 could be
explained at a psychological (e.g., psychological traits) or a
genetic level.
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sciences of the person that have developed in a post-Enlighten-
ment, Occidental context have been constructed upon a pre-
theoretical notion of an autonomous individual, bearing causal
and moral responsibility for his or her own actions, with the
brain/mind as the sole source of agency; this background is hard
to shake. We will need to develop our concepts with care.
Old habits of thought die hard. For example, in considering the
failure of high functioning autistic (HFA) individuals to engage in
successful social coordination, the authors say (sect. 4.1, para. 2)
“[the failure] might be related to their ability to activate ‘social
brain’ areas when asked to make a conscious effort to do so.”
This fails to step up to the mark and recognize that a felicitous
social interaction is a coordinative process that cannot be disas-
sembled into its components without losing its essence. The
paean to computational models (sect. 4.3.1, para. 1) also suggests
a clinging to a mechanistic, individualistic, understanding of the
person. The authors are not hugely at fault here. It is virtually
impossible to discuss experience and behavior without falling
back on the problematic assumptions on which modern psychol-
ogy is founded.
The language of dynamics is surely the way to make progress
here. In dynamical modeling, the ﬁrst and most important task
is the identiﬁcation of the system under consideration, and the
differentiation of it from its domain-speciﬁc background. For
the cognitive scientist, the system may be parts of the body, the
whole body, the body plus tools, multiple bodies, and so on. In
my own work (Cummins 2012), two speakers reading a text in syn-
chrony are viewed as a single system, with no central locus of
control. In modeling the behavior of sports fans in the Mexican
wave, a simple model of the individual will sufﬁce, if the inter-
actions among those units are appropriately constrained (Farkas
et al. 2002). This ﬂexibility with respect to the domain in which
lawfulness is recognized opens the door to a plurality of explana-
tory accounts of the structure of behavior and, equally, to a wealth
of potential avenues for perturbing, inﬂuencing, and directing that
behavior. Such an explanatory pluralism would not have been
foreign to the pragmatic founders of the discipline of psychology,
but it sits uneasily with naive scientism that expects a single truth
to emerge in our study of the person.
One might contrast accounts of control, where the assumed
causal origin of a behavior lies with a central executive, with the
complementary notion of coordination, an emergent property
that arises from the reciprocal interaction among complex
systems with many redundant degrees of freedom (Cummins
2010; Kelso 1995). Where the control perspective will interpret
skillful coping in a rich environment as a predictive (and represen-
tationally voracious) tour de force, a coordinative account will look
rather for evidence of coupling and entrainment as hallmarks of
the establishment of transient domains of relative autonomy
across individuals. Within such domains, knowledge may,
indeed, lie between persons, but this insight can only be properly
shored up if the language of modular computationalism is
replaced by a dynamical account, and the mentalistic vocabulary
of psychology is quarantined and questioned.
Neuroscience simpliciter continues to make huge advances.
Cognitive neuroscience must perforce build bridges between
the physiology and the kind of concepts with which we describe
ourselves. In leaning on the constructs of cognitive psychology,
it risks failing to recognize the degree to which we collectively
bring a human world into existence. Schilbach et al. have done
us all a service by pointing to a large domain of our ignorance,
what they call the “dark matter” of neuroscience. I suspect that
the scale of the unknown territory may be much larger than cur-
rently appreciated. Even Descartes, in his presumed solipsistic
introspection, expressed the thought “Cogito, ergo sum” in
language – a means made possible only by recurrent practices of
mutual coordination among individuals, and hence intersubjec-
tively constituted in every way. Social cognition, so regarded, is
not a special case, or a marginal sub-species; it is the fabric
whereof human experience and behavior is woven.
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Abstract: Second person social cognition cannot be restricted to dyadic
interactions between two persons (the “I” and the “you”). Many
instances of social communication are triadic, and involve a third person
(the “him/her/it”), which is the object of the interaction. We discuss
neuropsychological and brain imaging data showing that triadic
interactions involve dedicated brain networks distinct from those of
dyadic interactions.
Schilbach et al. defend the idea that social cognition research
would beneﬁt from studying “real-time social encounters in a
truly interactive manner” (target article, Abstract). Endorsing
“second-person” neuroscience would bridge the gap between
the solipsist view of ﬁrst person perspective, and third person
social psychology. We agree with this idea, but we point out that
second person studies cannot be restricted to dyadic relationships
between two persons. Indeed, communicative or collaborative
interactions always involve a third component: an object, a
person, an event, or even the goal of the interaction itself. There-
fore, many social interactions are intrinsically triadic (“I” talk to
“you” about “him/her/it”).
Dyadic interactions are present very early in human infants as
can be seen in the emotional domain (emotional contagion,
attachment, etc.; see Hobson & Hobson 2012) and in the commu-
nicative domain (turn taking; see Kugiumutzakis 1998). They are
also present in social animals in a variety of behaviors (feeding,
grooming, courting, dominance/submission displays, etc.; de
Waal 2005). Yet, they are distinct from triadic interactions (see
our Figure 1), which emerge in humans only at the end of the
ﬁrst year and are considered to play a pivotal role in the develop-
ment of human social cognition (Baron-Cohen 2005; Charman
2003). Impairment or delay in the acquisition of these triadic
interactions has been observed in patients with autism whose
social and communicative skills are severely affected (Baron-
Cohen 1989). In nonhuman primates only some limited abilities
for triadic interactions are observed – for example, instrumental
pointing, in which the addressee is used to get an object of interest
(Gómez 2005), or limited cooperation in hunting (de Waal &
Malini 2010); but not communicative pointing, in which the
addressee is invited to share the perceptual experience about an
object (Tomasello & Carpenter 2005), or fully ﬂedged
cooperation (Rekers et al. 2011).
Neuropsychological studies enable the disentanglement of
triadic from dyadic interactions. Heterotopagnosia is a puzzling
acquired deﬁcit which only arises in triadic situations where the
target object is a human person: Patients cannot point at
another person’s body parts, although they can grasp or touch
them. They can also point correctly at dolls’ body parts, at
videos of humans, at pieces of clothing, and at their own body,
thus indicating a speciﬁc difﬁculty for communicative pointing
directed to the physical body of another human (Cleret de Langa-
vant et al. 2009; Degos et al. 1997; Felician et al. 2003). Interest-
ingly, most of the errors consist of pointing at their own body
parts, which they rationalize by stating that the body parts of
*These authors equally contributed to the paper.
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the target individual occupy the same space as their own body
parts.
Heterotopagnosia cannot be explained by a simple impairment
of a human body representation or by other current theories in
social cognition (Cleret de Langavant et al. 2009), but this syn-
drome reveals a crucial difference between dyadic and triadic
interactions. Grasping and touching other’s body parts involve a
dyadic relationship between “I” and the target of the gesture. In
contrast, pointing involves the triadic relationship of communi-
cation where “I” show to “you” the object “it” or the person
“him/her.” Comparing the kinematics of pointing at objects in
both communicative and non-communicative situations in
healthy participants, we showed a spatial reshaping of the pointing
gesture according to the communicative interaction with a second
person and to the position of the second person relative to the ﬁrst
person. This suggests that in communicative pointing, we use a
heterocentric reference frame encoding the body and perspective
of the second person who is addressed (“I” represent how “you”
represent “this”). Such a reference is not used when pointing is
dyadic or in grasping or touching. PET-scan imaging shows that
this reference frame involves the right posterior superior temporal
sulcus region and the right medial prefrontal cortex (Cleret de
Langavant et al. 2011).
In addition, because performance in heterotopagnosia differs
according to the object of the pointing (a real human or a ﬁgure
of a human), we compared pointing at a living human’s body, at
a manikin’s body, and at artifacts in healthy participants. Reaction
times for pointing at artifacts or at a manikin’s body parts were
similar, whereas pointing at body parts of real persons was
slower than pointing at artifacts. This demonstrated the speciﬁcity
of the body of other persons: Only a real person can be viewed
both as a subject to communicate with (“you”) or an object to com-
municate about (“him” or “her”). The left posterior intraparietal
sulcus region was activated in healthy participants while they
were pointing at another person’s body (Cleret de Langavant
et al. 2012). Presumably, damage in this area explains why patients
with heterotopagnosia cannot consider the other person under
both views (“you” and “him/her”) simultaneously.
On the basis of our research on heterotopagnosia, we conclude
that a second-person neuroscience should assess communicative/
collaborative triadic interactions, as they offer a richer situation,
including the switching of perspectives or frame of references
between “you” and “him/her” perspectives. In a triadic inter-
action, the roles of the second and third persons are constantly
dynamically redeﬁned. This requirement should be taken into
account in experimental designs using computerized avatars as
opposed to real life participants.
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Abstract: We question the idea that the mirror neuron system is the
substrate of social affordances perception, and we suggest that most of
the activity seen in the parietal and premotor cortex of the human brain
is independent of mirroring activity as characterized in macaques, but
rather reﬂects a process of one’s own action speciﬁcation in response to
social signals.
We congratulate Schilbach et al. for raising these theoretical issues
concerning the nature of social engagement. We are also enthu-
siastic about the re-emergence of the concept of “affordance” to
characterize what is properly perceived by an engaged observer
during a social interaction. We share the view that observing
social cues (i.e., features of the environment whose function is
not to affect a recipient) is qualitatively very different from proces-
sing social signals. Social signals are, in contrast to cues, features of
the environment whose function is to alter a recipient’s behavior
and which are recognized and processed as such by the engaged
observer. This theoretical shift is fundamental and we see the
attempt to free social cognition from the “inferential detour” as
salutary and promising. We also consider with great interest the
various methodological improvements brought by Schilbach
et al., and see their practical suggestions as highly relevant.
However, we regret that the authors do not specify in more
detail what they understand by “social affordances,” and that
they offer too few details about how they are perceived and pro-
cessed by our cognitive apparatus. The clariﬁcation of these issues
is crucial to considering the neural candidates, which might enable
the perception of social affordances.
Contrary to what Schilbach and colleagues argue, we do not
think that the mirror neuron system (MNS) is involved. First,
Figure 1 (Cleret de Langavant et al.). Four distinct perspectives
in social cognition: (a) ﬁrst person perspective, (b) third person
perspective, (c) second person perspective: dyadic interaction,
(d) second person perspective: triadic interaction.
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this might be the case for purely anatomical constraints: Neurons
with mirror properties (MNs) only account for 17% (Gallese et al.
1996) of the macaque premotor (PM) and parietal neurons.
Among these 17%, only 5.5% code for a strictly congruent
action in the motor and the visual domain, whereas 8.6% code
for two or more actions in the visual domain, and 1.3% for non-
congruent actions. In humans, Mukamel et al. (2010) revealed
that 14% of the recorded neurons in the supplementary cortex
area responded to congruent observed actions, but 10%
responded to non-congruent observed actions. We do not think
the latter should be considered MNs. Rather, they may be cate-
gorized as “social” canonical neurons, that is, neurons that are
active when foreseeing a possible social interaction (vs. interaction
with an object as for canonical neurons) and preparing oneself
accordingly.
There is a second reason – a functional one –why MNs would
not be good candidates for the underpinning of the processing
of social affordances: What is involved in the perception of
social affordances is, cognitively speaking, very different from
what MNs are known to do, that is, to simulate an observed
motor pattern (Rizzolatti et al. 2001). Instead, we assume that
the affordance perspective of social signals calls for the reexamina-
tion of previous ﬁndings to identify speciﬁc neural networks.
Let us ﬁrst consider the notion of “social affordance.” Schilbach
et al. deﬁne social affordance as “the possibilities for interaction
provided by others” (sect. 3.1.1, para. 5). These possibilities,
according to the authors, are characterized by “an activation of
motor programs that could allow for interpersonal coordination
of behavior” (sect. 3.1.1, para. 5). It must be clear that social
signals can be considered affordances in the sense that they
trigger a wide range of opportunities for actions in the observer.
We, as animals, are continuously facing opportunities for action
in our environment and are constantly collecting information in
order to select the most relevant action from among numerous
potential actions (Cisek 2007; Cisek & Kalaska 2010). This
entails that brain activity during social interactions reﬂects this par-
allel processing of multiple representations of potential actions
(social affordances) and their evaluation through the use of exter-
nal as well as internal sensory information. Activity in the parietal
cortex and connected motor regions might therefore reﬂect the
representation of the various affordances (Cisek & Kalaska 2010).
In a recent study conducted by our team (Conty et al. 2012),
participants faced dynamic stimuli depicting actors producing
complex social signals involving gaze, a pointing gesture, and the
expression of anger. We were able to show, using electroencepha-
lography (EEG) coupled with functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) that a binding of these social signals occurred in
the PM as early as 200 msec after stimulus onset. Strict motor res-
onance (MNS) processing could not explain the activation in the
PM, as anger expressions directed at an observer are perceived
as a clear signals of non-afﬁliative intentions and are therefore
less mimicked than averted anger expressions (Bourgeois &
Hess 2008, Hess et al. 2007). We propose that activity in the
PM is related to two complementary mechanisms: (1) the esti-
mation of prior expectations about the perceived agent’s immedi-
ate intent, and (2) the speciﬁcation of currently available actions
for the observer to deal with in the immediate situation.
Indeed, only the combination of the two could explain the
highest level of activity in the PM for the highest degree of poten-
tial social interaction, that is, an angry person pointing, facing, and
looking towards oneself. This activity in the PM may therefore
reﬂect the competition between several representations of
action opportunities, triggered by the ongoing social interaction,
as well as the selection of an adaptive behavioral response.
In sum, we think that it is crucial to ﬁrst ask whether the kind of
cognitive activity that is involved in the processing of social affor-
dances is compatible with what is conventionally thought of as the
MNS, before considering all activities in the PM as mirroring pro-
cesses. Second, it is important to consider regions that do not
display mirroring properties – such as the amygdala (Sander
et al. 2003) – as fundamental in the evaluation of social signals
and in the triggering of one’s own adaptive reaction. Conse-
quently, it is reasonable to advance that the processing of social
affordance involves a speciﬁc brain network, neuron populations,
and mechanisms that differ (for the most part) from the MNS.
Characterizing the neural speciﬁcities of the “social affordance
network” beyond the MNS represents a challenging step in our
understanding of the processing of social signals.
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Abstract: As there is “dark matter” in the neuroscience of individuals
engaged in dynamic interactions, similar dark matter is present in the
domain of interaction between humans and cognitive robots. Progress in
second-person neuroscience will contribute to the development of
robotic cognitive systems, and such developed robotic systems will be
used to test the validity of the underlying theories.
The second-person neuroscience framework presented by Schil-
bach et al. is of particular interest for researchers in the domain
of cognitive robotics for two reasons that constitute a strong reci-
procity between these domains. First, the “dark matter” in
second-person neuroscience is also present in the domain of
second-person robotics, and it is likely that advances in the neuro-
science of second-person systems will contribute to robotic cogni-
tive systems. Second, as these robot cognitive systems become
increasingly advanced, they will become increasingly useful as
tools in the pursuit of second-person neuroscience.
As second-person neuroscience matures, it will be able to
characterize the human cognitive system so as to inform the
implementation of artiﬁcial embodied systems capable of
second-person cognition. Certain robot cognitive systems have
primitive notions of “self” and “other” that can be revealed in
mechanisms for shared planning (Dominey & Warneken 2011,
Lallée et al. 2012). We have developed robot systems that can
learn shared plans that specify the coordinated actions of self
and other, and use these plans, including reversing roles.
However, the underlying mechanisms are impoverished, as the
robot cognitive system is somewhat spectatorial, and coupled to
the other only through the succession of alternating actions in
the shared plan. It is closer to the high functioning autist who
prefers to follow an explicit ﬁxed plan, rather than adapt in real-
time to open ended social interaction.
In their target article, Schilbach et al. outline a program for
second-person neuroscience from which we can extract the fol-
lowing principals for second-person robot cognition:
1. The system should be motivated to socially engage. This is
related to the intrinsic motivation to share intentions described
in Tomasello (2009), cited in the target article.
2. This engagement is driven by the perception of social
affordances.
3. Social affordances derive from the interaction dynamics of
the system that is constituted by the two agents.
4. This requires that the system can perceive the other as a
subject, which is more than recognizing the other as an agent.
Instead, the other agent must be recognized as affording social
interaction. Schilbach et al. stress that social interaction involves
contingency between self and other. The detection of contingency
is present in the earliest stages of infancy and plays a central role in
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the infant’s elaboration of its ecological self and its interpersonal
or social self.
5. Once the system has perceived these affordances, it must
engage. Crucially –what is the nature of the mechanism for
engagement? Rochat (2010) importantly notes that in this
context, Merleau-Ponty (1967) breaks with a “self”/“other” dis-
tinction, and suggests instead that one’s own body perception
and representation is fundamentally inseparable from, and
melded with, the perception and representation of others in a
process that he refers to as mutual alienation. “In the perception
of others, my body and the body of others are coupled, as if per-
forming and acting in concert” (Merleau-Ponty 1967. p. 24, trans-
lated from the French in Rochat 2010, p. 741).
6. Finally, the system must have a notion of what Schilbach
et al. refer to as emotional engagement. We can consider that
this is related to the intrinsic motivation to share experiences
(Tomasello 2009), partially overlapping with point (1). Interest-
ingly, the implementation of this motivation can be based on
the lower-level detection of contingencies, and creating a form
of internal reward for their detection. This would apply both for
self-contingencies (motivating exploration) and mutual self-other
contingencies, extending motivated exploration and engagement
into the social domain.
As a ﬁrst step toward a second-person robotics, responding to
the 6 deﬁned requirements, we can provide the cognitive
system with mechanisms for contingency (correlation) detection.
This can ﬁrst be applied to self-contingencies that arise during
development, for example, where limb motion leads to perfectly
contingent vision and proprioception, allowing the system to
begin to construct a self-model (Rochat & Striano 2001). This
can then be gracefully extended to provide the basis for self-
object, and self-other contingencies. Again, Schilbach et al.
stress that social engagement and interaction relies crucially on
contingent responses. Thus, as the system detects contingent
responses in the other (e.g., gaze following, imitation of
actions), it will construct the Merleau-Ponty mutual-relation, in
which contingent relations and co-regulations form the basis for
social games and norms in an extended self-other shared body
schema. Such a robotic cognitive system could then be demon-
strated to display child-like responses in the establishment of
social interaction games, including negative emotional responses
when the rules of the games are violated.
Such robotic systems will be used to validate second-person
theories when tested with naïve subjects, and thereby contribute
to shining light on the dark matter of second-person neuroscience.
A principal advantage of robots in second-person neuroscience is
that their behavior can be parametrically controlled within and
between subjects. Although it is difﬁcult to force experimental
confederates to behave in controlled ways (e.g., “move your
eyes but not your head”), robots can produce such behavior. In
this context, we have recently studied human behavior in a
second-person context during human-robot interaction
(Boucher et al. 2012). The goal was to determine whether,
during cooperative physical interaction, humans would exploit
the gaze of their robot cooperator in order to reach more
quickly to an object whose location was indeed indicated both
by the robot’s speech and gaze. We established that in ecological
human–human interactions, naïve subjects indeed exploited gaze
cues from their cooperation partner. We then implemented a
human-based gaze heuristic for the oculomotor system of the
robot, and demonstrated that naïve subjects beneﬁt from robot
gaze in the same way they do with human gaze (Boucher et al.
2012). Interestingly, the experiments also revealed that aspects
of eye and head coordination in human gaze is less deterministic
than we initially considered, and hence led to the potential reﬁne-
ment of the characterization of human gaze in cooperative phys-
ical interaction.
Thus, the development of second-person neuroscience as pro-
posed by Schilbach et al. also helps to lay the groundwork for a
reciprocal interaction between neuroscience and robotics, where
neuroscience helps to deﬁne the system, and robotics provides a
novel tool for implementation and investigation of the emerging
hypotheses.
On projecting grammatical persons into social
neurocognition: A view from linguistics
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Abstract: Though it draws on the grammatical metaphor of person (ﬁrst,
third, second) in terms of representations, Schilbach et al.’s target article
does not consider an orthogonal line of evidence for the centrality of
interaction to social cognition: the many grammatical phenomena, some
widespread cross-linguistically and some only being discovered, which
are geared to supporting real-time interaction. My commentary reviews
these, and the contribution linguistic evidence can make to a fuller
account of social cognition.
Schilbach et al.’s stimulating target article, proposing the central-
ity of real-time encounters to social cognition, tallies with work
from the ﬁeld of linguistics that exposes the intricacy of spoken
interaction and assigns it a dominant role in shaping both social
cognition and overall language structure (Enﬁeld & Levinson
2006). In this commentary, I indicate some grammatical features
of particular interest for social cognition in the hope of developing
more subtle overall hypotheses about interactive social cognition
as played out in verbal interaction.
Any comprehensive theory of social cognition, in neuroscience
as in linguistics, obviously needs to draw on third-, ﬁrst-, and
second-person elements. With regard to the third-person, the epi-
sodic side of this concerns how languages characterize events:
grammatical categories encoding who beneﬁts from the event,
how obligations are created, whether actions are volitional, and
whether agents achieve their goals. Additionally, many languages
grammatically encode more durable information about social
relationships: kinship relations (Evans 2003) or different types
of possession and group afﬁliations relevant to social reasoning.
With regard to ﬁrst-person accounts, the empathetic represen-
tation of others’ experiences, beliefs, and intentions – staple
theory of mind – is enabled by many grammatical devices, includ-
ing complement-taking attitude operators (John believes that …),
and constructions which represent beliefs and intentions as (ﬁcti-
tiously) quoted speech: “he plans/wants to go the river” becomes
“he ‘I will go to the river’ saying-does” in many Papuan languages
(Reesink 1993). Of particular interest here, given that the rep-
resentation of others’ psychological states is mediated and
hypothetical, so hence never truly “ﬁrst person,” are the many
languages which have evolved means of representing the mental
worlds of others in a way that simultaneously depicts them
through two person-perspectives at once (Evans 2006), such as
the “logophoric pronouns” in many West African languages,
which present a third person’s ﬁrst-person perspective.
Though the grammar-derived metaphor of person categories
employed by Schilbach et al. is useful and should generate
fertile new research angles, as we pass to the second person we
note one caveat where the European-grammar-derived categories
might lead us astray. For many of the phenomena in Schilbach
et al.’s article, we are really dealing here with the interaction
between two participants – of a ﬁrst and a second person –
rather than simply of a second person per se, except in the
special case covered in section 3.1.1 under the rubric of “Being
addressed as you.”1 Now many non-Indo-European languages
have four person categories, not three, adding a “ﬁrst-person
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inclusive,” to denote the union of speaker and addressee. A more
precise projection of grammatical metaphors would help draw our
attention to possible differences between truly second-person and
ﬁrst-person inclusive phenomena in speaker-addressee interaction.
Languages are abundantly sensitive to the complexities of inter-
personal interaction, which requires the simultaneous conjuring
of: (a) alternating roles of two people as speaker and addressee,
whereby “I becomes you in the address of the one who in turn
designates himself as I” (Benveniste 1971, pp. 224–25); (b)
footing between participants, such as intimacy or formality con-
ditioning the choice between pronouns like du or Sie; (c) manage-
ment of mutual attention; and (d) the dynamics that follow from
asymmetries in who knows what. I focus below on just (c) and (d).
Regarding (c), a phenomenon only beginning to come to the
attention of linguists, is the category of engagement, which
encodes speaker’s assessments of how far the hearer’s attention
is currently locked in with their own. This can apply to either
events or entities. In the Colombian language Andoke (Landa-
buru 2007) the choice of grammatical auxiliary encodes whether
or not the speaker judges that the addressee is attending to the
event being described. In Turkish (Özyürek & Kita, n.d., unpub-
lished manuscript) there is a three-term demonstrative set: bu
versus o, like “this” versus “that,” encode close versus far from
speaker in situations where joint attention is already established,
but there is an extra term su̧ reserved for situations where joint
attention is still being established.
Regarding (d), knowledge asymmetries between speaker and
hearer –Heritage’s (2012) “epistemic gradient” – are a potent
driver of interactive cognitive coordination, realized most cen-
trally through what Karcevski (1941) called “ignorative-deictic”
systems. This typically pairs a question word (where? when?)
with a deictic response (there! then!) to adjust knowledge rep-
resentations during interaction. As this English example demon-
strates, many languages exhibit tight formal resemblances
between the “ignorative” (≈ interrogative) and “deictic” forms.
In English, the pairings are limited (there is no rhyming deictic
counterpart of who or which). But there are other languages,
such as Japanese and Tamil, where perfect formal proportions
run through extensive systems organized around different episte-
mic domains (including many – like “in which manner,” “which
side” – that are not obviously lexicalized in English). Japanese is
particularly informative here, because its deictic series regularly
opposes three values: near the speaker (k-initial, e.g., kore “this
one”), near the addressee (s-initial: sore “that one near you”)
and near neither (a-initial: are “that one [near neither of us]).
We do not yet know if this shapes different attentional strategies
in English and Japanese demonstrative use.
Some epistemic asymmetries reﬂect the difference between
what is subjectively knowable (e.g., “feel lonely”) and what can be
known by observation (e.g., give outward signs of feeling lonely).
Many languages, for example, Japanese, employ different gramma-
tical constructions for these two types. Interestingly, as interactants
pass from statement (“I am lonely”) to question (“Are you lonely?”),
the locus of “subjective authority” is passed to the addressee, sanc-
tioning the use of the basic “private predicate” form in the second
person (and now no longer applicable to the ﬁrst).
Ultimately we must seek a model of social cognition that is
equally informed by neuroscience and by linguistics. Studies of
diverse grammatical systems and how they are used have the
advantage of drawing on the variety of cognitively congenial
systems evolved by different communities through time and – by
hypothesis – potentially reconﬁguring the brains of different
language-speakers in subtly varying ways, which should form the
subject matter for a second-generation of second-person neuro-
science that includes interaction with language structure, as well
as interaction with addressees.
NOTE
1. See Wechsler (2010) for a synthesis of linguistic observations regard-
ing the issue of self-ascription (i.e., who is the “self” addressed by “you”).
From synthetic modeling of social interaction
to dynamic theories of brain–body–
environment–body–brain systems
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12001902
Tom Froese,a,b Hiroyuki Iizuka,c and Takashi Ikegamia
aIkegami Laboratory, Department of General Systems Studies, Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, Tokyo 153 8902, Japan;
bDepartamento de Ciencias de la Computación, Instituto de Investigaciones
en Matemáticas Aplicadas y en Sistemas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, Apdo. 20-726, 01000 Mexico D.F., Mexico; cDepartment of
Bioinformatic Engineering, Human Information Engineering Laboratory,
Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, University of Osaka,
Osaka 565-0871, Japan.
t.froese@gmail.com
iizuka@ist.osaka-u.ac.jp
ikeg@sacral.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp
http://froese.wordpress.com
http://www-hiel.ist.osaka-u.ac.jp/∼iizuka/Hiroyuki_Iizuka.html
http://sacral.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
Abstract: Synthetic approaches to social interaction support the
development of a second-person neuroscience. Agent-based models and
psychological experiments can be related in a mutually informing
manner. Models have the advantage of making the nonlinear brain–
body–environment–body–brain system as a whole accessible to analysis
by dynamical systems theory. We highlight some general principles of
how social interaction can partially constitute an individual’s behavior.
We agree with Schilbach et al. that the neuroscience of sociality
should be enriched by a better understanding of the constitutive
role of social interaction. An important challenge faced by the
development of a second-person neuroscience is to devise new
concepts and methods that can adequately capture and explain
its complex dynamics.
From a dynamical perspective, an agent’s behavior is an emer-
gent property of the brain–body–environment nonlinear system
(Beer 2000). The parametric coupling between subsystems (i.e.,
its brain, body, and environment) constitutes one encompassing
system, and it is only in this holistic context that the agent’s behav-
ior can be distinguished as such. The same applies to social behav-
ior among several agents. In the case when the current
environment of an agent A includes another agent B, and vice
versa, their mutual nonlinear coupling entails the temporary con-
stitution of a multi-agent system (Froese & Di Paolo 2011a). On
this view, social interaction is one kind of process in an irreducible
“brain–body–environment–body–brain” system as a whole, as
shown in Figure 1.
One insight that follows from this approach is that uni-direc-
tionally coupled agents (i.e., A is a detached observer of B) and
mutually coupled agents (i.e., A and B interact with each other)
are fundamentally different kinds of systems. In the former situ-
ation, common in the literature but hardly deserving to be
called “social,” B is merely an independent parameter of A’s
environment. In the latter situation, the nonlinear coupling
between A and B results in emergent structures of the interaction
process that provide top-down modulation of the two agents’ be-
havior. Therefore, the effective degrees of freedom of an agent
involved in social interaction will continually be modiﬁed. This
provides a basic dynamical account of the intuition expressed by
Schilbach et al. that “social cognition is fundamentally different
when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observ-
ing them” (target article, Abstract). Furthermore, we do not need
to assume any specialized neural modules to explain such qualitat-
ive difference in brain activity, because it is the interaction process
itself that constitutes the systemic difference.
As a case in point, this insight allows us to clearly distinguish
between the two situations of “double TV monitor” experiments
(Murray & Trevarthen 1985): When an infant is interacting with
its mother via the live video transmission, there is one kind of
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overall system; when it is watching the mother via video playback,
there is a qualitatively different kind of system. This systemic
difference between the two situations allows us to explain qualitat-
ive changes in the infant’s behavior in a relational manner, since
the behavior is either part of a social interaction or it is not.
Various models of this experimental setup have repeatedly con-
ﬁrmed that the removal of mutual responsiveness, that is, social
contingency, through playback will lead to qualitative changes in
an agent’s behavior, even without the presence of specialized
neural modules inside of the agent’s brain (Froese & Di Paolo
2008; Froese & Fuchs 2012; Iizuka & Di Paolo 2007; Ikegami
& Iizuka 2007).
Moreover, only mutually coupled systems offer the possibility
that the behaviors of the agents become entrained in such a way
that the social interaction process is conditioned by its own self-
sustaining organization. The implications of such autonomous
interaction dynamics have been much discussed by the enactive
approach to social cognition (De Jaegher et al. 2010). Various
models have investigated the dynamical underpinnings of auton-
omous interaction processes, and illustrated how they enable
and constrain individual behavior (De Jaegher & Froese 2009).
It appears that one important explanatory factor is the increased
stability of mutually responsive engagement (Di Paolo et al.
2008), which can in some cases make it easier for agents to
jointly achieve tasks, but in other cases makes it more difﬁcult
for them to escape from the constraints of their mutual entrain-
ment (Froese & Di Paolo 2010).
The systemic differences between detached social observation
and mutual social interaction are even more pronounced when
we consider that social interaction is normally not merely about
mutual coupling, like the passive exchange of heat among commu-
ters standing inside a packed metro. Social interaction is about
coordinating to devise and realize shared goals (Froese & Di
Paolo 2011a). One agent’s behavior creates an opening for a
joint action that can only be realized through the appropriate be-
havior of another agent. For instance, the act of giving a present to
someone is constituted by one’s giving as well as the other’s receiv-
ing (without the other’s corresponding act of acceptance the
necessary conditions of one’s giving cannot be satisﬁed).
A special property of social coordination is that it enables ﬂex-
ible renegotiation of an interaction process; robotic and modeling
research has shown that such renegotiations can emerge spon-
taneously from the interaction dynamics (Froese & Di Paolo
2011b; Quinn et al. 2003). One reason for this ﬂexibility is that
agents are able to co-regulate their internal dynamics via the inter-
action process (Froese & Fuchs 2012; Froese et al. 2012). They
take advantage of the fact that they constitute one complex
system, and that the organization of the state-space of each
brain component is partially dependent on the organization of
the state-space of the whole brain–body–environment–body–
brain system.
Finally, we emphasize that this dynamical systems approach is
suitable for taking the ﬁrst-person perspective into account.
These models can supplement traditional methods of phenomen-
ology (Froese & Gallagher 2010), and they serve as a bridge
between second-person neuroscience and phenomenological
accounts of intersubjectivity (Froese & Fuchs 2012; Froese &
Gallagher 2012).
The brain as part of an enactive system
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Abstract: The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the
brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-
representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it
does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it
is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain
limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright
posture, etc. coping with speciﬁc kinds of environments, and with other
people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective
conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view,
rather than representing or computing information, the brain is better
conceived as participating in the action.
We applaud Schilbach et al. on the long overdue venture to deﬁne
a second-person neuroscience and to improve the neuroscientiﬁc
study of social cognition. At the same time, we see an unresolved
Figure 1 (Froese et al.). Illustration of a dynamical perspective on the interaction between two situated, embodied agents. Following the
approach advocated by Beer (2000), an agent’s nervous system (abbreviated as “brain”), body, and environment are each conceptualized
as dynamical systems that are parametrically coupled. Here we extend this approach to show that when agent A is interacting with agent B
their mutual coupling constitutes a brain–body–environment–body–brain system. Social interaction is partially constitutive of social
cognition: An individual agent’s social behavior depends on the coupling of all the subsystems and cannot properly be attributed to
any one component in isolation from the others.
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tension in their account. Speciﬁcally, their questions about how
the brain functions during interaction continue to reﬂect the con-
servative nature of “normal science” (in the Kuhnian sense),
invoking classical computational models, representationalism,
localization of function, and so forth. Yet, in proposing an enactive
interpretation of the mirror neuron system (MNS), Schilbach
et al. point beyond this orthodox framework to the possibility of
rethinking not just the neural correlates of social cognition, but
the very notion of neural correlate, and how the brain itself works.
The enactive interpretation is not simply a reinterpretation of
what happens extra-neurally, out in the intersubjective world of
action where we anticipate and respond to social affordances.
More than this, it suggests a different way of conceiving brain
function, speciﬁcally in nonrepresentational, integrative and dyna-
mical terms (see, e.g., Hutto & Myin 2013). Although Schilbach
et al. point clearly in the direction of ecologically valid enactive
designs for investigating social interaction, they constantly fall
back to the language of neural correlates, singling out measurable
brain activation as the most relevant explanans. This vestige of
neurocentrism is at odds with the path-breaking potential of a
second-person neuroscience.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology
goes hand in hand with orthodox computational models. Standard
use of fMRI provides an excellent tool to answer precisely the
kinds of questions that can be asked within this approach. Yet,
at the limits of this science, a variety of studies challenge accepted
views about anatomical and functional segregation (e.g., Shack-
man et al. 2011; Shuler & Bear 2006), the adequacy of short-
term task-based fMRI experiments to provide an adequate
conception of brain function (Gonzalez-Castillo et al. 2012),
and individual differences in Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent
(BOLD) contrasts in subjects performing the same cognitive
task (Miller et al. 2012). Such studies point to embodied phenom-
ena (e.g., pain, emotion, hedonic aspects) that are not
appropriately characterized in representational terms but are
dynamically integrated with their central elaboration.
Consider also recent challenges to the idea that so-called men-
talizing areas (cortical midline structures) are dedicated to any one
function. Are such areas activated for mindreading (Frith & Frith
2008; Vogeley et al. 2001), or folk psychological narrative (Perner
et al. 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003); a default mode (e.g., Raichle
et al. 2001), or other functions such as autobiographical memory,
navigation, and future planning (see Buckner & Carroll 2007;
Spreng et al. 2008); or self-related tasks (Northoff & Bermpohl
2004); or, more general reﬂective problem-solving (Legrand &
Ruby 2009)? Or are they trained up for joint attention in social
interaction, as Schilbach et al. suggest; or all of the above and
others yet to be discovered?
Neuroscience, like any other discipline, works with limited
vocabularies and limited tools in a limited theoretical space. The
technical limitations are, as Schilbach et al. make clear, even
more obvious in the study of social cognition. In a scanner, two
is already a crowd and three is impossible (also see Dumas
2011). In contrast to the computational/representational ortho-
doxy of fMRI, the enactive approach not only adds extra-neural
externalities and interaction to the explanatory mix, but also rede-
ﬁnes the role of the brain – the way the brain actually works in this
mix –moving away from any idea of social cognition as a meeting
of brains (Schilbach et al.’s Fig. 1).
The explanatory unit of social interaction is not the brain, or
even two (or more) brains, but a dynamic relation between organ-
isms, which include brains, but also their own structural features
that enable speciﬁc perception-action loops involving social and
physical environments, which in turn effect statistical regularities
that shape the structure of the nervous system (Gallagher 2005).
The question is, what do brains do in the complex and dynamic
mix of interactions that involve moving, gesturing, expressive
bodies, with eyes and faces and hands and voices; bodies that
are gendered and raced, and dressed to attract, or to work or
play; bodies that incorporate artifacts, tools, and technologies,
that are situated in various physical environments, and deﬁned
by diverse social roles and institutional practices?
The answer is that the brain participates in a system, along with
eyes and face and hands and voice, and so on, that enactively
anticipates and responds to its environment. How an agent
responds will depend to some degree on the overall dynamical
state of the brain and the various, speciﬁc and relevant neuronal
processes that have been attuned by evolutionary pressures, but
also by personal experiences (the historicity, as Schilbach et al.
put it) of the agent (see Slaby et al. [in press] for evidence of
this in depression). How an agent responds also depends on the
worldly and intentional circumstances of the agent, the bodily
skills and habits she has formed, her physical condition, a
variety of so-called extraneous factors (see, e.g., Danziger et al.
2011), the person(s) with whom she is interacting, and what the
other person may expect in terms of normative standards stem-
ming from communal and institutional practices.
When a person turns her gaze towards you or reaches out to
touch you, what happens is not just that her visual and motor cor-
texes are activated; what happens also includes her eye move-
ments and the movements of her arm that require peripheral
(proprioceptive) and vestibular involvement. None of these
things happen, however, if you are not there, and whatever
happens next depends on your response, which involves your
eye movements, facial expression, and what you do with your
hands – which further involve peripheral and central processes
that may be controlled more by her than by you, and perhaps
by the fact that you are in a dance hall and dressed to the hilt.
There is no denying that the brain has a role to play, but an expla-
nation of what is going on here can never be cast solely in terms
of neurons or mental states. If we are looking for an explanation
of social cognition and interaction – the kind of things that
happen in the world rather than in the brain, or scanner, or
lab – then, as Schilbach et al. suggest, we need to employ a
multiplicity of methods which includes neuroscience as one
among many.
Why not the ﬁrst-person plural in social
cognition?
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Abstract: Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions,
the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared
intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of
the action scene from the perspective of the group (the “we-mode”).
This ﬁrst-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and
preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
Individualism is an entrenched and implicit assumption of a good
number of mind and society studies. The role of the individual in
guiding reﬂection about the nature of social cognition is tradition-
ally presented under the view that interpersonal understanding
can be achieved by passive, individual agents who process the rel-
evant information about other agents “from the inside,” by simply
observing them in action. It is the great merit of Schilbach et al.’s
target article to have paved the way for a signiﬁcant alternative to
observational theories of social cognition based on modes of cog-
nition other than the individual. Yet a central constituent of this
alternative, the procedural dimension to social understanding, is
construed along argumentative lines that raise several concerns.
One line in particular, which is related to the way in which
mental states are shared in relational dynamics, relies on
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assumptions that might well turn out to be at odds with some
aspects of the authors’ proposal.
The target article discusses the concept of shared mental states
mainly in the context of the empirical literature on joint attention,
which in turn draws on philosophical work about collective inten-
tionality (Tomasello 2009; Gallotti 2012). On one possible
reading, a state of shared intentionality can be described as one
in which individual agents think and act in the ﬁrst person-
plural (“we”), meaning in an irreducibly collective mode of cogni-
tion called the “we-mode” (Gallotti & Frith 2013). Hence, joint
attention is, in the words of the target article, the experience of
“attending to something together with someone and being
aware that ‘we both’ are attending” (sect. 3.1.2, para. 2). This
sense of “we-ness” evidently echoes the sort of directedness
towards each other’s mind (“you-and-me”) that captures the gist
of the second-person perspective. But the commonality is not
merely conceptual. Both approaches direct philosophical and
scientiﬁc attention to the sort of meeting of minds that is
claimed to be characteristic of awareness of other minds. So the
target article goes further in suggesting that the commonality is
of substance and purpose: cognizing in the ﬁrst-person plural
(we) can be subsumed under the second-person label (you).
It is certainly the case that acting together produces a form of
mental “attunement” that could not be attained if one’s action
was conceived of in abstraction, or in isolation, from that of
others. But the point is to specify the exact aspect of real-time
interaction that individuates the relevant meeting of minds, and
this is where the authors’ suggestion should be resisted on motiva-
tional and conceptual grounds. With regard to the motive,
we-mode theorists traditionally postulate ﬁrst-person plural rep-
resentations (“we-representations”) to gain a better understanding
of phenomena of sociality that could only be partially explained by
representations which specify features of actions solely from the
perspective of the ﬁrst-person thinking and experiencing subject
“I”. For example, research in group behavior shows that team-rea-
soners have a broader grasp of the action scene, which therefore
narrows the range of possible interpretations of each player’s be-
havior, than a purely distributive, that is, individualistic, account of
strategic interaction would achieve (Bacharach 2006). This is
because individuals understand the action scene from a shared
point of view, namely one that maps their own and the others’
action planning onto a group perspective (Tsai et al. 2011). Of
course, people acting as a group see things differently from
people acting as single agents. But the point of the we-mode is
not that ongoing interaction plays a constitutive role for social
knowing; it is that individuals are capable of thinking of them-
selves and the others as plural rather than single subjects of
thought and agency. This move makes an important step
forward from individualistic approaches to social cognition, but
it certainly is not anti-individualistic enough to meet the standards
of the second-person approach. Neither is it constrained by the
anti-mechanistic spirit of the target article, because we-mode the-
orists aim to develop a causal-psychological account of the cogni-
tive processes involved in group-thinking. It is this constraint that
raises further conceptual doubts about the similarity of the you-
and the we-mode approach.
In analyses of shared intentionality, the concept of we-ness has
considerable explanatory power. The concept offers a vivid grasp
of what it means to mutually understand each other and interact,
precisely in terms of the individual agents’ perceiving themselves
as a “we” doing things together. The current challenge for
research in shared intentionality is to look down at low-level
parts of the architecture of the brain that might instantiate the
kind of functions identiﬁed as processes of we-thinking. Some of
these processes are likely to be implicit: Although the experience
of we-ness can rise to the level of consciousness, it need not do so
(Frith 2012a). That is, people do not have to be in the mental state
of attending to themselves as members of the same group for
mutual understanding and interaction to occur. If this character-
ization of the we-mode turned out to be robust enough, then
this would be, at least partly, consistent with the claim of
second-person theorists that no discrete form of psychological
awareness needs to be internally generated and introspected
upon as a prerequisite of social cognition. However, if nomechan-
ism whatsoever is postulated for the idea that knowledge of other
minds consists in directly perceiving your mind towards me, then
something important seems to be left out of the picture. What is
the exact process whereby experience of reciprocity alone secures
full understanding of minds? Furthermore, if one succeeded in
answering this question without reference to individual mechan-
isms, what would the advantage of this explanatory effort be
after all? These are important questions for critically engaging
the two literatures on the we- and the you-mode. They are
especially important for generating the appropriate operationali-
zation of the relevant theoretical constructs which will be so
crucial for future experimental studies.
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Abstract: A second-person perspective in neuroscience is particularly
appropriate for the study of communication. We describe how the
investigation of joint language tasks can contribute to our understanding
of the mechanisms underlying interaction.
Schilbach et al. make a powerful case that researchers should
study social cognition and social neuroscience using interactive
rather than observational paradigms. In this commentary, we
claim that the most important basis for interaction is communi-
cation (where the interlocutors know that interaction is necessary
for them to achieve their goal). As communication typically
involves language, it is especially important that the language
sciences assume a second-person perspective.
Perhaps surprisingly, the vast majority of work on language has
considered isolated examples of production (e.g., naming pic-
tures) or comprehension (e.g., reading texts), whether using be-
havioral or neuroscientiﬁc methods (e.g., Traxler 2012). But it is
undeniable that dialogue is the basic site for language use, in
both developmental and evolutionary terms (Clark 1996; Picker-
ing & Garrod 2004). It is therefore the right time to conduct
extensive “second-person” research in language use.
The little experimental work on dialogue has tended to involve
two interlocutors jointly performing a task (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs 1986) and indicates the importance of feedback on commu-
nicative success (e.g., Bavelas et al. 2000). There is clear evidence
of entrainment, at levels from syntax (Branigan et al. 2000) to
speech rate (Giles et al. 1991). Recent work has studied brain acti-
vation during speaking and listening (Menenti et al. 2011) and
showed that communicative success correlates with the extent
to which activity in the listener’s brain anticipates activity in corre-
sponding areas of the speaker’s brain (Stephens et al. 2010).
But we believe that greater understanding is likely to result
from studies of moment-by-moment processing in pairs of partici-
pants. Pickering and Garrod (2103) have argued that highly
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interactive uses of language in dialogue are rendered possible by
underlying (predictive) mechanisms common to language pro-
duction and comprehension. To test accounts such as this, we
propose the use of joint language tasks in a way that is analogous
to testing whether co-actors form representations of each other’s
actions (i.e., of their own performed actions and of another’s
observed actions; Sebanz et al. 2006). Such tasks should of
course involve two speakers “talking together”; however, we
argue they need not necessarily involve fully-ﬂedged interaction
(i.e., “talking to each other”).
One way of “talking together,” for example, is talking at the
same time. Albeit rare in natural conversations, it is theoretically
interesting to investigate what happens when production and
comprehension occur simultaneously. If the two share mechan-
isms, one would sometimes expect interference when they are
engaged concurrently (Gambi & Pickering 2011). Another way
of “talking together” is completing each other’s utterances. Para-
digms in which speakers are asked to jointly produce a sentence
allow tests of the hypothesis that, given shared mechanisms
between production and comprehension, coordinating with
others is similar to coordinating with oneself. For example,
timing in speech is affected by properties of upcoming linguistic
elements (e.g., Grifﬁn 2003). One could therefore ask whether
it is also affected by the properties of an expected continuation
by somebody other than the current speaker.
Although such tasks are unlike natural dialogue in many ways,
they allow us to test the role of predictions about what another
speaker is about to say. Thus, they can investigate questions
like: How do beliefs about one’s interlocutor inﬂuence anticipat-
ory adaptation to their upcoming utterances? What is the
minimum degree of interaction necessary for such beliefs to be
taken into account in the ﬁrst place? To what extent are beliefs
modiﬁed as a result of the interaction? In addition, such tasks
allow tight experimental control and therefore permit a meaning-
ful comparison between “isolated talking” and “talking together,”
since in natural conversations it is much harder to disentangle the
relative contribution of beliefs about one’s partner from the direct
inﬂuence of what they say or do during the interaction itself.
The latter point also relates to the interesting observation that
there are various ways of entering a joint activity, with explicit
commitments to shared goals and seamlessly automatic entrain-
ment playing different roles at different times (Tollefsen & Dale
2012). Interestingly, the gaze coordination task proposed by Schil-
bach et al. could be used both in the investigation of how low-level
entrainment inﬂuences the perception of being in a joint activity
and in the study of how higher-level beliefs inﬂuence interactional
dynamics (sect. 3.2.1). Similarly, with the joint sentence pro-
duction task mentioned above, it would be possible to investigate
how the degree of achieved coordination inﬂuences beliefs and
feelings towards one’s interlocutor, as well as the extent to
which previous knowledge about one’s interlocutor and their
utterances affects the amount of coordination attained.
Finally, communication is best seen as existing on a continuum
from monologue at one end to truly interactive dialogue at the
other. In a casual conversation between intimates, the “ﬂow” from
one speaker to the other is likely to be seamless and the conversation
is internally managed (i.e., the participants control the nature of the
interaction). In a more formal situation such as an interview, a large-
group discussion, or an audience attending to a story, the opportu-
nities to interact are limited and are constrained by social rules.
Linguistic communication, therefore, represents an ideal case for
the study of what it means to interact, because it allows researchers
to compare behavior or neural activity in settings involving different
degrees of interactivity. The study of communication is therefore
likely to be very fruitful in the development of a second-person per-
spective in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences.
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Abstract: In the target article, Schilbach et al. defend a “second-person
neuroscience” perspective that focuses on the neural basis of social
cognition during live, ongoing interactions between individuals. We
argue that a second-person neuroscience would beneﬁt from formal
approaches borrowed from economics and behavioral ecology and that it
should be extended to social interactions in nonhuman animals.
The “second-person neuroscience” proposed by Schilbach et al. in
the target article proffers the intriguing idea that social cognition
during real-time interactions with another individual may be fun-
damentally different from passive observations of another’s
actions. Understanding the contribution of neural processes to
ongoing interactions with complex beings is a fascinating research
direction, with potential implications for the treatment of dis-
orders attended by social deﬁcits, as well as for ethics and
public policy.
Several decades of neuroscientiﬁc research have sketched out
the neural circuits that may translate perceptual information
about other individuals into purposeful action. Speciﬁcally,
regions of the human and nonhuman primate brain including
the superior temporal sulcus and fusiform face area contribute
to social identiﬁcation (Tsao et al. 2008). The ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and striatum appear to play a
role in translating knowledge of others into motivational signals
(Azzi et al. 2012; Burke et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2010). The
anterior cingulate cortex and fronto-insular cortex contribute to
empathy and other-regarding cognition (Chang et al. 2013;
Decety 2010; Gu et al. 2010). The so-called mentalizing and mir-
roring networks appear to participate in action and intention
understanding (Becchio et al. 2012; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia
2010). Circuits connecting these areas could translate social per-
ceptual information into appropriate actions via decision-making
mechanisms (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 2011; Knoch et al. 2009).
To better understand the neural mechanisms underlying social
cognition, we propose that social neuroscience needs to ground its
predictions and hypotheses in a formal framework such as that
provided by behavioral game theory (Dorris & Glimcher 2004;
Gintis 2009; Kosfeld et al. 2005; Lee 2008; Platt & Glimcher
1999; Tomlin et al. 2006). Schilbach et al. criticize game theoreti-
cal approaches for not recreating the dynamics of everyday real-
life social encounters, but this common opposition has been
rebutted before (Gintis 2009). Game theoretical frameworks are
general and open, allowing formal delineation of speciﬁc hypoth-
eses while not imposing restrictions on the behaviors that are
being described. Formal approaches borrowed from economics,
game theory, and behavioral ecology have been extremely useful
in describing decisions in dynamic foraging or social environments
(Chang et al. 2011; Hayden et al. 2011; Lee 2008; Sugrue et al.
2004).
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These approaches can be extended to describe the dynamics of
interacting individuals, with several advantages. First, they allow
us to generate empirically testable and mathematically formaliz-
able predictions about the neural mechanisms that could underlie
decisions in complex social environments. Second, they allow for
comparative analyses of decision processes in humans and other
animals with respect to the demands placed on them in speciﬁc
physical and social environments (Heilbronner et al. 2008; Kacel-
nik & Bateson 1996; Stephens et al. 2002).
Schilbach et al. also raise the concern that classical game theory
paradigms involve mainly one-shot interactions or turn-taking.
Although this structure is often used for simplicity, we contend
that continuous interactions in interactive games can also be effec-
tively described using a similar theoretical framework (Braun et al.
2009; Debreu 1952). Such mathematical tools would help trans-
late some of the intuitive aspects of Schilbach et al.’s approach
into concrete experimental predictions.
Second-person neuroscience would also beneﬁt from broaden-
ing its inquiry to the interactions of nonhuman animals (Chang
et al. 2011; Fujii et al. 2007; Washburn et al. 1990). Social com-
plexity appears to have favored the evolution of higher social cog-
nition in animals that have brains similar to ours, like macaques
(Azzi et al. 2012; Barsalou, 2005; Chang et al. 2012; Rudebeck
et al. 2006; Tsao et al. 2008) and in animals that have very differ-
ent brains as well, like scrub jays and rooks (Bird & Emery 2010;
Emery & Clayton 2001). We know from research in macaques,
sheep, and mice that social cognition in mammals appears to
rely on neural circuits that are similar, and perhaps homologous,
to those in humans (Azzi et al. 2012; Barsalou, 2005; Jeon et al.
2010; Rudebeck et al. 2006; Sanchez-Andrade & Kendrick
2009; Tsao et al. 2008). One possible explanation is that we inher-
ited those circuits from a common ancestor that possessed some
level of social complexity. Alternatively, similar constraints apply-
ing to neural circuits could also have caused them to evolve in
similar ways to support similar functions. How such functions
are accomplished by neural circuits in animals with brains that
are very different from our own – such as birds – remains an
open question.
We agree with Schilbach et al. that studying the neural pro-
cesses mediating live interaction between real agents is crucial
for the maturation of social neuroscience as a discipline. What
we propose is to supplement this approach with formal game
theory and value-based analysis of preferences in humans and
nonhuman animals. In our lab, for example, we study pairs of
monkeys interacting both in economical and interactive games
(Chang et al. 2011; Chang et al. 2013). Estimating preferences
allows us to quantify how much monkeys value certain options
(e.g., giving juice to another monkey). Game theory will allow
us to generate predictions of the equilibriums that could
develop over time between two interacting individuals (see
Braun et al. 2009). Understanding the neural processes that
underlie social cognition in such animals could powerfully
inform our understanding of the evolutionary origins of our own
social abilities.
Second person neuroscience needs theories
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Abstract: Advancing second-person neuroscience will need strong
theories, as well as the new methods detailed by Schilbach et al. I assess
computational theories, enactive theories, and cognitive/information
processing theories, and argue that information processing approaches
have an important role to play in second-person neuroscience. They
provide the closest link to brain imaging and can give important insights
into social behaviour.
Schillbach et al. make a strong case that studying human social be-
haviour requires more than our traditional “isolation paradigms.”
They detail a number of methods which will allow the neuroscien-
tists of the future to study social interaction in a more meaningful
way. They also suggest that new theoretical approaches are
needed, going beyond traditional cognitive theories. However,
they dedicate much less space to specifying what these new the-
ories should be. In this commentary, I would like to reiterate
the need for strong theories to drive forward the ﬁeld of
second-person neuroscience. Such theories must be clearly speci-
ﬁed so that other researchers can test them, and must be falsiﬁ-
able because theories that accept all data do not make strong
predictions.
Here I consider three possible categories of theories drawn
from different research traditions: computational models, dynami-
cal systems, and cognitive models. I suggest that cognitive/infor-
mation-processing models remain the most promising, but that
all three approaches may be able to converge.
First, advances in the non-social domains of reinforcement
learning and motor control have led to computational models of
social interaction. Such models often use tasks or games derived
from game-theory in which people interact within a set of rules.
Impressive localisation of speciﬁc computational parameters in
the brain has been possible with these models (Behrens et al.
2009; Hampton et al. 2008; Tomlin et al. 2006). Other related
approaches include adapting motor control models to control
not just physical objects (e.g., a tennis racket), but also social
objects (e.g., another person) (Wolpert et al. 2003). These compu-
tational approaches are very powerful in the cases where the
model can be speciﬁed. However, a current limitation is that
these models are only applied to abstract, rule-bound contexts
(e.g., iterated trust games). Such tasks are somewhat artiﬁcial
and lack many of the behavioural cues (eye gaze, emotion, etc.)
of real social interactions.
Second, research derived from ecological psychology and dyna-
mical systems has led to an enactive approach to social neuro-
science (Thompson 2007). This approach rejects traditional
cognitive models, together with ideas of symbolic information pro-
cessing and representation. Instead, it relies on dynamical systems
(Port & van Gelder 1995; Thelen & Smith 1996). A key idea is that
social cognition exists in the interactions between agents rather
than in the information processing within the head of a single
agent (De Jaegher et al. 2010). The target article endorses these
approaches, and they seem particularly useful in thinking about
infant development. However, there seems to be some tension
between the claims of the strong enactivist models, and the neu-
roimaging method, which remains routed in studying activation
within one brain at a time. This is clear in Figure 1 of the target
article, which assumes localised information processing systems
within each brain as the originators of the dynamic social
interaction.
These diagrams of brain systems seem more compatible with a
third approach, that of embodied information processing models.
This type of model emphasises the overlap of motor, propriocep-
tive, linguistic and affective information processing streams (Prinz
2005). It thus rejects the strict modularisation of Fodor but retains
the cognitive idea that the brain is an information processing
device and that we can localise speciﬁc types of processing to
speciﬁc areas of cortex. Such information processing models
have in the past been used to describe performance on “spectator-
ial” tasks and in contexts without dynamics. However, this does
not mean that they should always be used in this way.
An example of a more socially engaged information processing
model is the STORM (social top-down response modulation)
model (Wang & Hamilton 2012). This is based on the idea the
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human brain contains a visuomotor processing stream (Cisek &
Kalaska 2010) embedded within parietal and premotor cortex.
This visuomotor stream is called the perception–behaviour
expressway in social psychology (Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001)
and is also present in ideomotor theories of action (Prinz 2005).
It is likely to incorporate the “human mirror neuron system”
and its behaviour is almost certainly determined by associative
learning over the lifetime (Heyes 2011). The central claim of
the STORM theory is that information processing within the
visuomotor stream is subtly and dynamically modulated by other
social brain systems. For example, the tendency to spontaneously
mimic other people is rapidly modulated by eye contact signals
(Wang et al. 2010), and this modulation is implemented by proces-
sing in medial prefrontal cortex and enhanced connections from
medial prefrontal cortex to superior temporal sulcus (STS)
(Wang et al. 2011). Thus, key regions of the social brain (medial
prefrontal cortex, mPFC) regulate information processing in the
visuomotor stream (superior temporal sulcus, STS). In other con-
texts, other social brain systems such as those linked to reward and
motivational processing are also likely to modulate the basic visuo-
motor stream. The key predictions of this model are that during
dynamic interactions top-down inﬂuences on the visuomotor
stream should be clearly visible. However, upward information
ﬂow from motor systems to mentalising systems (as suggested
by simulation models; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011) should be less
prominent. Such predictions can be tested behaviourally or by
means of neuroimaging combined with dynamic causal modelling
(Friston et al. 2003).
It is not yet clear which of these three quite different categories
of theory will provide the clearest answers to core questions about
human social interaction and the functioning of the social brain.
Here, I make the case for using information processing models
in second-person neuroscience. Just because information proces-
sing approaches have sometimes been “spectatorial” or have
lacked dynamics does not mean that they should always be this
way. These models can be closely linked to brain activation, can
be applied across a large number of contexts including psychiatric
disorders, and are testable using methods like dynamic causal
modelling.
Whichever type of theory ultimately prevails, having published
theories will help to drive the ﬁeld forward. In the new realm of
interaction neuroscience, strong theories and clear models will
help us choose which of the many possible experiments are
worth pursuing, and will make our work more than just butterﬂy
collecting.
From the bottom up: The roots of social
neuroscience at risk of running dry?
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Abstract: A second-person neuroscience, as an emerging area of
neuroscience and the behavioral sciences, cannot afford to avoid a
bottom-up, subcortical, and conative-affective perspective. An example
with canid social play and a modern motivational behavioral
neursocience will illustrate our point.
We agree with Schilbach et al.’s suggestion that investigation of
social cognition is too often restricted to passive observation,
and social cognition is entirely different when one is interacting
and emotionally engaged with others. We applaud their proposal
for further investigation into second-person information but
suggest their outlook for future research is limited. We encourage
investigation beyond the traditional parameters of social knowing.
We suggest less emphasis on social “cognition” and more on a
direct interaction between systems responsible for immediate
social perception, affective processing and action. We propose a
shift in focus, away from corticocentricity – a hierarchical
interpretation of the brain with the cortex as the centre for
“higher cognition,” responsible for top-down monitoring of sub-
cortical structures (Parvizi 2009) – and toward social understand-
ing as a dynamic system supported by bottom-up processes.
Recent theories suggest that behavior is modulated by affective
and conative processing of physical and social environmental
stimuli (Berridge 2003; Panksepp 1998, Siviy & Panksepp 2011).
Due to the homology of affective systems among mammals,
foundations of the human social mind can be investigated by
studying subcortical systems, as done with other animals. In
doing so, a biological component is added to social behavior
without a restrictive emphasis on higher order processes. If adopt-
ing a functional and evolutionary framework, then canine social
play is an ideal behavioral phenotype to consider for investigations
into social knowing. Canine social play is a dynamic social inter-
action involving emotionally engaged conspeciﬁcs, modulated by
subcortical processes.
Schilbach et al. identify three aspects of social interaction that
are important for research in social neuroscience. Each aspect is
evident in canine social play. First, a social encounter involves
two players – an initiator and a responder. During the social play
routine one dog elicits a response from another. The responder
perceives and responds to socially relevant cues. The play bow
is one cue that signals the invitation to play plus the intention to
maintain play. The encounter requires frequent reappraisals; if
one partner becomes too aggressive, play stops and that partner
must modify their behavior in order for play to resume. The
bow can signal reappraisal of a preceding action, and reinforce
the intention to play (Bekoff 2008; Burghardt 2005). Consistent
modiﬁcation of approach and response relies on rapid recognition
of the state of the other and ﬂexibility in action output.
The playful interaction is dynamic, rich in anticipation, prep-
aration, and revision, consisting of reciprocities based on percep-
tion of socially relevant information prompting a response. In
keeping with Schilbach et al.’s description of a social interaction,
reciprocities that occur during a play encounter may be sequen-
tial, but not predictable. Social play can be considered a system
that evolves in response to the environment. It is a stable
system as there may be a repertoire of behaviors, and unstable
because the expression of the repertoire is nonlinear – it is respon-
sive, and dynamic (Fentress & Gadbois 2001; Fentress &McLeod
1986; Smith & Thelen, 2003; Thelen & Smith 1994).
Second, the play interaction demands cooperation. Play is a
voluntary encounter built on shared intentions and negotiations
to initiate and maintain play at nonaggressive levels (Bekoff
2004; 2008). In a cooperative manner, threats of aggression are
absent when large partners self-handicap and dominants exhibit
role reversals (Bekoff 2004; Burghardt 2005). Critical to the inter-
action is the perception of sensory cues that indicate more than
agency. It involves recognition of the state of the other, intentions,
reconciliation, and consolation. We suggest social play is indicative
of empathic responding between conspeciﬁcs. It may involve a
same or similar mechanism that supports post-conﬂict afﬁliative
(conciliatory) behavior (de Waal 2008; Palagi & Cordoni 2009).
Third, play emerges in the young without training and con-
tinues throughout the life span, even after maturation of the moti-
vational system for aggression and sexual maturation. Because
play is observed in the wild among wolves and feral dogs, it is
not considered an artifact of domestication (Bauer & Smuts
2007). Play may be an intrinsic function supported by a play-
speciﬁc motivational system (Panksepp 1998). Social isolates
show high levels of play-seeking behavior (Burghardt 2005),
higher than controls (Panksepp 1998). Decorticates show
normal levels of play solicitation (Pellis et al. 1992), however, if
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damage extends to the limbic structures, then play declines (Pank-
sepp et al. 1994). Lack of motivation to play has been associated
with maladaptive forms of behavior such as depression (Burgdorf
et al. 2011). The suggested beneﬁts of play include recognition of
social hierarchy, development of motor coordination, and the
acquisition and reﬁnement of social skills (Bekoff 2008; Miklosi
2008; Panksepp 2011). Moreover, play feels good and is associated
with a release of endorphins. We concur with the authors’ sugges-
tion to consider the inﬂuence of reward-related processes on
action control due to the hedonic experience of social stimuli.
Play is a source of fundamental pleasure and play as reward is a
strong incentive. Research supports the idea of a subcortical locus
of control for play, with stimuli predicting play activating the
mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway (Panksepp 1998; Siviy 1998).
Neurotransmitter release in a proposed PLAY circuit may modu-
late the playful interaction with noradrenergic and opiod pathways
inﬂuencing attention and pleasure respectively (Panksepp 1998;
2011; Siviy 1998; Siviy & Panksepp 2011). Rats emit ultrasonic
vocalizations (50–55 kHz range) during play and when anticipat-
ing play, and the mesolimbic dopaminergic system controls pro-
duction of these vocalizations (Burgdorf et al. 2007).
Fundamental pleasure may be supported by a three-part sub-
cortical reward system based on sensory pleasure (liking), incen-
tive motivation in response to cues (wanting) and associations
between cues and pleasure to follow (learning) (Kringelbach &
Berridge 2009). Berridge and colleagues identiﬁed distinct
neural representations of each component of this system for a
common reward. Opioid stimulation in the nucleus accumbens
increased both liking and wanting signals represented by ﬁring
in the ventral pallidum. Dopamine stimulation increased
wanting signals and behaviors, but not liking and wanting.
Neither affected neurochemical modulation of Pavlovian signals
(Smith et al. 2011). Separate neural ﬁring may indicate that motiv-
ation and liking components of the system can be modulated inde-
pendent of learning supported by cognitive representation.
Fundamental pleasure experienced during social interaction
with conspeciﬁcs and supported by subcortical structures may
not require cortical interfacing for higher order processing. As
Kringelbach and Berridge (2009) suggest, wanting matched with
liking may “facilitate engagement with the world.”
Schilbach et al. suggest the need for a naturalistic social inter-
action for investigation of the neural mechanisms supporting
social understanding, yet their examples involve laboratory-
controlled interaction with virtual characters and an emphasis
on higher order cognitions. A study of second-person neuro-
science could beneﬁt from an examination of bottom-up mechan-
isms (i.e., affective and conative processes) that have been well
demonstrated in other species and contexts (e.g., canine play
behavior).
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Abstract: Second-person neuroscience offers a framework for the study of
social emotions, such as embarrassment and pride. However, we propose
that an enduring mental representation of oneself in relation to others
without a continuous direct social interaction is possible. We call this
state “social immersion” and will explain its impact on the neuroscience
of social emotions.
The so-called dark matter in social neuroscience contains the
experience of social emotions such as embarrassment, guilt, or
pride. Thus, second-person neuroscience is an ideal framework
to shed light upon the neural foundations of social emotions.
Schilbach et al. do not emphasize in their review the great poten-
tial second-person neuroscience could have on social emotion
research. This aspect is important, where broadening our under-
standing of social emotions as an integral part of the human
emotional repertoire is overdue.
Social emotions require the representation of oneself in relation
to others and primarily emerge through reciprocal interaction
between two or more individuals (Tangney et al. 2007). Despite
the constraints of the laboratory setting, social neuroscience
studies have investigated social emotions such as embarrassment
(Krach et al. 2011; Takahashi et al. 2004), pride (Takahashi
et al. 2008), shame, and guilt (Wagner et al. 2011). Commonly
used in this research is some form of written or pictorial vignette
that asks participants to judge, simulate or re-enact a brieﬂy
described situation. In doing so, the integral part of social
emotions – the reciprocal interaction with others and also the rep-
resentation of oneself in relation to others – remains “dark
matter.” It is unlikely that paradigms using vignettes have been
able to fully capture the neural foundations of the actual experi-
ence of social emotion. Given the relevance of social emotions
regarding developmental psychology and mental disorders, the
lack of knowledge is intriguing.
In order to induce and assess social emotions in a social neuro-
science laboratory, strong emotional engagement and reciprocal
interaction are necessary in the experimental setting. However,
we question whether direct, continuous reciprocal interactions
are necessary. Rather, it is the mental representation of oneself
in relation to others that is essential. This representation has to
be implemented in the participant’s mind, resulting in social
immersion. We understand social immersion to be a state that
makes the participant perceive others as active, salient, and signiﬁ-
cant during the experiment. In order to implement this state, not
only the content of the experiment (e.g., emotional vignettes) has
to be carefully manipulated, but also the context of the experiment
has to be actively designed (e.g., compelling cover story). The
latter enables participants to immerse in a constructed social
reality that is highly controllable by the experimenter. Instead of
treating social emotions as a mere side-effect within social inter-
actions, the control of the experimental context allows selective
priming of speciﬁc social emotions.
In a state of social immersion, the mental representation of
oneself in relation to others (i.e., the social representation) and
the actual social interaction might not be corresponding during
the entire experiment (see our Figure 1). In the pre-recording
phase, initial face-to-face interaction establishes a social represen-
tation of others as active, salient, and signiﬁcant. When the data
recording starts (e.g., participant enters scanner room), the trajec-
tories of the social representation and the social interaction bifur-
cate. Now, without direct, continuous interaction it is possible to
elicit ecologically valid social emotions. Referring to the target
article, this means that a class B interaction contingency is per-
ceived as class D interaction contingency (cf. schematic depictions
1B and 1D of the target article’s Fig. 1).
This approach implies several beneﬁts for social emotion
neuroscience. First, person–group interactions are possible
(e.g., audience effects) with moderate technical effort. Second,
repetitive induction of genuine social emotions is feasible in
the controlled environment (e.g., manipulated negative feed-
back by confederates). Third, reduced cognitive costs (e.g., no
need for recollection of autobiographic episodes) facilitate the
investigation of social emotions in clinical samples such as
people with autism or schizophrenia. Fourth, the experiments
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will be more attractive for participants, which is especially rel-
evant for studies that involve children and adolescents.
However, one drawback might be the higher costs in terms of
price and time to induce social immersion (e.g., paying multiple
participants or confederates).
To conclude, we expect that the neuroscience of social
emotions will be stimulated by the ﬂexibility, ecological validity,
and feasibility of social immersion paradigms.
A mature second-person neuroscience needs
a ﬁrst-person (plural) developmental
foundation
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Abstract: Schilbach et al.’s model assumes that the ability to “experience”
minds is already present in human infants and therefore falls foul of the
very intellectualist problems it attempts to avoid. We propose an
alternative relational, action-based account, which attempts to grasp how
the individual’s construction of knowledge develops within interactions.
We applaud Schilbach et al.’s target article for its critique of the
assumptions of contemporary neuroscience. We largely agree
with their attack on the “spectator” view inherent in current
research and theory. The second-person perspective and its con-
stituent parts, emotional engagement and social interaction, ﬁll
many of the gaps in these approaches to the origins of human
skills. However, the authors fail to adequately account for the
processes in which second-person understanding of others
emerges within development, particularly in establishing social
understanding in infancy. A crucial issue concerns how infants
and children come to be able to overcome the spectatorial gap
which is described so well in the paper (sect. 2.1).
The article’s developmental perspective (sect. 2.2) assumes
repeatedly that within interactions infants experience “minds”
that are directed towards them. As a result the authors do not
avoid the very problem of foundationalism (Allen & Bickhard
2013) that they are attempting to critique. Simply changing
the terminology from, for example, “mindreading” to “experi-
ence” or “engagement” does not help them avoid falling into
one of two traps: merely describing the fact that infants get
involved in interactions, on one hand, or assuming that words
like “engagement” actually explain how an understanding of
such interactions emerges, on the other. The authors appear
to suggest that there is a starting point at which infants do not
possess sophisticated skills. Yet, without explaining how these
skills emerge, this second-person account is incomplete.
To compound the problem there is occasional slippage into
the very approach (theory theory: e.g., sect. 4.2.1, ﬁnal para-
graph), which they are earlier at pains to distance themselves
from.
We suggest that the central importance of interactions in
human social neuroscience can only be understood from a rela-
tional action-based perspective. Rather than framing interactions
in terms of their second-person components, we need to grapple
with the means by which understanding is developed by an indi-
vidual within such interaction. Knowledge of “you” must
Figure 1 (Krach et al.). Schematic depiction of experimental phase (top), level of social immersion (middle), and interaction
contingencies (bottom) over time. In the Pre-Recording phase, the participant acquires a social representation of herself in relation to
others by direct social interaction and emotional engagement (left side). In the Recording phase, the direct social interactions stops at
the bifurcation point (e.g., participants enters MRI scanner room), but the social representation persists. Intermittent direct social
interactions assure the maintenance of the social representation (e.g., short intercom exchange). At debrieﬁng, a correspondence
between the social representation and social interaction is re-established.
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emerge from somewhere. It cannot simply be attributed to me
experiencing your “mind.” As Hurley (2008) recently argued, a
lower level, non-Cartesian developmental model of social neuro-
science would initially be based upon ﬁrst-person plural experi-
ence. In our view, human infants become involved in
interactions and get into the behavioural ﬂow of shared activities,
even though they are largely stage-managed by the adult. As a
result, infants become naturally attentive to gestures that are
intentional because they are repeated and become predictable.
For example, they attend to a purposeful grasp but not a reach
with the back of the hand (e.g., Woodward 1999). Such compe-
tence, which is evident before the child’s ﬁrst birthday, does not
mean that human infants grasp “minds.”
How can we explain the emergence of social skills and knowl-
edge within this ﬁrst-person plural experience? We feel that
Schilbach et al. misinterpret our account (Carpendale & Lewis
2004; Stack & Lewis 2008) as supporting a second-person
approach when really this and related ones (e.g., Barresi &
Moore 1996) stress the infant’s perspective on shared experience
with others. From this perspective, early forms of awareness are
sensorimotor and take place within practical activities like
toy manipulation or social second-person interactions. Such
actions make the infant able to attend to and then follow
simple gestures expressing emotion, gaze, or bodily orientation.
According to this approach, infants build gradually upon these
actions to construct increasingly complex forms of knowledge.
These provide the basis for reﬂective forms of social understand-
ing and communication. The activity-based approach would
never automatically assume that infants read or experience
minds, as this is too rich an interpretation of their attention to
human actions.
Evidence for our perspective comes from the errors of older
children. We agree with the authors that some form of represen-
tational redescription may explain the process of transfer from
simple to more complex understanding (sect. 4.2.1), but the
target article is particularly vague about how this might take
place, or what actually gets redescribed, and how. This might
simply be an omission due to the ambitious scope of the
article. However, such claims and the observation that individ-
uals with autism have difﬁculties in social interactions (sect.
2.2.1, para. 4), make their second-person perspective yet more
under-speciﬁed. According to an action-based approach,
shared interactions enable the infant to re-present the world,
anticipating the outcome of various intentional actions. Develop-
ment is a protracted process because the inferences that trans-
form actions into representations are dependent on hard won,
small-scale achievements. Although infants seem to follow pur-
poseful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make
simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being
based on the mere presence of others at set points within an
event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective
appreciation of another’s perspective has been demonstrated
across the third year (Moll et al. 2011; O’Neill 1996), extending
into early childhood (Flavell et al. 1980; McGuigan & Doherty
2006). Such ﬁndings suggest that knowledge of what others
have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in
terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others.
Even preschoolers do not simply “experience” the mind, as
assumed in the target article.
In short, we feel that Schilbach et al.’s claim that we need to
make social neuroscience truly social is well placed but the
second-person perspective does not specify how humans
acquire such skills. It is not sufﬁcient to present simple dia-
grams showing that interactants’ neural processes act in syn-
chrony (Fig. 1D of the target article) or to state that early
affective exchanges “pave the way” to later understanding
without specifying how the paving is laid. An action-based
theory originating within ﬁrst-person plural interactions pro-
vides a more detailed, and more plausible, account of these
developmental processes.
Merging second-person and ﬁrst-person
neuroscience
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Abstract: Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person
approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-
person and ﬁrst-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied
in isolation. Contingency is central for converging ﬁrst- and second-person
approaches. Studies of embodiment show how contingencies scaffold
ﬁrst-person perspective and how the transition from a third- to a second-
person perspective fundamentally involves ﬁrst-person contributions.
In developing their framework for second-person neuroscience,
Schilbach and colleagues contrast their approach with what they
consider third-person approaches, widespread in cognition and
social neuroscience, in which participants simply observe (but do
not interact with) others. Surprisingly, Schilbach et al. have less
to say about the converse relation, between their second-person
neuroscience and ﬁrst-person approaches. Recent research has
provided rich descriptions of the ﬁrst-person experience of embo-
diment, the role of sensory and motor signals in forming such
experiences, and their subsequent effects on cognition and behav-
iour. Here, we will discuss points of potential convergence between
ﬁrst- and second-person approaches and argue that the two cannot
be approached in isolation from each other.
First, the key factor differentiating second-person from third-
person approaches on Schilbach et al.’s view is contingency.
Second-person others respond contingently to an observer’s
actions, whereas third-person others do not. Intriguingly, this idea
of contingency is also central to recent approaches to studying
ﬁrst-person experiences of embodiment (for reviews see Longo &
Haggard 2012; Tsakiris 2010). In the case of ﬁrst-person experience,
this plays out at both the perceptual and motoric levels. In terms of
perception, our somatic experiences (e.g., of touch, pain, or position
sense) are contingently related to our experiences in other sensory
modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, or vestibular sensations). For
example, my tactile experiences as I reach to pick up my coffee
mug are exactly temporally and spatially congruent with my visual
experience of seeing my hand grip the mug. This visual-tactile
match is a strong cue that the hand I see is my hand, and can be
manipulated to produce perceptual illusions of embodiments such
as the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen 1998), full-body illu-
sions (Lenggenhager et al. 2007), or the body-swap illusion (Petkova
& Ehrsson 2008). In the rubber hand illusion, for example, vision of
touch applied to a prosthetic hand in temporal and spatial synchrony
with felt touch on one’s own hand creates the compelling illusion
that the rubber hand actually is one’s hand (the sense of body own-
ership) and corresponding proprioceptive biases (Botvinick &
Cohen 1998; Longo et al. 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard 2005).
Contingency in ﬁrst-person approaches also plays out in terms of
action. The actions of our body are contingently related to our inten-
tions. When I form an intention to lift my arm, it ismy arm that lifts.
The contingent relation between efferent motor commands and
visual and proprioceptive feedback strongly inﬂuences our ﬁrst-
person experience of our body, over and above matches between
vision and proprioception alone. This is another strong cue for
body ownership, and creates an additional sense of agency over
one’s body (i.e., the feeling that I am in control of my body).
Recent results have demonstrated that ownership and agency are
distinct and separable components of the experience of embodiment
(Longo et al. 2008) and have distinct functional consequences on be-
haviour (Kammers et al. 2009; Longo & Haggard 2009; Tsakiris
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et al. 2006) and separable neural correlates (Tsakiris et al. 2010).
Thus, contingency, both of perception and action, plays a critical
role in structuring ﬁrst-person experiences of our own body.
As Schilbach and colleagues point out, however, contingency also
plays a fundamental role in differentiating our second-person experi-
ences of immediate others from third-person experiences of more
distant others. This raises a critical question: What differentiates
contingent relations specifying ﬁrst-person experiences from those
specifying second-person experiences? This is an important question
for future research, about which we can only speculate here. We
wish to propose, however, that ﬁrst-person experiences may be
primary and possibly even necessary prerequisites for second-
person experiences. For example, ﬁrst- and second-person contin-
gency differ in terms of their immediacy, both temporally and
logically. When I form an intention to act, my own action follows
immediately, whereas your response comes later. Any instance of
contingency specifying second-person relations thus follows the
sequence: Intention! My Action! Your Action, where the ﬁrst
arrow indicates the contingent relation specifying a ﬁrst-person
experience and the second arrow indicates the contingent relation
specifying a second-person experience. The second-person contin-
gency cannot exist without the ﬁrst-person contingency, because
the sequence: Intention ! Your Action would not indicate that I
am interacting with you (a second-person relationship), but would
rather indicate that I am you (a ﬁrst-person relationship).
Related to the preceding argument is the possibility that embo-
died interactions may alter self-other boundaries, which suggests
that the transition from a third- to a second-person perspective
may fundamentally involve, but also affect, ﬁrst-person represen-
tations. This possibility has been explored by extending the known
role of multisensory integration from body-awareness to self-other
boundaries. In the “enfacement illusion” (Sforza et al. 2010; Tsakiris
2008), participants see someone else’s face being touched at the
same time as their own face, creating a situation that resembles
the experience of looking at oneself into the mirror, albeit the
“mirror reﬂection” of one’s face is replaced by another individual.
Synchronous interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS)
between the two faces changes self-face recognition, as the other’s
face is perceived to be more similar to one’s own face (Tajadura-
Jimenez et al. 2012). Interestingly, and of particular relevance for
our understanding of the second-person perspective, IMS also inﬂu-
ences social cognition processes of inference and conformity (Pala-
dino et al. 2010). Such ﬁndings support a model of ﬁrst-person
perspective according to which our sense of self is plastically affected
by multisensory information as it becomes available during self-
other interactions. Shared multisensory experiences might explain
how the “I” comes to be identiﬁed with “me,” allowing this “me”
to be represented as an object for others, as well as for one’s self.
Together, these considerations suggest that there are important
points of connection between the ﬁrst- and second-person per-
spectives, meaning that neither can be investigated in isolation
from the other. In particular, it will be critical for future research
to investigate how contingency alters both the relation of the self
to its “self” or body (ﬁrst-person neuroscience), and the relation of
the self to the other (second-person neuroscience).
A second-person approach cannot explain
intentionality in social understanding
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Abstract: A second-person approach that prioritizes dyadic emotional
interaction is not well equipped to explain the origins of the
understanding of mind conceived as intentionality. Instead, the critical
elements that will deliver the understanding of self and other as persons
with intentionality are shared object-centered interactions that include
not only emotional engagement, but also joint attention and joint goal-
directed action.
The second-person approach advocated by Schilbach and col-
leagues may be seen as one of a group of theoretical approaches
that avoid the “simulation theory” and “theory theory” horns of
the dilemma of understanding other minds. Like other relational
approaches (e.g., Barresi & Moore 1996; Carpendale & Lewis
2004; Hobson 2002; Moore 2006; Zlatev et al. 2008), Schilbach
et al. argue that minds are known within and through interaction
with others. As a viable theory, however, their second-person
approach has a number of signiﬁcant drawbacks. Here we focus
on two – its over-reliance on emotional engagement and its over-
emphasis of dyadic, rather than triadic, interaction. We believe
that a signiﬁcant reason for these shortcomings is that Schilbach
et al. appear not to have a coherent account of what it means to
understand mind; certainly they never actually deﬁne what that
means. Obviously they want to avoid the standard representational
theory of mind account of mental understanding. But instead of a
structured analysis, they seem to assume that the understanding of
mind is immanent in a variety of different social phenomena,
including contingent social interaction and emotional reactivity
to others.
Our position, consistent with a long intellectual tradition in phil-
osophy of mind (e.g., Brentano 1874/1973), is that understanding
mind entails understanding intentionality. We take intentionality
to cover all of its myriad forms, ranging in complexity from
simple object-directed action to complex embedded mental
states (see Barresi & Moore 1996), and ranging across a variety
of psychological qualities, including not only emotional, but also
epistemic, and conative forms.
For Schilbach et al., there are two key features to the second-
person approach: emotional engagement and social interaction.
We address the limitations of these two features of their
account in reverse order.
All relational approaches to social understanding place social
interaction at the core. Knowledge of minds happens through inter-
action with others. For some authors, social interaction is seen pri-
marily as the solution to the problem of other minds (e.g.,
Carpendale & Lewis 2004; Hobson 2002). For others, it is the sol-
ution not only to that problem, but also necessarily to the problem
of how the self’s own intentionality comes to be known (Barresi &
Moore 1996). Schilbach et al. argue for the primacy of a particular
form of social interaction – face-to-face or what is often termed in
the developmental psychology literature, “dyadic.” For them,
second-person appears to mean primarily the kind of social stimu-
lation available within dyadic interaction. Certainly dyadic inter-
actions can have special dynamic properties, such as contingency
of the actions of self and other, and particular characteristics,
such as full-face gaze. Yet, although it is true that these properties
and characteristics are key attractants to young infants, the proces-
sing of this information does not necessitate any awareness of the
other as being another – or being a person of the same kind as
the self. Indeed, empirical evidence has suggested that these
phenomena could be subserved by “subpersonal” attentional and
sensorimotor mechanisms (Moore & Barresi 2009; Paulus 2011).
The same problem holds for their view on motor resonance in
the Mirror Neuron System when observing others’ actions. While
we agree that these motor processes may support social inter-
action either by predicting the future effect of the other’s action
or by directly preparing a timely response, the activation of a
motor program alone need not lead to an awareness of another’s
mind in any conceptual sense (Paulus 2012). There is a conceptual
gap between the activation of one’s own motor system through the
perception of another person’s action and the ascription of an
intention to this person or to the self (Jacob 2009).
The problem with purely dyadic interactions is that there is no
obvious way for the intentionality of action – its object-
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directedness – to be manifest. That is, it is unclear how the proper-
ties of dyadic interactions alone, such as contingency and second
person characteristics, could reveal intentionality at all. Intention-
ality is tied inextricably to actions on objects, whether real or rep-
resented, and therefore to triadic interaction. Triadic interaction
involves participation in joint or coordinated actions over shared
objects, often directed at particular effects (Paulus et al. 2012)
and it is through participation in these interactions that the activity
of both self and other becomes interpretable as intentional
(Moore 2006; Tomasello et al. 2005). Therefore, while we agree
with Schilbach et al. that dyadic interaction is a necessary
context for intentional understanding, we argue that it cannot be
sufﬁcient.
Schilbach et al. reserve a place of particular importance in their
theory for emotional engagement. We agree that emotional
engagement is of critical importance, particularly during early
development, for bringing people into the kinds of interactive situ-
ations that will ultimately enable intentional understanding.
However, intentionality involves muchmore than emotion. Interac-
tive partners engage in other forms of coordinated activity where
emotion may play a relatively minimal role. Two broad forms of
coordinated activity involve shared epistemic relations to objects
and shared conative relations to objects or goals. By epistemic
relations, we mean psychological activity that is directed at the
acquisition, elaboration, and negotiation of knowledge. Shared epis-
temic activity, such as joint attention, can deliver an understanding
of epistemic mental activity that will elude purely emotional
engagement, such as the understanding of perspective and belief.
By conative activity, we mean activity that is willed, purposeful,
and goal-directed. Shared conative activity, such as imitation and
cooperation involving joint goals, provides an entry into the under-
standing of goal-directed actions and desires. Emotional interaction
on its own is not well-suited to the acquisition of an understanding
of either epistemic or conative types of intentional relations.
In short, although we applaud Schilbach et al.’s attempt to set
the neuroscience of social understanding in a context that places
social interaction as the foundation, we believe that their
account must be elaborated to show how interaction beyond
emotional engagement can yield the key understanding of mind
as intentional.
Second-person neuroscience: Implications for
Wittgensteinian and Vygotskyan approaches
to psychology
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Abstract: Interactive approaches to development and social psychology
may particularly beneﬁt from the non-dualist features of a second-
person neuroscience. In that context, I discuss the compatibility of a
second-person neuroscience with a Wittgensteinian analysis of
psychological concepts and its connections to a Vygotskyan approach to
psychological development.
A “second-person neuroscience” avoids elements of dualism in
psychological theories. For interactionist approaches in social
and developmental psychology this is particularly welcome. It
also makes possible a Wittgensteinian neuroscience. Here, I
focus on its compatibility with Wittgenstein’s philosophy and
Vygotsky’s (1978) developmental psychology.
Wittgenstein’s thought (Wittgenstein 1953; 1969) has inﬂuenced
several interactionist approaches in psychology, including social
constructionist and discursive theories (e.g., Edwards & Potter
1992). Like Schilbach et al.’s focus on emotional engagement and
social interaction, these approaches also emphasize interest-
based, emotionally (and morally) loaded social interaction.
Few would argue that an aim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy was
to show that a dualist interpretation of psychological terms was
mistaken and confused. Echoing a similar aim, Schilbach et al.
correctly identify the continuing “methodological dualism of be-
havior and mind” (sect. 1.1, para. 4, their emphasis) in psychology
and how a second-person neuroscience can avoid it.
More fully, Wittgenstein (1953) argued that psychological con-
cepts gain meaning by how they are used in the “forms of life” and
“language-games” that characterize meaningful action (“meaning
as use”). Their meaning is not reliant on ontologically private
states and events occurring in a world of individual experience.
In this light, Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument
is an argument for the conceptual priority of the activities and
interactions that ground language, and therefore thought, over
supposedly private phenomena. Further, and analogous to Schil-
bach et al.’s focus on real time, ecologically valid social inter-
actions, Wittgenstein leaned heavily upon considerations of
ordinary, everyday uses of language for his analysis.
Conceptual compatibility goes further than a shared focus on
everyday interactions. Wittgenstein (1969), for example, stated
that human action is grounded not on an “ungrounded presupposi-
tion” but on an “ungrounded way of acting” (p. 17e, O.C. 110).
From a Wittgensteinian perspective, ﬁrst-person (e.g., simulation-
ist) and third-person (e.g., Theory Theory) approaches in social
neuroscience – as characterized by Schilbach et al. – incorrectly
assume that social cognition is grounded on “ungrounded presup-
positions” (i.e., various spectatorial representations of, or inferences
about, others’minds). By contrast, a second-person approach high-
lights processes of emotional engagement and interaction. These
ground action in the immediacy of action itself. In Wittgenstein’s
terms, social cognition occurs within, and is motivated by,
“ungrounded ways of acting.” By implication, a “Wittgensteinian”
second-person neuroscience then must explain how ﬁrst- and
third-person perspectives arise out of ontogenetically and concep-
tually prior second-person engagement. This is presumably one
reason why Schilbach et al. (sect. 4.2) are interested in how implicit
social cognition is transformed into explicit cognition (sect. 4.2).
On this last question, Vygotskyan developmental psychology can
provide insights for ontogenetic neuroscientiﬁc research. For
Vygotsky (1978), development involves organizing maturing func-
tions into “higher” processes, largely through social interaction.
Maturing functions are co-opted and restructured to subserve the
higher psychological processes speciﬁed by the cultural
environment.
Using a simple example, Vygotsky (1978) explained how an
adult might complete an infant’s unsuccessful grasping move-
ment. This completion psychologically reconstructs the infant’s
grasping movement as a pointing gesture, once perceptual and
attentional processes have matured. As Vygotsky (1978, p. 56)
put it, there is “a change in that movement’s function: from an
object-oriented movement it becomes a movement aimed at
another person, a means of establishing relations.”
Schilbach et al. (sect. 2.2.1, para. 2) note how the emotional
power of attention directed towards newborns grounds second-
person engagement. They later hypothesize that “the second-
person approach suggests that acts of mentality should be
meaningful to infants depending on the infant’s ability to
respond to them when they receive them, regardless of whether
the infants can do the actions themselves” (sect. 4.2.1, para. 4,
emphasis added). This suggestion aligns well with a Vygotskyan
account of the origins of how infants participate in socially mean-
ingful activity and is supported by Tomasello and colleagues’ work
on the early development of joint attention, shared intentionality,
and cooperative activity (see Tomasello 2009).
In Vygotsky’s view this fundamental interaction involves a
tension between psychological development (“maturing” functions)
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and learning and instruction. Given this tension, the process could
neither begin nor bemaintained without the natural responsiveness
of infants to “acts of mentality” (target article, sect. 4.2.1, para. 4).
Emotional engagement and circuits delivering reward signals draw
infants into the process by which learning and development are
coordinated. A second-person neuroscience could investigate the
neural correlates supporting this integration of learning and devel-
opment and, along the way, test and reﬁne Vygotsky’s developmen-
tal theory. Reciprocally, Vygotsky’s framework could guide that
neuroscientiﬁc investigation.
As mentioned, Schilbach et al. also highlight the question of
how implicit processes become available for explicit social cogni-
tion. They mention Anderson’s (2010) theory of the reuse of
brain areas during ontogeny and suggest that cognitive circuitry
developed in early interactions may be reused, and re-described,
to develop explicit social cognition. Neural reuse of this type
is straightforwardly translatable into a Vygotskyan framework
based on the social reconstruction of maturing functions.
Further, reuse of implicit processes for explicit social cognition cor-
responds with a central process in Vygotsky’s approach –
internalization.
For Vygotsky (1978) all functions appear twice: “ﬁrst between
people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsy-
chological)” (p. 57, emphasis in original). The incorporation of
speech into practical action mediates this shift, as Schilbach
et al. also argue. Initially, speech is provoked and determined by
activity. It is descriptive, emotionally expressive, and communica-
tive (e.g., to describe a situation or ask for help). Through social
interaction – and via egocentric speech – it develops a “planning
function” that precedes and dominates activity. From a role in
controlling the external world it turns inward and exerts control
over the self, setting the scene for the emergence of ﬁrst- and
third-person social orientations.
Wittgenstein (1953, p. 232e) wrote of the “confusion and bar-
renness of psychology,” stating that “in psychology there are
experimental methods and conceptual confusion.” Schilbach
et al.’s proposal in the target article helps avoid the dualist con-
fusion Wittgenstein identiﬁed. It therefore could harness exper-
imental and other methods to solve “the problems which
trouble us” in social psychology.
The use of non-interactive scenarios in social
neuroscience
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Abstract: Although we fundamentally agree with Schilbach et al., we
argue here that there is still some residual utility for non-interactive
scenarios in social neuroscience. They may be useful to quantify
individual differences in prosocial inclination that are not inﬂuenced by
concerns about reputation or social pressure.
Schilbach et al. argue that economic scenarios may not recreate
the interaction dynamics of everyday-life social encounters, on
account of their implicit view of the subject as a simple recipient
of information. Indeed, economic scenarios are poor stand-ins for
natural interactions. A mature social neuroscience inevitably
requires dynamic, “second-person” paradigms. However, some
aspects of social cognition are best studied in controlled, restricted
scenarios, where the subject is anonymous and unobserved, as the
presence of another human presents as many interpretational pro-
blems as the absence of one. We propose that in some cases, con-
trolled, ﬁrst-person economic scenarios are still useful for a
mature study of social interaction. These scenarios enable
measures of individual differences and provide a window into
basic brain-behavior relationships which can serve as a rudimen-
tary “glossary” for decoding the complex datasets posed by
second-person paradigms.
Experimental paradigms in social studies exist somewhere
between two extremes: On one, we have controlled, observer-
based protocols to study phenomena like empathy for pain or
emotional reactivity. Individual subjects are exposed to stimuli
which are ordered and controlled in order to group features of
interest. These are then assigned to contrasts in order to isolate
correlates of those features within our dataset of dependent vari-
ables. This allows us to abstract across conditions, making it poss-
ible to extrapolate and generalize. On the other extreme, we have
observational studies of social phenomena in vivo, which assume
that we cannot examine components of social scenarios in isolation
without altering them beyond recognition. The ﬁrst extreme is
unrealistic, by assuming that there is such a thing as context-inde-
pendent behavior. The second lacks the ability to say anything
about anything other than its subject, if we cannot abstract and
extrapolate beyond its context. In short, the ﬁrst lacks validity,
while the second lacks generalizability.
A second-person neuroscience may, in avoiding the problems
inherent to the ﬁrst extreme, stray too close to the faults of
the latter: Namely, if we are to study interactions, how do we cat-
egorize them without somehow restricting them, and, most
importantly here, how do we interpret data derived from inter-
actions? Beyond inter-subject correlations such as those observed
in hyper-scanning, what can we say about the neural mechanisms
of interaction? To give an example by analogy, if we are studying a
pair of linked oscillators, we are aware that their behavior in iso-
lation may say little about their behavior in interaction.
However, when in interaction, we can say nothing more than
“they are in sync; they are decoupled, etc.” We can still say very
little about how their internal architecture produces the observed
behavior. But what if we could group varieties of oscillators
according to their internal properties? Then, we might observe
that, for example, AB, BB, and AA dyads tend to coalesce into sig-
niﬁcantly different stable states. Bringing the analogy back to
social neuroscience, we propose that a study of individual differ-
ences rooted in internal structure and function can best link inter-
action-level data with the internal properties of the interactive
agents.
The study of individual differences in empathy and prosocial
behavior generally falls into two camps: Neurobiological studies
have proposed “low-level” neural mechanisms for empathy
based on mirroring and simulation (Carr et al. 2003; Singer
et al. 2004). On the other hand, studies of prosocial behavior
have focused on the role of empathy in our decision-making, pri-
marily through observational studies of prosocial behavior, and
economic studies of sharing and fairness using games (Fehr &
Camerer 2007). Each of these ﬁelds has historically measured
individual differences using questionnaires. However, a handful
of studies in the last few years have at last attempted to bridge
the gap, foregoing questionnaires to directly relate differences
in brain activity to differences in behavior. This sort of study, in
our view, best exempliﬁes the utility of controlled economic scen-
arios. Our research, for example, attempts to correlate individual
differences in neural correlates of mirroring with behavior in the
Dictator game. Rather than attempting to mimic natural social
interactions, we attempt to isolate neural biomarkers of noncom-
pliant prosocial behavior. Subjects are asked to share a portion of a
sum of money with virtual proﬁles which represent real people in
the community who will actually receive the money. By assuring
subjects that they are anonymous and unobserved, we can
isolate neural correlates of prosocial inclination or empathic
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concern, as we are not confounding their behavior or cognition
with the presence of another in interaction. Because, in point of
fact, it is in those very scenarios where we are unobserved, and
anonymous, yet still aid others, that we can be said to act
without concerns for our reputation or due to social pressure.
Thus, to best measure differences in brain activity, connectivity,
and structure which map onto variability in controlled, noncompli-
ant altruistic behavior, subjects should not interact. We believe
that the results of this sort of study can allow for neural biomarkers
of prosocial behavior which can aid in the interpretation of behav-
ior patterns within interaction.
We agree that interactions between multiple subjects may not
be reducible to the characteristics of their participants. Dyads,
triads, and other group conﬁgurations may one day be the basic
unit of social neuroscience. We may one day refer to “group
states” in social neuroscience, as a unit of information separate
from and incommensurable with the states of the individuals
within them. This parallels the study of quantum mechanics and
complexity theory, which require us to consider the behavior of
systems holistically, defying the reductionist notion that group
states are reducible to the sum of their parts. However, the
volume of data that we can expect from studies of social inter-
action, and the intricate complexity of relating this data back to
mechanistic models of brain function, suggests that it may be
useful to parameterize the interactive agents. This can be done
by measuring individual differences based on internal functions,
even if the paradigms we use to do this sometimes bear little
resemblance to natural scenarios.
What we can learn from second animal
neuroscience
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Abstract: There are several facets of second-person neuroscience which
can beneﬁt from comparisons with animal behavioral neuroscience
studies. This commentary addresses the challenges involved in obtaining
quantitative data from second-person techniques, the role of stress in
inducing robust responses, the use of interactive functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), and the value of applying interactive
methods to studies of aggression and depression.
A comparison of second-person neuroscience with animal behav-
ioral neuroscience reveals several common facets between these
ﬁelds. Discussion of these similarities may lead to improvements
in second-person neuroscience techniques. One facet is the exper-
imental challenges involved in obtaining quantitative data from
second-person techniques. Quantitative data is necessary in the
study of disorders that involve disrupted social behavior. The
use of virtual interactors will be valuable in this regard, but
there is also a need for interpersonal interactions. Screening of
interactors will reduce some of the variability, but there is more
inherent variability in quantitative second-person techniques
compared to current social neuroscience methods. However,
observational studies in animals or humans may not be able to
identify relevant differences between experimental groups
because of the confounds imposed by the observational process
or the fact that observation does not trigger the responses necess-
ary to identify signiﬁcant differences.
Although Schilbach et al. compare adult second-person neuro-
science with studies of infants as an example of a successful appli-
cation of second-person neuroscience, the personal psychological
history of two adults will generate greater variability than inter-
actions between an adult and an infant. In animal studies, more
ethologically and ecologically relevant social interactions have
been used in stress studies for many years (Tamashiro et al.
2005). With investigations where social defeat is the objective,
the use of larger and/or more dominant animals is key to inducing
social defeat and generating consistent and reliable data, but
effects are gender speciﬁc (Haller et al. 1998). If social conﬂict,
but not defeat, is the objective, then similarly sized or smaller
animals with a consistent social ranking may be more effective
(Nephew & Bridges 2011). Another key beneﬁt to socially interac-
tive animal studies is the role of stress in inducing robust and rel-
evant responses, especially in the study of depression. Exposure to
chronic social stress is a strong predictor of the development of
depressive disorders (Hammen 2005), and emphasis on the
second-person neuroscience approach in humans could be a
powerful tool in exploring the etiology of affective disorders
through the investigation of changes in social interaction over
time during exposure to chronic social stress. The use of stressful
stimuli has been valuable in rodent fMRI.
A third facet of second-person neuroscience addressed in
animal studies is interactive fMRI. Functional MRI work in con-
scious rodents has illustrated the necessity of using robust stimuli.
Rodent fMRI work from the labs of Marcelo Febo and Craig
Ferris have used ethologically relevant interactions between rat
dams and their pups (Febo et al. 2005; Ferris et al. 2005), and
also rat dams and threatening male intruder rats (Nephew et al.
2009). These studies have provided a wealth of information on
the real time neuroanatomy of maternal care and aggression,
and highlight some of the challenges to interactive imaging
studies. Stimuli such as direct suckling by pups and the presence
of a male intruder rat elicit robust blood oxygen level dependent
(BOLD) responses. Although consistent data has been collected
from rat dams actively nursing their pups, this interaction is extre-
mely complex and simultaneously activates brain areas involved in
reward, sensation, and lactation. Efforts to tease apart the motiva-
tional brain regions involved in BOLD responses have been chal-
lenging, as presenting novel objects or pups without contact
between the dam and pup does not produce substantial changes
in BOLD activity. In contrast, novel objects and the presence of
pups produce reliable behavioral responses in the home cage.
The lack of BOLD responses to these stimuli is hypothesized to
be a result of the strength of the stimulus relative to the basal
level of response to the imaging procedures, despite acclimatiz-
ation. In human imaging, it is likely that there is a certain
degree of basal BOLD response to the imaging procedure, and
the use of robust, ethologically relevant stimuli will produce sig-
niﬁcant and consistent data. While virtual imaging paradigms
provide control and consistency, are the limitations of this tech-
nology any less than the limitations involved in observational or
hyperscanning studies? A necessary component with the use of
fMRI work in both animals and humans is supporting data from
other experimental paradigms. In animals, interactive BOLD
data can be supported by electrophysiology, neuroendocrine,
and behavioral studies (Caffrey et al. 2010; Febo & Ferris
2007), and similar combinations can be used in human neuro-
science. The challenge of collecting consistent data from two
interacting humans can be attenuated by the use of large
sample sizes and/or carefully chosen research groups and exper-
imental paradigms. For studies using interpersonal interactions,
it will be advantageous to use interaction paradigms that create
responses greater than the noise introduced by variations in
psychological background.
Two ﬁelds of social neuroscience in addition to autism where
interactive methods would be valuable are aggression and
depression. While second-person neuroscience studies of high-
functioning autism (HFA) patients certainly have merit, the lack
of speciﬁcity in autism diagnoses may be limiting to this area of
research, and studies of aggression or depression may not
involve as many confounds. For both human and animal studies
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of aggression, observational studies are limited in what they can
address. Interactive animal studies on the neurocircuitry of
aggressive behavior have generated a wealth of data which are
translationally relevant for disorders involving altered aggressive
responses, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Ferris
et al. 2008). The comments by Schilbach et al. on the importance
of reward circuits and social interaction suggest that second-
person neuroscience is a valuable addition to the study of
depression as well. Anhedonia and attenuated social interaction
are common features of depression, and the second-person
neuroscience method can address both features in studies of
depression in males and females. In humans, Lane Strathearn
and others have shown that it is possible to record differences
in fMRI responses to stimuli such as infant cry or infant pictures
in healthy mothers (Strathearn et al. 2009), but the most relevant
BOLD differences are from studies comparing healthy and
depressed mothers (Laurent & Ablow 2012). Strong collabor-
ations between animal and human researchers focused on devel-
oping ecologically and ethologically relevant second-person
neuroscience experimental paradigms will advance the develop-
ment of social neuroscience.
Social perception and “spectator theories” of
other minds
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Abstract: We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social
perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other
minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the
crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also
highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish
their second-person approach from the social perception view.
Schilbach et al. argue that their “second-person” approach to
social cognition –which emphasizes the centrality of interaction
and emotional engagement in facilitating social understanding –
differs fundamentally from what they term “spectator theories.”
Under the latter heading they include not just “Theory Theory”
(TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST), but also what they aptly
term the “social perception” approach. Although we suspect
similar questions could be raised with respect to TT and ST, we
focus on the question of whether it is true that the social percep-
tion approach is “committed to an observer epistemology” (sect
1.2, para. 2) and thus is a “spectator theory.”
The social perception approach comes in different forms (see,
e.g., Duddington 1918; Gallagher 2008; Hobson 2008; Scheler
1954; Stout 2012; Wittgenstein 1980). Common to all is the
idea that we can sometimes perceive (and thus need not infer)
the mental states of others (Krueger 2012; Krueger & Overgaard
2012; Overgaard 2012). But contra Schilbach et al., it is not clear
that this commits the social perception approach to a “spectator
theory of how we relate to other people” (sect 1.2, para. 2). For,
ﬁrst of all, there is no reason to construe the social perception
theory as a general theory of “how we relate to other people.”
Not only is the theory fully consistent with the idea that social
life is more a matter of interacting with, than merely observing
others. Additionally, it can also maintain that when we perceive
others’ emotions and goals, say, we typically do so in order to facili-
tate or enable interacting with them. For example, I may perceive
anger in another person’s facial expressions and gestures; the
former expresses speciﬁc features of the anger whereas the
latter articulates its intensity and level of arousal (Ekman 1965).
But this need not involve a static observational stance. Rather, I
see this anger as affording (or perhaps constraining) further inter-
active possibilities. My social perception is thus typically part of an
ongoing process in which I use what I see in others to further
negotiate my engagement with them.
More importantly, the social perception account can maintain
that the ability to perceive others’ mental states may be a
capacity that is developed and/or reﬁned within interaction, for
example, the face-to-face interaction characterizing early infant-
caregiver exchanges (see, e.g., Hobson 2002; Legerstee 2005).
Moreover, even in adult perceivers, our exercise of the ability
may be greatly facilitated by current interaction with others –
and may in some cases be hindered in the absence of interaction
(see, e.g., Gallagher 2008). For example, certain socially-salient
details – gestures, intonation, posture, shifts of spatial proximity,
and so forth –may only become available for perception as an
interaction unfolds over time. And when we perceive facial ges-
tures (e.g., a smile or frown), we automatically attune to these ges-
tures by involuntarily mimicking them (Dimberg & Thunberg
1998). As one of the target article authors notes in another
paper, this mimetic response seems to indicate that “the process
of perceiving faces always includes an ‘enactive’ element
through which we engage with and respond to stimuli instead of
a mere ‘passive’ perception of face-based cues” (Schilbach et al.
2008a, p. 45). The social perception approach is fully compatible
with this observation.
But Schilbach et al. are right that at least standard versions of
the social perception approach suggest that social cognition is
“something that could in principle occur in the presence of a
one-way mirror, where a detached observer reads out the
mental states of another person” (sect. 2.1, para. 2). However, it
seems highly plausible that “detached” social perception of the
“one-way mirror” sort could in principle occur; indeed, it might
be something that happens fairly frequently – as, for example,
when we perceive the emotions expressed by people on TV,
while watching one’s fellow diners in a restaurant, or when
viewing others from a distance.
So Schilbach et al. are faced with the following dilemma. Either
they maintain that social perception is in principle impossible in
the absence of current social interaction, as, for example, in the
case of the one-way mirror. This is a very strong claim: A single
instance of social perception without interaction (e.g., successfully
perceiving a diner’s expression of happiness as such across a
crowded restaurant) would sufﬁce to falsify it. Or else they
acknowledge that the latter is a possibility. But then they are
wrong to suggest that their “second-person” approach is distin-
guished from the social perception approach by the “spectatorial”
nature of the latter. For, the sort of purely “spectatorial” social
cognition that the social perception approach as such makes
room for (e.g., recognizing emotional expressions at a distance
or in the absence of interaction) is one that Schilbach et al.
themselves want to accommodate.
In our view, it is crucial to recognize the broad scope of our
social competence, encompassing situations in which we are
active participants, as well as situations in which we are passive
bystanders. Despite their justiﬁed emphasis on the primacy of
interaction, Schilbach et al. recognize this complexity and
attempt to develop their view accordingly. However, in doing
so, they fail to show that the social perception approach to
social cognition is genuinely committed to the sort of “observer
epistemology” they see their own view as opposing.
Although we have here focused on the social perception
approach, our commentary also raises the more general question
of whether the theoretical commitments of existing approaches
really are so opposed to the “second-person” approach cham-
pioned by Schilbach et al. Defenders of TT, for example, have
long emphasized the importance of social interaction for the
development of desire and belief understanding (e.g., Repacholi
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& Gopnik 1997; Ruffman et al. 1998). “Development in social
cognition depends on two-way trafﬁc between self and other,”
as Meltzoff et al. (1999, p. 19) put it more than a decade ago.
So perhaps it is not just the social perception approach that in
reality is less “spectatorial” than Schilbach et al. make it appear
to be.
Interaction versus observation: A ﬁner look
at this distinction and its importance
to autism
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12002026
Elizabeth Redcay,a Katherine Rice,a and Rebecca Saxeb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742;
bDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.
redcay@umd.edu krice@umd.edu saxe@mit.edu
www.dscn.umd.edu www.saxelab.mit.edu
Abstract: Although a second-person neuroscience has high ecological
validity, the extent to which a second- versus third-person neuroscience
approach fundamentally alters neural patterns of activation requires
more careful investigation. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that this new
avenue will prove fruitful in signiﬁcantly advancing our understanding of
typical and atypical social cognition.
We enthusiastically applaud the call for a second-person neuro-
science as described in the target article by Schilbach et al.,
and are excited for the new insights this avenue of research
will bring. In this commentary, we expand on the target
article in two ways. First, we suggest increased emphasis on
characterizing the differences in neural processing during an
interaction as compared to observation. Second, we elaborate
on the potential importance of this research to our understand-
ing of autism.
Schilbach et al. argue that engagement in interpersonal inter-
action fundamentally changes cognitive and neural processing as
compared to such processing during observation alone. For
example, interpersonal interaction may recruit additional neural
regions or systems that are not present during third-person obser-
vation. The authors present compelling preliminary pieces of evi-
dence to support their theory, as well as many suggestions for
future directions. Here we discuss several notable differences
between observing a person and engaging with a person, which
can make isolating the interaction component difﬁcult. First,
engagement with another involves a contingency (or back and
forth) between participants rather than passive perception and
as such includes an element of action. Second, and related to
the ﬁrst, when a response is required (as is common in an inter-
action as compared to observation) attentional demands may be
higher. Third, the stimuli used to elicit the feeling of being in
an interaction have different low-level characteristics than those
that signal no interaction. A ﬁnal possibility is that there is some-
thing special about being engaged with another that goes beyond
the simple differences described above.
Controlling for these differences is important, and although
Schilbach et al. devote attention to this problem, they do not
address whether stimulus characteristics secondary to the inter-
action could drive differences in neural processing. For
example, in one study participants are presented with a face
either facing towards or away from them that makes either com-
municative or arbitrary facial movements (Schilbach et al. 2006).
Ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) and amygdala regions
are recruited to a greater extent for the communicative facial
expressions directed towards the participant but these regions
may be sensitive to direct gaze and facial movement independent
of social engagement. While these expressions are typically
encountered in the context of an interaction, they are also seen
in movies, TV, and pictures when the viewer is (presumably)
detached. Although interaction is often a more ecologically valid
social situation, it is an open question of how, once other factors
are controlled for, this interaction fundamentally changes the
neural correlates of social processing.
We have begun to address this question (Redcay et al. 2010) by
borrowing a method from developmental psychology (e.g., Kuhl
et al. 2003; Murray & Trevarthen 1985) in which participants
are engaged in a simple, highly scripted interaction that is either
conducted via live video feed (“face-to-face”) or via video record-
ing. The recorded conditions included one in which the same
video from the live interaction was repeated and one in which a
video of the experimenter from a different interaction was
played. Crucially participants were told to continue to play along
in the recorded condition even though the experimenter would
not be able to see or hear them. These controls allowed for an
examination of brain regions that were recruited during an inter-
action that could not be accounted for by differences in stimulus
properties. Comparison of live and recorded conditions revealed
that largely the same set of brain regions were engaged in both
conditions. For example, robust recruitment was seen in the pos-
terior superior temporal sulcus (STS) during both live and
recorded conditions, which is not surprising given the STS’s role
in human action perception (e.g., Pelphrey et al. 2004; Saxe
et al. 2004). Interestingly, the live condition showed increased
activation of the posterior STS, and this extended more posteriorly
into the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), a region associated with
theory of mind processing. Thus, this study offers support for
differences in the magnitude of activation in brain systems
between live, contingent interaction, and non-contingent inter-
action when stimulus characteristics are constant and some
support for fundamental differences in the brain systems
recruited. Future studies which control for action, attention,
and stimulus characteristics (in addition to those proposed by
Schilbach et al.) will be critical to disentangle where the “book-
ends” (sect. 4) begin and end; in other words, what are the differ-
ential effects of second- versus third-person approaches to social
cognition on neural patterns of activation?
Characterizing these “bookends” is especially important for
understanding autism, a developmental disorder characterized
by impairments in social interaction, particularly in the inten-
tional coordination of attention with others, or joint attention
(e.g., Charman 2003; Mundy & Newell 2007). However,
ofﬂine laboratory-based tasks often fail to ﬁnd deﬁcits in joint
attention behaviors (Nation & Penny 2008; Redcay et al.
2012). Similarly, tasks tapping into belief representations
demonstrate fairly typical performance (e.g., Senju et al.
2009) and even typical neural patterns of activation (e.g.,
Dufour et al. 2012). One possibility is that these third-person
studies may be failing to capture the challenges of a real-time
social interaction for a person with autism. A recent study of
ours (Redcay et al., in press) compared patterns of activation
during a real-time joint attention game between high-function-
ing adults with autism and typical adults. Whereas typical adults
demonstrated selective recruitment of the left posterior STS
and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) during joint, as
compared to solo, attention, the participants with autism
revealed a pattern of reduced selectivity due to both hypoactiv-
ity during the joint conditions and hyperactivity in the solo con-
dition. These data suggest a failure to modulate these brain
regions according to whether the task required a social inter-
action. Importantly, the differential effects of second- versus
third-person interaction might vary between typical and atypi-
cal populations, or change throughout development. This pre-
sents a major challenge to our understanding of the
neurobiology of social processing in autism, but we are optimis-
tic that a continued second-person neuroscience approach will
reveal the mechanisms underlying real-world social difﬁculties
in autism.
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Social affordances in context: What
is it that we are bodily responsive to?
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Abstract: We propose to understand social affordances in the broader
context of responsiveness to a ﬁeld of relevant affordances in general.
This perspective clariﬁes our everyday ability to unreﬂectively switch
between social and other affordances. Moreover, based on our experience
with Deep Brain Stimulation for treating obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD) patients, we suggest that psychiatric disorders may affect skilled
intentionality, including responsiveness to social affordances.
We suggest that the two constituents of a second-person approach
proposed by Schilbach et al. – emotional engagement and social
interaction – are best seen as aspects of bodily or skilled intention-
ality. Skilled intentionality can be understood as adequate respon-
siveness to a ﬁeld of relevant affordances (Rietveld, in press)
enabled by embodied know-how or abilities. From phenomenology
(e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002) and ecological psychology (e.g.,
Gibson 1979; Reed 1996) we learn that normally we engage skill-
fully with our environments (Ingold 2000/2011). This skillful
engagement is a form of unreﬂective action that is “solicited” or
“motivated” by the situation. It is characterized by responsiveness
to “affordances” (Gibson 1979; Rietveld 2008); to possibilities for
action offered by the environment. Affordances are relations
between aspects of the environment and abilities (Chemero
2003). Crucially, we are selectively responsive to one affordance
rather than another: In the context of the particular situation and
depending on the person’s concerns, some affordances are more
relevant than others. Social affordances are a subcategory of affor-
dances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by the
environment. For example, a friend’s sad face invites comforting
behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conver-
sation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. The ﬁeld of rel-
evant affordances integrates social affordances and other
affordances such as object affordances, epistemic affordances,
place affordances, and even possibilities for reﬂection.
Although social interactions are extremely important for under-
standing both our everyday life and possible disorders of it, it is
important to take into account that they take place within a
broader context: Any relevant possibility for social interaction is
embedded in a ﬁeld of other soliciting possibilities for action.
While engaged in a conversation with a friend, the cup of coffee
on the table affords drinking from it, and my iPhone affords
checking my email. Every now and then I unreﬂectively switch
from interacting with my friend to drinking and back to the con-
versation afforded by my friend. Thus “the context” is not a static
pre-given: What is at the foreground and what is at the back-
ground for us shifts – depending both on what happens in the
environment and on our current needs. It is important to under-
stand how we switch spontaneously from responsiveness to a
social affordance to responsiveness to another affordance, and
back, because this is what happens in real life all the time.
Are we just “responsive to the socially relevant, expressive be-
havior of others” (target article, sect. 3.1.1, para. 3) or are we
responsive to something broader? Our work on skillful unreﬂec-
tive action suggests that it is thewhole ﬁeld of relevant affordances
(social and other) that we are responsive to. This also explains why
we switch so easily between interacting with a person and interact-
ing with an object: We are immersed in an integrated ﬁeld of rel-
evant affordances, each of which can solicit activity. Affordances in
the background can solicit activity because they are bodily poten-
tiating. A relevant affordance can generate bodily “action readi-
ness” (Frijda 1986; 2007), that is, the readiness of the
affordance-related ability (Rietveld, 2008). In this way, starting
from bodily or skilled intentionality, our perspective avoids an arti-
ﬁcial separation between social cognition and nonsocial engage-
ments with the environment.
All this amounts to putting social affordances in context, which is
in line with our ﬁndings in psychiatry, where we investigate the phe-
nomenology of patients suffering from treatment-refractory obses-
sive-compulsive disorder (OCD) who are treated with Deep Brain
Stimulation (DBS). DBS treatment consists of permanently
implanted electrodes that deliver electrical pulses to a target brain
region. DBS of the nucleus accumbens shows encouraging results
as treatment for therapy-resistant OCD (Denys et al. 2010). OCD
is characterized by the presence of recurrent and anxiety-provoking
thoughts, images, or impulses (obsessions), typically followed by
repetitive ritualistic behaviors (compulsions) to relieve anxiety.
One could interpret compulsions as a disturbance in affordance-
responsiveness, the perpetuation of a meaningless act that is an
ongoing but inappropriate response to the ﬁeld of affordances.
Interestingly, some patients respond rapidly to DBS and many
report profound changes (Denys et al. 2010). Important changes
do indeed concern the social dimension: Patients report increased
social interests and communicative interactions. However, patients
also report a different interaction with the world in general;
feeling more open and less anxious. Some even report a renewed
sense of their own body, and more intense perception of the
world. This suggests that at least certain kinds of psychiatric dis-
orders may be described by changes or dysfunction in affordance-
responsiveness, including responsiveness to social affordances.
There is something right in Schilbach et al.’s suggestion of under-
standing psychiatric disorders as “disorders of social cognition” (sect.
5.1). However, they are not disorders of just social cognition. From
theOCDpatients treated withDBS, it becomes very clear that many
aspects of engagement with the world change all together: percep-
tion, reﬂection, mood, interests, and social interaction. These phe-
nomenological changes can be understood as changes in their
responsiveness to the ﬁeld of affordances as a whole, not just to
the social affordances encountered. This general capability of affor-
dance-responsiveness may correspond to brain activities that heavily
interact and need to be understood in rapidly communicating neuro-
circuitries (Freeman 2000; Friston 2011; Friston et al. 2012; Thelen
& Smith 1994) rather than separate brain areas, which in turn
explains the integrated responsiveness to the ﬁeld of affordances.
This general capability of affordance-responsiveness may be directly
inﬂuenced by brain manipulation such as with DBS.
To conclude, Schilbach and colleagues make an interesting call
for a second-person methodology for neuroscience. We also
support their broader understanding of social cognition as funda-
mentally encompassing the implicit, bodily, affective, and contex-
tual aspects of our social interactions. We suggest that a fruitful
way to integrate these aspects is to understand social interactions
as a form of skilled intentionality. We are bodily responsive to a
ﬁeld of relevant affordances, including social and other affordances.
Such a broader account sheds light on how we unreﬂectively switch
between these affordances. Finally, based on our experience with
DBS for treating OCD patients, we suggest that psychiatric dis-
orders may affect affordance-responsiveness in general.
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Abstract: Schilbach et al. contribute to neuroscience methodology
through drawing on insights from the second-person approach. We
suggest that they could further contribute to social neuroscience by
more fully spelling out the ways in which a second-person approach to
the nature and origin of thinking could transform neuroscience.
By integrating social neuroscience with a second-person
approach, Schilbach et al. make a signiﬁcant contribution, at
least to neuroscience methodology. A further contribution, we
suggest, would be to more fully spell out the implications of a
second-person approach for neuroscience. We take it that the
second-person approach is a form of a relational, action-
based, or developmental systems approach (e.g., Carpendale
& Lewis 2010; Overton 2006) because Schilbach et al. state
that their second-person approach to knowing minds is based
on an “interactive account of social cognition that emphasizes
the constitutive role of participating in the social world” (sect.
6, para. 3). From this sort of a perspective, knowledge is inter-
active rather than representational, and this should lead to a
different way of thinking about what the brain does. Neuro-
science can only explain cognition as well as the psychological
theory it is assimilated to, so there is a second and deeper
level at which a relational metatheoretical approach to the
nature and origin of thinking could transform neuroscience.
Schilbach et al., however, are somewhat silent on these impli-
cations. We encourage them to be more explicit in order to
avoid the problematic assumptions presupposed in the compu-
tational view of the mind.
A relational, action-based, approach would re-conceptualize
cognitive and social cognitive development in an embodied
and situated context of mutual engagement. According to
such an account, children construct knowledge by learning
the interactive potential of aspects of the world as experi-
enced, which enables them to anticipate the results of their
actions and thereby engage in viable interactions with the
world. Cognition, then, does not consist of computations per-
formed on internal symbols, but is a process of anticipatory
and adaptive action, and develops through the mastery of
physical and social interactions. Importantly, if an agent’s
knowledge depends on its history of situated actions and inter-
actions in its environment, it simply cannot be characterized in
terms of internal representations of an outside world (Marshall
2009).
If meaning, communication, language, and thinking cannot
emerge independently of social-emotional interaction, then the
brain cannot be viewed in the classical computationalist sense as
a detached information-processor, which, in any event, is a
vacuous claim because it assumes a homunculus (e.g., Heil
1981; Tallis 2004). Rather, neural activation and interconnectivity
formed through social experience must enable persons to antici-
pate increasingly complex interactions within a given environment
based on their interaction histories, and to elicit more complex
social, emotional engagement. Furthermore, the brain must do
this without being described as a thinking or social entity in and
of itself, or else a second-person neuroscience would ascribe to
the parts of an organism cognitive functions that can only properly
be ascribed to the whole, thus succumbing to the mereological
fallacy that plagues contemporary neuroscience (Bennett &
Hacker 2003).
Despite the fact that in the target article Schilbach et al.
have pioneered new experimental paradigms, admirably cri-
tiqued “spectatorial” theories of social cognition (Hutto
2004), and promoted the neuroscientiﬁc study of ongoing
social interaction dynamics and social synchronies, the
danger remains that even in trying to situate brain activity
in a sociocultural context, social engagements will once
again be reduced to computational manipulations of purely
internal representations in an individual, isolated mind, as
has generally been the case in classical cognitivist approaches
to social cognition (Frith & Frith 2006; Goldman 2006).
Indeed, many of the methods advocated by the authors may
be applauded by traditional cognitive neuroscientists who
have retained the information-processing assumptions of clas-
sical cognitive science. For such theorists, the only shift in
thinking required by this target article may be that emotional
engagement and ongoing interaction must be included in the
experimental design in order to isolate the peculiar social cog-
nitive functions that characterize social encounters. Such the-
orists might even suggest that social cognitive functions could
be better localized in the brain by employing two functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machines to study both
individuals in a dyadic interaction, rather than just one. We
suggest that Schilbach et al., in crafting experimental
methods to be employed in service of a new, second-person
framework for neuroscience, have not clariﬁed the framework
governing the interpretation of subsequent experimental
results, and have inadvertently improved the methods of a tra-
ditional neuroscience that continues to operate on a notion of
a detached, information-processing individual mind. This
leaves open the possibility that these same second-person
methods could just as easily be used by traditional neuroscien-
tists to locate speciﬁc brain structures in which social cogni-
tion supposedly resides, and to interpret those brain
structures as sites of the internal symbol manipulation that
supposedly constitutes social cognitive functioning. The inno-
vative methods of second-person neuroscience, therefore, do
not protect theorists from the mereological fallacy (Bennett
& Hacker 2003).
A challenge for a second-person neuroscience is getting from
the subpersonal level of neural activity to the personal level of
meaning, rationality, and normativity. This distinction is gener-
ally neglected in neuroscience, perhaps because it seems
difﬁcult to bridge this gap from the perspective of a compu-
tational approach. From an action-based approach, however,
neural activity makes action possible, and meaning emerges as
infants learn the interactive potential of their world. Within
infants’ interpersonal social and emotional engagement human
forms of communication emerge, making self-awareness and
thinking possible. Neural pathways are structured through
experience in social-emotional interaction and play a causal
role in interactivity. Although neurons are necessary, we
cannot locate rationality and normativity at that level, nor
indeed the interpersonal experience of engagement with
others that is so important in the second-person approach.
Rather, psychological phenomena at the personal level are
emergent, and, as Schilbach et al. state, are constituted
through participation in the social world. This needs to be
made explicit in a second-person neuroscience.
We encourage Schilbach et al. to further integrate the second-
person approach with neuroscience. If the traditional, compu-
tational view of the individual mind cannot account for the
emergence of meaningful communication, and ignores important
aspects of embodied and situated social cognition, then it is
necessary to adopt a second-person approach informed by an
embodied relational metatheory in interpreting the neuroscienti-
ﬁc data on social cognition.
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Abstract: Based on mirror neurons’ properties, viewers are emotionally
engaged when observing others – even when not actively interacting;
therefore, characterizing non-participatory action-viewing as isolated
may be misleading. Instead, we propose a continuum of socio-emotional
engagement. We also highlight recent developmental work that uses a
second-person perspective, investigating behavioral, physiological, and
neural activity during caregiver–infant interactions.
We comment on two points: one conceptual, relating to the impli-
cations of the discovery of mirror neurons, and the second meth-
odological, relating to the application of a second-person
perspective in developmental psychology. Schilbach et al. wish to
distinguish two types of social interactions – active participation
among individuals (e.g., face-to-face), and passive social viewing
(e.g., watching a movie of someone) – claiming there may be key
differences in the neurophysiology underlying these different
types of interactions. However, we think this is in part a false dichot-
omy; rather, there is a continuum of social-emotional engagement,
inﬂuenced by a variety of factors. The level of (current or future)
active interaction is one such factor, but others include the relation-
ship between individuals, the perceiver’s goals, and the types of
actions viewed (e.g., Breithaupt 2012). We are in agreement with
Rizzolatti and colleagues that mirror neurons allow viewers to go
beyond cold, detached, third-person, mere spectator perspectives,
even if viewers make no active interaction attempts (Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia 2010; Sinigaglia 2010). Therefore, the characterization
of non-participatory action viewing as isolated (an “isolation para-
digm”) may be misleading.
Instead, viewers can be emotionally engaged by simply viewing
others. Anyone who has felt the emotional pain of a favorite actor
or actress while watching a movie can testify to this. The impor-
tance of phenomenology in theorizing – that viewers are not pure
spectators, but that social perception involves emotional engage-
ment – has been arguably the greatest implication of the discovery
of mirror neurons. Several scholars, including Husserl, who is con-
sidered the father of phenomenology, and Merleau-Ponty, pre-
viously reasoned and theorized that our perception of the world
activates sensorimotor programs and thus allows our bodies to
have ﬁrst-person knowledge about the object of our perception.
Work on the mirror neurons system for facial expressions (Ferrari
et al. 2003) and emotions – by Iacoboni, Aglioti, Wickler, Singer,
and others from our group in Parma – demonstrate that when we
see emotions, there is a brain mirroring in the traditional mirror
areas (premotor-parietal), as well as in deep areas of the brain
involved in ﬁrst-person perception of emotion, such as the cingulate
cortex and the anterior insula. In other words, it is as if viewers
experience the same emotion as that displayed by the other. The
simulation account (Gallese & Goldman 1998) is tightly linked to
the empirical work on mirror neurons, and the simulation
account is indeed an empirical bridge between the mirror neuron
work and the phenomenological grounding previously mentioned.
Moreover, nearly all work on single cell recordings of mirror
neurons involves second-person interactions; thus, the simulation
paradigm and the mirror neuron discovery are of utmost impor-
tance for theorizing about a neuroscience of social interaction.
We agree with the authors that there is a need to look more at
interactions involving brain networks for coordinating actions and
second-person engagements. The dynamics occurring during a
social interaction have different requirements when the observer
is passively viewing a scene, compared to actively engaging with
another individual. For example, in an active engagement there
is concurrent activation of executive function networks, which
plan and coordinate online movements with the interacting
agent, during potential intersubjective exchanges.
Developmental psychological studies have utilized this second-
person perspective, and in doing so have been useful in describing
the complexity of social interaction from early in the postnatal
period. In particular, emotional responses between caregivers and
infants are of utmost importance in tracking the developmental
emergence of social understanding. Early interactions between care-
givers and infants are formative in a number of ways, giving infants
opportunities for learning and also strengthening bonds between
infants and caregivers. Studying caregiver–infant interactions is par-
ticularly important, as those early interactions can have lasting
impacts on later social and emotional development. Interactions
with real social partners – not simply avatars – can provide more eco-
logically valid measures of social engagement and perception. More-
over, caregiver–infant interactions can be used as a guide for the
creation of ecologically valid adult studies (e.g., Dumas 2011).
A number of developmental studies (not mentioned by Schilbach
et al.) have successfully utilized a second-person perspective, inves-
tigating behavioral, physiological, and neural synchrony during
caregiver–infant interactions, which may serve as models for
second-person developmental research. For example, in work
with humans, Feldman and colleagues found heart rate synchrony
between mothers and infants during face-to-face interactions
(Feldman et al. 2011), Messinger and colleagues discovered
stable individual differences in infants’ attention to mothers’
faces, controlling for maternal behaviors, such as smiling (Mes-
singer et al. 2012), and Musser and colleagues found neural corre-
lates of maternal sensitivity during face-to-face interactions (Musser
et al. 2012). Recent work in our lab examined newborn infant
monkeys’ live face-to-face interactions with human caregivers. Elec-
troencephalogram (EEG) recordings revealed a 5–6 Hz activity
suppression when the infants produced facial gestures and when
infants observed facial gestures, but not when they observed non-
biological stimuli (Ferrari et al. 2012). This EEG suppression,
named mu-rhythm, is considered a signature of the mirror
neuron system. This ﬁnding suggests that the basic elements of
the mirror neuron system are operational in the ﬁrst week of life
and might be central for early face-to-face interactions.
Toward a neuroscience of interactive
parent–infant dyad empathy
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12002063
James E. Swain,a Sara Konrath,b Carolyn J. Dayton,a
Eric D. Finegood,a and S. Shaun Hoa
aDepartment of Psychiatry, University of Michigan School of Medicine, Ann
Arbor, MI 48109; bDepartment of Psychology, University of Michigan,
Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, Ann
Arbor, MI 48106.
jamesswa@med.umich.edu skonrath@umich.edu
carolynjdayton@gmail.com eﬁnegoo@med.umich.edu
hosh@med.umich.edu
http://www2.med.umich.edu/psychiatry/psy/fac_query4.cfm?
link_name=jamesswa
Abstract: In accord with social neuroscience’s progression to include
interactive experimental paradigms, parents’ brains have been activated
by emotionally charged infant stimuli – especially of their own infant –
including baby cry and picture. More recent research includes the use
of brief video clips and opportunities for maternal response. Among
brain systems important to parenting are those involved in empathy.
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This research may inform recent studies of decreased societal empathy,
offer mechanisms and solutions.
Within the ﬁeld of social neuroscience, investigators are now
studying the brain basis of human parenting, using paradigms in
accord with the ideas of Schilbach et al. in the target article.
Recent neuroimaging studies, in which mothers respond to
infant stimuli, have demonstrated the functional signiﬁcance of
many parental care-giving-related brain regions – building on
rodent neuroscience. In summary, a broad array of brain
regions activate to baby-cries (Swain, Mayes, & Leckman 2004)
and pictures (Swain & Ho 2010) and according to measures of
parent–infant interaction, thoughts, and behaviors – highlighted
by parts of the amygdala (alarm), striatum/nucleus accumbens
(NA; motivation and reward). In humans, cortical response cir-
cuits are added, including the anterior cingulate for decision-
making, inferior frontal gyrus for theory of mind, as well as
orbitofrontal cortex, insula, periaqueductal grey, and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex that regulate complex social-cognitive functions
currently under study. (For reviews, see Barrett & Fleming 2011;
Mayes et al. 2005, Swain 2011a; 2011b; Swain et al. 2011.)
One of the key conceptualizations in the neuroscience of parenting
has been that of empathy, which has been a central topic in social
neuroscience highlighting the insula (Decety & Jackson 2004,
Lamm et al. 2007). Among parents, the insula was activated while
reacting to own baby cry (Kim et al. 2010) and more among breast-
feeding versus formula-feeding mothers (Kim et al. 2011). Further-
more, observing and actually imitating faces of their own child
activated in the insula and other cortical motor imitation and mirror
neuron systems (Lenzi et al. 2009), which correlated positively with
levels of maternal empathy assessed with independent validated
interviews. Support for the insula being part of a general system
of empathy includes responses of non-parents to baby-pictures
(Schechter et al. 2012) –which also involves premotor cortex
activation in preparation for appropriate behavioral responses
(Caria et al. 2012).
Direct studies of reciprocal baby brain function in response to
their parents are yet to be done; however, a recent neuroimaging
study of mothers showed how perceived maternal care (a proxy for
animal models’ licking and grooming behaviors) affects both brain
structures and functional response to own-baby cries in adult
mothers (Kim et al. 2010). In this study, mothers who reported
higher maternal care in their own childhood showed higher gray
matter density, proportional to the number of neurons, in a
range of higher cortical areas and executive function areas, includ-
ing the insula, superior and middle frontal gyri, orbital gyrus,
superior temporal gyrus, and fusiform gyrus. There were also
increased functional responses in a number of frontal brain
regions and the insula in response to own-baby cries. This may
reﬂect long-term effects in humans of early-life mother–child
interactions affecting adult maternal mother–infant interactions.
Three recent studies of maternal interactions with brief video clips
come closest to second-person neuroscience. (Atzil, Hendler, &
Feldman 2011, Atzil, Hendler, Zagoory-Sharon, Winetraub, &
Feldman 2012, Schechter et al. 2012). In Atzil et al. (2011; 2012),
mothers were scanned while observing several own and standard
infant-related vignettes. Beyond basic motivation/reward nucleus
accumbens (NA) responses, functional NA and amygdala were func-
tionally correlated with emotion modulation, theory-of-mind, and
empathy networks including the insula. In studies by Schechter
et al. (2012) mothers with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and controls, epochs of play and separation from their own and unfa-
miliar childrenwereprocessedby regions including the insula.Exten-
sions of this work might be to ask mothers to respond to the visual
stimuli as if they were actually there with a push-button device to
attempt parenting responses. Other experimental approaches on
the horizon include direct electroencephalography (EEG) or func-
tional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) studies of simultaneous
interacting mother–infant dyads.
The neuroscience of maternal–infant dyadic interaction and
empathy leads to a concern regarding apparent societal declines in
other-orientation in the United States. For example, Americans are
less likely than ever to participate inmany types of social experiences,
from sharing dinner to attending religious services (Putnam 1995;
2000). Moreover, dispositional empathy has declined among Ameri-
can college students from the 1980s onward (Konrath et al. 2011),
suggesting that young people today ﬁnd it difﬁcult to experience
others’ emotional worlds (O’Brien et al. 2013). Finally, there has
been a recent change in attachment style. Today’s college students
increasingly report having a predominantly avoidant attachment
style (Chopik et al. 2011; Konrath et al., under review), which is
characterized by having positive views of the self but negative views
of others (Bartholomew & Horowitz 1991). It has been suggested
that these trends may be related to modern electronic “social” inter-
actions,manyofwhichareat the level ofmereobservation (e.g., email,
social networking sites) instead of dynamic interaction (discussed in
the target article), and many of them are also lower in emotional
engagement. Even tools that are more socially interactive (like
Skype) do not currently allow eye contact. In fact, the “virtual” char-
acters described in the target article have more properties of actual
social interaction (i.e., eye contact, real-time responsiveness) than
many social interactions commonly experienced today.
These considerations beg many broad social policy questions
regarding the effects of different media environments on mother–
child interactions. Parents may be continually distracted by their
social media from caring for their infant – effectively simulating a
still-face paradigm to their own infant (Tronick et al. 1978), which
encourages infants to ﬁrst try harder to engage their parent, and
then to withdraw and become distressed (Mesman et al. 2009).
Could some of the social changes described above be partially
explained by an increase in still-face-like parent–infant interactions?
Moreover, it is not just parents who are increasing their screen time
in recent years. Children are now watching more television than
ever and it is now common for toddlers to be proﬁcient iPhone
users (Konrath 2013).Does this affect thedevelopment of fundamen-
tal social cognitive capacities?
We recommend that future research take into account parental
and child media use when examining neural signatures of attach-
ment and bonding. Excessive media use may be a relatively unex-
plored risk factor, or a marker, for poor parent–infant attachment,
with concerning implications for social-cognitive development.
Second-person neuroscience used to optimize dyadic interven-
tions may offer a solution (Swain et al. 2012).
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Abstract: Language is a social act. We have previously argued that
language remains embedded in sociality because the motivation to
communicate exists only within a social context. Schilbach et al.
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underscore the importance of studying linguistic behavior from within the
motivated, socially interactive frame in which it is learnt and used, as well
as provide testable hypotheses for a participatory, second-person
neuroscience approach to language learning.
Language is a strikingly social behavior. While it is possible to have
social behavior that is not linguistic, the converse is not true.
Language is learned, perceived, and produced within the fabric
of social interaction. Using developmental and comparative litera-
ture, we have previously contended that the presence of structural
and functional linkages between subcortical motivation systems,
and conventional language and social circuits in the brain, are criti-
cal determinants of the evolution and development of language in
a given species (Syal & Finlay 2011). A research program that aims
to study language-learning needs to attend to language as
embedded in its ecological context, acquired in the early develop-
ment of an obligatorily social, gregarious, and often-altruistic
species, where the motivation to learn to communicate with con-
speciﬁcs drives both its ontogeny and phylogeny. To that end,
researchers have thus far focused on the role of socially derived
motivation in language learning through studying infant-caregiver
interactions in the development of vocal communication (Gold-
stein & Schwade 2008; Kuhl 2007b). However, this corpus of
knowledge has been constrained by the inability to study brain-be-
havior linkages through the acquisition of functional neuroimaging
data that model ecologically valid social interactions. The novel
methodologies discussed by Schilbach et al. in the target article
use eye-tracking in conjunction with functional magnetic reson-
ance imaging (fMRI) to create interactive paradigms that allow
human participants to experience the effects of their gaze on
that of a social counterpart, simulating a naturalistic social inter-
action, while allowing researchers to gather MRI data that eluci-
dates underlying neural networks. This approach provides an
immensely pliable platform on which social motivation in vocal
learning can now be placed and probed, in both adult and infant
language learners. For instance, the role of joint attention in
guiding the learning of artiﬁcial object-labels in (a) adults, using
both eye-tracking and fMRI, or (b) infants, using interactive
eye-tracking setups, are immediate examples of experimental
questions that can be addressed using these paradigms.
From early life, human children attend to social cues, share
information, join games, and generally cooperate, serving a form
of social learning limited largely to humans (Moll & Tomasello
2007). These prosocial tendencies also sustain vocal learning be-
havior during development, wherein numerous structural aids to
language learning are presented to the infant in a characteristically
social environment replete with positive feedback. For example,
mothers reliably use predictable prosodic contours to modulate
infant affect and attention (Fernald 1992; Fernald & Simon
1984). They engage in contingent turn-taking vocal interactions
with their infants that facilitate vocal development (Goldstein &
Schwade 2008). They use variation sets – sentences with partially
overlapping syntactical structure – to aid word learning (Onnis
et al. 2008). Recent work has shown how learning of the structural
regularities of language can emerge from the richness of social
interactivity embedded in the human ecological niche. Speciﬁc
forms of contingently delivered vocal reinforcement from a
social counterpart cause infants to change correspondingly
speciﬁc features of their own vocalizations towards developmental
advancement (Goldstein & Schwade 2008). Contingency of social
interaction remains a core requirement in these learning pro-
cesses – infants do not display vocal learning when the same
amount of stimulation is provided in a non-contingent social inter-
action (Goldstein & Schwade 2008; Goldstein et al. 2003; Gold-
stein et al. 2010a), or through audio-visual media (Kuhl et al.
2003). Indeed, the extent of learning is in fact determined by
the amount of social engagement – greater shared visual attention
between infants and interactive social agents facilitates greater
language learning (Conboy et al. 2008).
An idea essential to this approach is that social contingency in
dyadic or triadic interactions is inherently rewarding, and promotes
learning through the recruitment ofmotivational neurocircuitry, and
the facilitation of shared attention. In support of this, initial data
using the experimental paradigm outlined in the target article
suggest a role for reward-related circuitry in initiating joint attention
on both neural and behavioral levels (Schilbach et al. 2010b).
Numerous studies have highlighted the role of contingency in
speciﬁc forms of reward-based learning. In adults, the caudate
nucleus within the dorsal striatum is sensitive to reinforcement of
action and shows a robust response when subjects perceive a contin-
gency between their actions and task-outcomes (Tricomi et al. 2004).
The caudate is also involved in encoding stimulus salience (Zink et al.
2006) and, in language learning, reward-related caudate activation in
response to contingent feedback facilitates the learning of non-
native phonetic contrasts in adults (Tricomi et al. 2006). This social
hypothesis of language learning suggests that reward-based instru-
mental learning and positive affect systems may be critical to
language development, not only in terms of acquisition, but also in
theﬂexible integration of newly learned informationwithin the exist-
ing lexicon. Positive affect embedded in social interaction could
facilitate language-learning through salience-tagging information
and/or shifting focus towards a broader information encoding
context. Data from adults indicates that positive affect can lead to
fundamental shifts in information processing through the facilitation
of ﬂexible modes of cognition (Isen 2002), which increase the
breadth of attentional allocation in both perceptual and conceptual
domains (Rowe et al. 2007; Schmitz et al. 2009). Additionally, as a
social act, language learning and use involves not only the ability to
make narrow associations between words and their referents, but
also the broader capacity of reading another’s mental states, possibly
invoking a network of shared activation between minds. The afﬁlia-
tive role of positive emotions is likely critical to this interpersonal
network resonance.
Past work on language learning has accorded limited signiﬁcance
to emergent properties of social interactions. The second-person
approach to neuroscience posits social interaction and emotional
engagement with social counterparts as fundamental features of
social living that enable us to understand and learn from the
minds of others, highlighting the importance of studying real-time
interaction dynamics between individuals in an ecologically valid
manner. Within the ecological framework of vocal learning, the
parent-infant dyad constitutes a socially distributed system of learn-
ing, best viewed as a consolidated network that incorporates the
learner, the social interactor, the interaction between the two, and
the effect of each actor on its own and the other’s nervous system.
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Abstract:We argue that Schilbach et al. have neglected an important part
of the social neuroscience literature involving participants in social
interactions. We also clarify some part of the models the authors
discussed superﬁcially. We ﬁnally propose that social neuroscience
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should take into consideration the effect of being observed and the
complexity of the task as potentially inﬂuencing factors.
Our ﬁrst point is that Schilbach et al. have neglected a relatively
important part of the social neuroscience literature in which par-
ticipants are actually involved in social interaction or exclusion/
rejection with others. This major part of the literature shows
that an overlap in neural activation exists between physical pain
and social pain (following rejection). Studies that illustrate this
point most commonly use the Cyberball paradigm, a computer-
ized ball-tossing game eliciting feelings of social rejection and dis-
tress, which has previously been used in functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies (e.g., Eisenberger & Lieber-
man 2004; Eisenberger et al. 2003). In this paradigm, participants
who were ﬁrst involved in a simulated ball-tossing game with two
other players were then implicitly excluded from the game by the
other two players who only passed the ball to each other, thereby
socially rejecting the participant. Interestingly, the fMRI results
showed that rejection produced brain activity in areas that are
also activated when people experience physical pain.
We agree with Schilbach et al.’s claim that a second-person
neuroscience would be particularly relevant to understanding
mental or behavioral disorders. We have, in fact, recently exam-
ined social rejection (using Cyberball) in alcohol-dependent
inpatients (Maurage et al. 2012). In this study, 22 abstinent
alcohol-dependent participants and 22 paired controls played
Cyberball during fMRI recording. Participants were ﬁrst included
by other players, then excluded and ﬁnally re-included (when the
other two players resumed passing the ball to the participant). We
found increased activation in brain areas typically associated with
social-rejection feelings and with impaired ability to inhibit these
feelings (as indexed by a reduction in frontal activation) in alcohol-
dependent participants compared to matched controls. Reduced
frontal regulation was suggested to be responsible for the inter-
personal alterations observed in alcohol-dependence, which
seems to be reinforced by impaired fronto-cingulate connectivity.
As suggested by Schilbach et al., this very recent publication con-
ﬁrms the importance of second-person neuroscience studies as a
dynamic tool for helping differential diagnosis in psychiatric dis-
orders and also shows neglected studies related to second-
person neuroscience.
Some other examples from this important ﬁeld of literature may
be found in studies investigating obedience to authority (such as
the Milgram experiment). In a recent fMRI study, Cheetham
et al. (2009) investigated the neural basis of obedience and
empathy in participants who were instructed to punish a victim
with electric shocks for every incorrect answer the victim gave.
Other important examples of second-person social neuroscience
come from studies on racism (Olsson et al. 2005), out-group dehu-
manization (Hein et al. 2010), and even cognitive dissonance
(Kitayama et al. 2004). These studies represent only a few
examples among many others of second-person social neuro-
science effects that deserve to be reported in the current article.
The second point we argue is that Schilbach et al. have neg-
lected an important aspect of the Simulation of Smiles (SIMS)
model. The SIMS model recently proposed by Niedenthal et al.
(2010) does not only constitute a model of how involuntary
mimicry occurs during social interactions (as discussed by Schil-
bach et al.), but also speciﬁes the involvement of different
neural areas (e.g., amygdala, somatosensory cortex) in the psycho-
logical understanding of others’ feelings during second-person
interactions. This model constitutes a theoretical model of
second-person understanding of emotional states, which was
applied to smiling only because this emotional expression consti-
tutes one of the more complex and ambiguous expressions
involved during social interaction. For instance, the SIMS
model speciﬁes the inﬂuence of different social contexts (e.g., cul-
tural, afﬁliative) on the use of functional triggers (mainly eye
contact) inducing subsequent embodied or grounded processes.
As far as we understand, this SIMS model clearly ﬁts with what
Schilbach and colleagues have coined as second-person
neuroscience “going social” and represents a direct and detailed
second-person theoretical model of social interactions.
Finally, based on the ﬁndings from social psychology, we would
like to stress the importance of taking into consideration, in future
social neuroscience studies, the effect of being observed as well as
the complexity of the task. Researchers have shown that perform-
ance may be impacted by the mere (or even imagined) presence
of other people. More speciﬁcally, it has been claimed that in
simple (well-learned) tasks, the presence of others leads to per-
formance increments, whereas in complex (not well-learned)
tasks performance is negatively inﬂuenced by the presence of
others. This effect has been named the “activation theory
model” by Zajonc (1965; see Strauss [2001] for a review of this
phenomenon). As well, many studies in nonhuman primates
have also shown that these effects are not limited to humans
but have been observed in other social species, such as Capuchin
primates (Dindo et al. 2009). We believe it is important to con-
sider this phenomenon in future social (e.g., second-person
neuroscience) experimental situations because it implies that per-
formance – in fMRI, for instance – does not rely solely on partici-
pants’ abilities but also depends on the internal awareness of the
presence (or envisaged presence) of others. In our opinion, this
highlights the importance of better understanding whether (and
how) activity in the neural network may be modulated by the
feeling of being observed and/or evaluated. Moreover, such
social neuroscience fMRI investigations may conﬁrm (or discon-
ﬁrm) the involvement of speciﬁc cognitive processes during
social interactions (attention, short-term memory, etc.) (Muller
et al. 2004). This could be particularly important in psychopathol-
ogy such as (social) anxiety disorders or alexithymia, as most of
those disorders are known to be related to impaired attentional
processes (Rossignol et al. 2007; Vermeulen et al. 2008) or
memory processes (Vermeulen & Luminet 2009; Vermeulen
et al. 2010).
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Abstract: In this response we address additions to as well as
criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a
second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial
aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-
person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand
others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2)
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claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in
order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3)
restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the
mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but
asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and
a cognitive process when it is conﬁned to intra-agent space. We
address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out
that while a second-person social understanding may not be the
only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their
ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in
the expression, certainly in the development of social
understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency
and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical
implications of our approach.
We are pleased and surprised to ﬁnd that the second-
person approach described in the target article resonates
so positively with most commentators. An important
number of those endorsements also suggest ways in
which this account could conceptually be expanded
further (e.g., Cummins; Rietveld, de Haan, & Denys
[Rietveld et al.]), or into other domains such as language
and communication (Evans; Gambi & Pickering; Syal &
Anderson), animal research (Hamon-Hill & Gadbois;
Nephew; Simpson & Ferrari), and robotics (Dominey;
Froese, Lizuka, & Ikegami [Froese et al.]). In our
response, we touch upon these suggested extensions
(sect. R2). Afterwards we focus on comments that
suggest providing further details in describing the theoreti-
cal speciﬁcs of the second-person approach (e.g., Gariépi,
Chang, & Platt [Gariépi et al.]; Hamilton) (sect. R3).
Also, we noticed that some commentaries take issue with
the fact that we seem to push the second-person issue
too far (e.g., Moore & Iacoboni; Overgaard &
Krueger; Simpson & Ferrari), while on the other hand
others suggest that we do not apply it consistently (e.g.,
Gallagher, Hutto, Slaby, & Cole [Gallagher et al.];
Hamilton; Sameen, Thompson, & Carpendale
[Sameen et al.]) (sect. R5). Lastly, another group of com-
mentaries exists – focusing on issues of intentionality and
agency (Gallotti; Krach, Müller-Pinzler, Westermann,
& Paulus [Krache et al.];Cleret de Langavant, Jacque-
mot, Bachoud-Lévi, & Dupoux [Cleret de Langavant
et al.]; Lewis & Stack; Longo & Tsakiris; Moore &
Paulus) –which seems to read assumptions into our
article that we do not make (sect. R4). Therefore, we
think it is necessary to start off by brieﬂy re-stating what
our proposal for a second-person neuroscience is and
what it is not, what it hopes to add, and what its limitations
are before we tackle the other questions (sect. R1). As in
the target article, we end by discussing clinically relevant
aspects of our proposal, which have been referred to in
different commentaries (Chakrabarti; Nephew; Redcay,
Rice, & Saxe [Redcay et al.]; Rietveld et al.) (sect. R6).
R1. Rebooting a second-person neuroscience
What may have irritated a number of commentators is that
our proposal is simultaneously less and more extreme than
some assume or deduce from our target article, as in the
following three respects: First, we are less extreme, in the
sense that we do not claim that second-person engaged
interaction is the only way to understand others, although
we defend our claim that it is ontogenetically prior.
Second, we are more extreme in a methodological sense,
in that we claim that crucial aspects of social understanding
remain under-studied as long as we assume that spectator-
ial paradigms are the only approach that can tell us mean-
ingful things about how we go about in the social world.
Third, and most importantly, we are extreme in our theor-
etical proposal to start looking in a different way at concepts
like “minds” or “intentionality,” in that these are not just
“properties” to be read into behavior. The neurobiological
substrates that can be found in such instances may be real,
but it is unclear what their ﬁne-grained functional role
might be in the ﬁeld of social cognition. To us this seems
comparable to earlier stages of the search for human psy-
chology, in which logical operators and symbolic processing
proved to be fruitful in computing aspects of conscious
human thinking and decision-making, but not in describing
the basic nature of human cognition, in that it failed to
capture the subsymbolic processes that underlie logic and
symbols. However, in the case of social understanding,
our approach is more radical in that it not only questions
the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into
being, but it also questions whether it is at all meaningful
to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it
is conﬁned to intra-agent space.
Before advancing to the discussion of more speciﬁc
points raised by the commentaries, we will brieﬂy touch
upon two general concerns: First, as stated in the previous
paragraph, we do not, at any point, exclude the possible
existence of an observation mode of social cognition, a
way of theorizing about people from a third-person
stance, in terms of a “we-mode” (Gallotti) or by means
of “simulations” of what others feel: We can certainly
infer things about others when we are observing them
through a one-way mirror. Rather than denying ﬁrst- and
third-person social cognition, we want to emphasize the
status of second-person engagement and direct interaction.
While we acknowledge that within interaction there is a
continuum (Simpson & Ferrari), we also hold that there
is something fundamentally different about direct inter-
actions with the world or with others. Speciﬁcally, we do
not think that approaches that give priority to ﬁrst- and
third-person modes can satisfactorily describe how these
interaction-related faculties come into existence. Impor-
tantly, we do not think that they are necessary prerequisites
for successful social interaction, whereas we propose that a
second-person mode is a prerequisite for coming to know
others. From a developmental point of view – rather than
assuming the existence of a gap between self and other –
we understand the subjective experience of such a “gap”
as a result of development through interaction and engage-
ment with others, a process in which, for instance, contin-
gencies related to my own volition and that of others may
play an important role (see target article sect. 4). In other
words, it seems to us that it is the emergence of the capacity
for reasoning about people for inference and simulation
that needs to be investigated and understood as resulting
from our prior ability to interact with them, and not how
social actions and interactions emerge from our capacity
to represent knowledge about other people.
Second, the focus of our article falls on neuroscientiﬁc
methods, and more precisely, on possible solutions for
the problems or potential incompatibilities that seem to
exist between a neuroscientiﬁc approach that focuses on
an individual’s brain, and a social and cultural world in
which “information processing” does not seem to be at all
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limited to the conﬁnes and characteristics of particular indi-
viduals. One of the core insights here is that neuroscience
should not content itself with a spectatorial view of social
cognition. This is why we advocate the adoption of para-
digms that allow a person to engage or interact with
someone in a meaningful manner. Indeed, some commen-
taries (e.g., Vermeulen, Pleyers, & Mermillod [Vermeu-
len et al.]) identify paradigms which they assume could be
considered as belonging to the category of “second-person”
studies such as Olsson et al. (2005), Hein et al. (2010), or
Kitayama et al. (2004), whereas in fact these studies are
purely observational. So is the concept of social immersion
(Krach et al.), whereby interaction is merely used to prime
a different way of reasoning. According to our proposal,
these paradigms are insufﬁcient to approach, explore, and
explain the core processes that go on and constitute every-
day-life social interactions.
On the other hand, the need for a second-person neuro-
science that looks beyond the individual brain as an expla-
nans does not imply that looking at an individual brain is
incompatible or meaningless in a second-person context
(as suggested by Gallagher et al. and Sameen et al.),
or that speciﬁc brain activations cannot be an adequate
explanans for a well-deﬁned explanandum. The core
message of a second-person neuroscience is that in social
cognition studies, the part that is often left out, in an
attempt to isolate an explanandum, a scientiﬁc phenom-
enon, or a system (which has, in psychology, been confused
with isolating a person), might not just be part of the expla-
nandum, but might well be the crucial explanans. In other
words, we should not simply abandon any speciﬁc way of
probing parts of the system, but we should be aware that
we are only dealing with parts of a causally complex
dynamic framework out of which we lifted a speciﬁc and
perhaps non-essential part. Consequently, we should not
draw conclusions on how people interact or what parts of
the brain are responsible for a function in interaction, if
we have never taken such measurements during inter-
action. Otherwise, the functional role we ascribe to speciﬁc
brain areas is conﬁned to a spectatorial account, which sits
comfortably behind the one-way mirror.
R2. Contextualizing and extending the
second-person account
The fact that we do not seek to replace all other alternative
theoretical accounts, but instead advocate the primary role
of second-person engagement and interaction for social
cognition and describe its sufﬁcient empirical characteriz-
ation as a key target for the future of social neuroscience,
does not make the implications of our approach less
wide-ranging. As Cummins suggests in his commentary
“the ‘dark matter’ may be much larger.” In fact, as
Cummins points out, the overarching problem lies in the
occidental tradition of focusing on the individual, rather
than on the context. Indeed, this is also reﬂected in the
issue of free will in western philosophy, and the controversy
surrounding experiments questioning free will (e.g.,
Haggard 2008; Libet 1985; Soon et al. 2008), which
revolve around the question of whether our actions are
determined by our own volition or are instead decisions
caused by “something else.” In this context we can also
mention studies on unconscious determinants of behavior
and unconscious behavioral priming or goal activation
(Bargh & Earp 2009; Custers & Aarts 2010; Doyen et al.
2012). In all of the above described cases, the fact that
we perceive as exotic the idea that individuals might be
mere pawns in an environment that “controls us” outside
of awareness, only stems from an artiﬁcial split between
individual agents and their environment, and between indi-
viduals. On the contrary (as suggested by Dominey), one
could argue for a starting point, which holds that individual
agents are intertwined with and part of their environment.
Consequently, the question should be how we come to per-
ceive ourselves as intentional agents that are separate from
others and how this develops and results from our innate
capacity for (inter-) action and engagement. What is the
minimal requirement, not only of the individual brain,
but of the dynamic system, that can account for the fact
that I am able to perceive other people as different from
myself, without taking this “gap” between self and other
as epistemologically given?
Both Cummins and Froese et al. point towards the
importance of focusing on dynamic systems, an idea that
Dominey extends to robotics. Crucially, this includes an
interaction between “A’s brain” and “A’s body,” as well as
“B’s brain” and “B’s body” (see Froese et al., but also
Longo & Tsakiris), with the important point being that
these cannot be isolated from their shared environment.
This harks back to what we mentioned earlier, namely
that taking into account the dynamic system does not
imply that one cannot assume sub-systems. It just means
that these cannot be studied in isolation. As Longo & Tsa-
kiris suggest for agency, Cummins points towards outcome
prediction as an important mechanism. For instance, pre-
dictive coding mechanisms might constitute one of the
brain’s primary functions, which could be related to subcor-
tical bottom-up processes and reward mechanisms
(Hamon-Hill & Gadbois; Swain, Konrath, Dayton,
Finegood, & Ho [Swain et al.]). One interesting question
is whether, at the system level, there is something like
“shared predictive coding” – how the coupled system
anticipates its own future states as well as those of the
emergent, overt system behavior as co-constructed by the
agents meeting each other in a social encounter. This ties
in with Cummins’ suggestion to go a step further, not
only investigating brain activities in interactive settings
and relating brain activities of different agents, but also to
relate these to emergent phenomena in the interaction
process. Approaches to study dynamic patterns of interper-
sonal gaze adjustment by making use of virtual characters in
interactive settings have been introduced by Bente et al.
(2007b; 2008b). These studies, however, have been
restricted to the behavioral aspect of gaze coordination
and have neglected the social cognitive dimension and its
neural correlates. Our ongoing efforts are targeting the
integration of both behavioral and neural data captured
during human interactions, and utilize newly established
dual eye-tracking methodology to connect experimental
variations to participants’ responses (Barisic et al. 2013).
As highlighted in the target article, another important
ﬁeld in which interpersonal dynamics come into play is
language research. This is also emphasized by the insightful
comments provided by Evans, Gambi & Pickering, and
Syal & Anderson, who suggest that a second-person
neuroscience can learn from language research as well as
it should itself “assume a second-person perspective”
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(Gambi & Pickering) because – historically – the majority of
work in this ﬁeld has considered isolated examples of
language production or comprehension without focusing
on pairs of participants engaged in dialogue. We are thank-
ful to these authors for pointing towards this interesting
parallel in research development and are in full agreement
with their view that investigations of real-time dialogue are
likely to advance our knowledge of processes of interperso-
nal prediction and adaptation in joint activities. We are also
intrigued by the comment provided by Evans, who draws
attention to the person category of “ﬁrst-person inclusive”
to denote the union of speaker and addressee in non-
Indo-European languages and thereby reminds us to also
raise questions about cultural differences, as well as the
intricate relationship of culture and social interaction.
Furthermore, the issue of language-based communi-
cation also ties in with the insightful commentary provided
by Kevin Moore who discusses similarities between the
second-person approach and a Wittgensteinian analysis
of psychological concepts. According to Moore both
approaches converge in their argument for a priority of
interaction in grounding language and providing meaning
that is not reliant on “ontologically private” states. Moore
is also right in suggesting that our interest in the transform-
ation of implicit to explicit social cognition stems from the
idea that ﬁrst- and third-person perspective arise from
ontogenetically prior second-person experiences. We are
also most sympathetic to Moore’s suggestion that on a
Vygotskian view social interactions serve as the motor,
that drives developmental processes (“maturing functions”)
and may lead to their “internalization,” thereby allowing for
the emergence of explicit forms of social cognition.
R3. How far and wide: Situating the second-person
account within current theories of social cognition
Some commentaries (Hamilton; Gallagher et al.;
Sameen et al.) seem to suggest that we do not take the
second-person idea far enough, whereas others seem to
suggest that we take it too far (Moore & Iacoboni; Over-
gaard & Krueger). We take this disparity in judgment as
an opportunity to spell out further where we situate our
account.
Hamilton argues that the target article lacks a sufﬁ-
ciently detailed theoretical model of how social cognition
works in order to lead empirical investigation of the
neural mechanisms enabling it. We agree that – although
the underlying philosophical ideas are only sketched in
broad strokes –Hamilton is right to place the authors
beside proponents of the enactive approach like de
Jaegher et al. (2010), who emphasize interaction dynamics
as an important feature and – in part – constitutive aspect of
social understanding. Hamilton goes on to discuss (i) com-
putational models derived from game theory, (ii) enactive
approaches based on dynamical systems theory, and (iii)
information processing models, which emphasize the idea
of the brain being involved in generating predictions
about future events. Hamilton clearly favors the latter
kind of approach. She also hints at the possibility that
these theories might not be mutually exclusive, but may
converge.
Traditionally, enactive approaches have been formulated
as being massively anti-representational, thus engendering
a paradigm shift in the cognitive sciences (Chemero 2009;
Hutto 2008; Thompson 2007; Varela et al. 1991). Yet, it
should be emphasized that the main idea of enactive cogni-
tion is not incompatible with the traditional idea that the
brain is in the business of processing information by way
of representations. This should already be clear when we
trace back the use of the term “enactive” to its origins in
the work of Jerome Bruner (1964). Apparently unbe-
knownst to Varela et al. (1991), Bruner introduced the
notion in the context of his distinction of three ways of
storing the knowledge that is acquired consecutively
during the cognitive growth of the infant: enactive, imagis-
tic, and linguistic representations.
The ﬁrst kind of representation is, according to Bruner,
essentially connected to and inseparable from the
execution of certain actions. While the latter idea is compa-
tible with Varela’s later usage of the term, the idea that it is
fundamentally a kind of representation is not. Yet, even
though we cannot elaborate this thought further here, it
demonstrates that simply placing a theory alongside enac-
tive approaches does not yet determine the details of the
theory. Enactive theories range from providing very
modest to very strong claims, and some of the basic ideas
are actually deemed compatible with the idea of predictive
coding (cf. Clark 2013). So we agree with Hamilton’s
assessment that the theoretical options discussed are not
mutually exclusive; and as mentioned above, the goal was
not to replace the existing theories altogether. As in the
development of new experimental paradigms, further
work needs to be done in order to support empirical
research with an appropriate theoretical background.
Overgaard & Krueger defend the social perception
view (as proposed, e.g., by Gallagher 2008) against our cri-
ticism that it remains committed to a spectator theory.
They present us with a dilemma between the (implausible)
claim that social perception is impossible and acknowledg-
ment of its possibility, which would show that our approach
and the social perception view cannot be distinguished. But
this appears as a dilemma only if we had proposed that
there is merely one means of coming to understand
others, namely, by way of interacting with them.
However, this is not what we claimed. We claim that para-
digmatically social situations are characterized by inter-
action and engagement and that in such situations, social
cognition is fundamentally different from situations
where we are mere observers. This, of course, implies
that the latter situations are also possible. The problem
for the social perception approach, in our view, is of a con-
ceptual nature, because it is typically cashed out in terms of
direct perception. Yet, it is just not clear whether direct
social perception is possible without involvement or inter-
action. As recent debates have shown, the notion of
“direct perception” is not unproblematic. This is acknowl-
edged by Gallagher (2001) and Hutto (2008) who sup-
plement their view with a further “narrative” hypothesis,
according to which young children are exposed to stories
in which people act for reasons based on their beliefs and
desires. Such narratives are supposed to provide the
necessary scaffolding for the acquisition of the concepts
of belief and desire. So, even in these terms, the social per-
ception view on its own is not enough to explain the full
range of social cognitive abilities. Second, the notion of per-
ception at play here must be a rich one. Gallagher (2008)
calls it “smart perception,” which is conceptual (epistemic
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seeing) and includes a wide range of background assump-
tions and world knowledge when, for example, it is
claimed that even young children directly perceive affor-
dances. This appears problematic, because this notion of
perception lines up with a weak notion of “theory” as in
the “theory theory” approach. Thirdly, not only in light of
philosophical debates about the epistemology of percep-
tion, but also in light of recent developments in the neuro-
science of perception, it is questionable whether there is
such a capacity or process as direct perception. According
to the predictive coding hypothesis, brains are in the
business of predicting future sensory events. In turn,
these hypotheses are tested by sensory feedback and by
action (Friston 2010; Frith 2007; Hohwy 2012). Clark
(2013) has recently given an overview of the explanatory
strength of this general approach to brain functions while
leaving no room for direct perception. On this, we agree
with Rietveld et al., who adopt this view with regard to
human beings’ responsiveness to affordances. So, the
defender of the social perception approach faces the
dilemma of enriching her notion of perception so much
that it is in danger of collapsing into a version of “theory
theory.”
This discussion leads naturally to the comments put
forward by Gallagher et al. and Sameen et al. who criti-
cize our account of containing an unresolved tension by
maintaining that social neuroscience is supposed to be in
the business of locating neural correlates of social cogni-
tion, which they suggest is at odds with the main thrust
of the enactive approach to cognition that we seem to
endorse. More speciﬁcally, these authors point out that
our approach is still dealing in representations, whereas
the enactive approach rejects this notion altogether. First,
we have already elaborated above that only extreme ver-
sions of the enactive approach (e.g., Hutto & Myin, in
press), are really at odds with the idea that neural/mental
representations play a special role in the explanation of cog-
nition. In fact, representations can be a fruitful conceptual
instrument if they are understood as eliciting the functional
role of neural processes in a three-place concept of rep-
resentation as opposed to a simple causal-correlative
understanding of representation (e.g., Vogeley & Bartels
2011). Second, and this point speciﬁcally addresses
Sameen et al., if the task of cognitive neuroscience is not
supposed to be the investigation of the neural mechanisms
that enable cognitive activities, then the critics must deter-
mine an alternative task for cognitive neuroscience. Surely,
the idea of a neural correlate is coherent enough if it is not
understood as a neo-phrenological attempt to isolate brain
regions, which are responsible for speciﬁc cognitive func-
tions. Instead, the relevant neural mechanisms must be
conceived in terms of the context of dynamics that
include body and (physical as well as social) environment.
Since the main thrust of our target article is to provide
new ideas for research in the neurosciences that deals
with the nature of social cognition, emphasis was placed
on what neuroscientists could do to investigate social cogni-
tion in an ecologically valid way. While this will continue to
include measuring brain activity, we are in full agreement
with Gallagher et al. that “the question is, what brains do
in the complex and dynamic mix of interactions.” Finally,
whether (some or all) embodied phenomena relevant to
social cognition can (or should) be characterized in rep-
resentational terms is an open and important question.
Simply assuming that they cannot (or should not), like
the authors do, is surely inappropriate (Vogeley & Bartels
2011). Here, it is important to distinguish different claims
associated with embodied, embedded, enactive, and
extended cognition. While it is not clear whether Gallagher
et al. and Sameen et al. would subscribe to all of these
different theses, the role played by the various cultural,
evolutionary, and personal factors in shaping not only cog-
nition, but also the cognition-enabling brain circuitry, has to
be investigated in the context of the more general debate
about the so-called extended mind. That is, the background
question of this debate is whether these factors can be said
to be constitutive elements of cognitive processes or merely
important scaffolding or shaping factors. Only if one were
to hold a strong extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers
1998), would the role of brain circuitry for cognition be
diminished. But whether such a strong claim can be vindi-
cated against the more modest scaffolding-claim (Adams &
Aizawa 2008) is also an open question (Menary 2010). In
sum, the important role that body and environment play
in the dynamics of social cognition has been already sufﬁ-
ciently emphasized in the target article (e.g., see sect. 2).
Moreover, the general idea of the enactive approach,
namely that cognition is an activity of the whole organism,
is compatible with an explanatory framework that makes
use of mental representations, even if these have to be
understood in a more action-oriented sense (Clark 2001;
Wheeler 2005). Whether a radical enactivism or the
extended mind thesis can be vindicated is an open question.
R4. Agency, intentionality, and development
Another focus of commentaries dealt with how our second-
person account may be seen to fall short with respect to
explaining the experience of agency and intentionality.
Speciﬁcally, several authors suggest a role of perspectives
and triadic interaction in the development of ascriptions
of agency and intentions, which partially stems from a mis-
interpretation of our proposal.
Longo & Tsakiris suggest that second-person experi-
ences presuppose ﬁrst-person (singular) experiences and
that the former cannot be investigated independently of
the latter. Their main point is that contingencies also play
an important role in the ﬁrst-person experience of embodi-
ment, ownership, and agency, which can all be experimen-
tally manipulated. Of course, our proposal does not imply
that investigations of ﬁrst-person experience (e.g., by
means of the famous rubber hand illusion) cannot inform
the investigation of social cognition in interesting ways. In
their argument for the claim that ﬁrst-person experiences
are necessary for second-person experiences, Longo &
Tsakiris focus on the case where I form an intention,
which leads ﬁrst to my own action and only then elicits
the action of another. But one of the main points of
the target article was to emphasize cases where “being
addressed as you” (sect. 3.1.1) in social interaction may
elicit a reaction on my part that can lead to reciprocal inten-
tional relations. It is not clear how Longo & Tsakiris’s dis-
cussion of body ownership and bodily agency bears on
the issue, unless they want to argue that ﬁrst-person
agency experiences are ontogenetically prior to second-
person agency experiences (in addition to the question
whether they are logically prior): We think that this is not
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the case. In fact, as suggested by, for instance, Dominey
and Froese et al., the gap between self and other may
be largely artiﬁcial and may only develop at a later ontogen-
etic stage. One can, for example, imagine that differences
in contingencies, with respect to my own intentions and
action outcomes as compared to my intentions and
others’ action outcomes, can lead to a differentiation
between self- and other-agency. As Lewis & Stack write,
“infants become naturally attentive to gestures that are
intentional because they are repeated and become predict-
able.” Importantly however, in our proposal, contingencies
as described by Longo & Tsakiris are only a part of what it
means to be in a second-person interaction with someone.
Another example of reading our proposal as more radical
than it is, are the commentaries of Gallotti, Krach et al.,
and Lewis & Stack. Gallotti argues – in line with ideas
developed by Chris Frith (see Frith 2012b) – that the
emphasis on the second-person perspective should be
replaced by a ﬁrst-person plural perspective or “we-mode.”
Similarly, Lewis & Stack suggest that second-person under-
standing may emerge from a more foundational “ﬁrst-
person plural experience.” Here, too, it seems important
to repeat that we never argued that it is impossible to rep-
resent ourselves as being in a “we-mode.” Persuasively,
Gallotti emphasizes that the we-mode may constitute an
irreducible mode of cognition vis-à-vis cognitive states in
the I-mode. As Searle (1990) and others have shown, we-
intentions (e.g., “we are playing this game together”)
cannot be analyzed in terms of or reduced to a sum of
the individual intentions of the agents and that the we-
mode has considerable explanatory power. We can comple-
tely agree with this claim and have actually said nothing to
undermine it. In addition to Gallotti’s claim, our account
can actually tell a persuasive story about the origin of
our we-intentions. Surely, we-intentions cannot simply
precede social interaction. Neither should we take we-
intentions as brute, inexplicable facts. The only viable
explanation seems to be that joint engagement and activities
may lead to intentions in the we-mode. That is, the we-
mode presupposes the features emphasized in our approach
and is thus no replacement for it. Even if the we-mode was
irreducible to two I-modes, it would still assume that within
an interaction, the actions of an agent can be causally
explained in terms of representations that reside in that
agent alone. In this sense, it would be clearly spectatorial
and would downplay sensorimotor accounts (see, e.g.,
Lewis & Stack). Rather than downgrading ideas of collective
intentionality, our approach can lead towards an answer to
the question of how collective intentions arise from inter-
action dynamics and emotional engagement.
In the same vein as Gallotti, commentators Lewis &
Stack suggest that “knowledge of ‘you’” emerges from a
previously shared context in which infant and adult form
a (proto-) conversational unit that can be described as a
very early ﬁrst-person plural experience. As mentioned
before, we suggest that it may be the other way around.
Implicitly, Lewis & Stack acknowledge this when they
contend that these shared activities are “largely stage-
managed by the adult.” Without needing to discuss
whether it is actually genuinely participatory and jointly
“managed,” it is clear that this implies that someone takes
the initiative by emotionally engaging with the other in a
communication loop that is characterized by reciprocity,
and is supported by social affordances. Furthermore, they
ask what may ﬁll the “spectatorial gap.” Even from a spec-
tatorial perspective, one valid suggestion might be that it is
essentially a form of embodied sensorimotor know-how
(McGeer 2001; Schlicht, forthcoming). This is actually
what Lewis & Stack themselves seem to suggest. The ear-
liest forms of awareness are arguably “sensorimotor and
take place within practical activities.” One important
characteristic of know-how (with respect to some ability)
is that its development goes hand in hand with the ability
to recognize the execution of this ability in someone
else’s actions. Knowing how to swim enables one to recog-
nize when someone else executes her swimming ability suc-
cessfully (McGeer 2001). Similarly, the suggestion would
be that we develop social know-how in the context of
scenes of mutual engagement and interaction. But, as men-
tioned before, the crucial difference in our approach is that
this development of social know-how is not a faculty we
develop to “bridge a gap.” Rather, it constitutes our
primary way of experiencing others. This is in line with
Bruner’s (1964) suggestion that the developmentally
primary form of representation is “enactive” in the sense
that it is embodied and inextricably tied to (inter-) action.
It provides the “basis for reﬂective forms of social under-
standing,” as Lewis & Stack emphasize. As argued above,
the ﬁrst-person plural perspective does not emerge from
nowhere, but instead may be seen to arise from second-
person experiences. Our point is not that all infant
attentiveness already and necessarily involves complex
awareness of othe’s minds. Our point is that it could.
Lewis & Stack are very clearly ruling out any reference to
awareness of mind in early infancy on the grounds that
this is too rich an interpretation. But this is precisely the
point. Why should mentality be assumed to be too rich?
Because it is non-perceivable and needs inference is the
usual answer in cognitive developmental psychology. It is
not clear whether this is Lewis & Stack’s answer, too, but
if so, they fall prey to the very same methodological beha-
viorism that according to our argumentation neuroscience
and psychology should try to avoid.
Krach et al. present a methodological equivalent of
Gallotti’s argument, in that they suggest that having
direct interactions is not necessary, but that instead
priming interactions by social immersion might sufﬁce to
put people in some social state of mind. In our view this
proposal runs into the same trap as the we-mode proposal
by suggesting that our brain may simply switch to an “inter-
action mode,” which represents ourselves in some interac-
tive context. But from a methodological point of view,
putting people in such a state does not seem like an accep-
table substitute for actually having them interact. One
might observe differences with non-social immersion situ-
ations, but these would still bear no relationship to the
experience of being engaged in ongoing interaction.
An interesting issue put forward by Moore & Paulus
and Cleret de Langavant et al. is related to differences
between dyadic and triadic interactions. Even though we
focus on dyadic interactions in our article, we, of course,
do not claim that social cognition stops there. Triadic inten-
tional relations clearly are complex interactions, and we are
happy to agree upon the view that joint attention enriches
the kind of social encounters that go on in the ﬁrst few
months of life. In fact, we speciﬁcally refer to the impor-
tance of looking at how triadic interactions develop out of
dyadic ones and make suggestions about how to investigate
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their neural bases in the target article (sect. 3). For
instance, it might be that triadic interactions hold the key
in the development of a distinction between how my own
and someone else’s actions are coupled to an effect in the
outside world, something that the dyad may not provide.
Unfortunately, Moore & Paulus do not substantiate or
present evidence for their strong claim that the third
element is a necessary component for social cognition.
They are claiming that “it is unclear how the properties
of dyadic interactions alone […] could reveal intentionality
at all” simply because, as they state, “intentionality is tied
inextricably to actions on objects.” Based on this premise,
they hold that “the problem with purely dyadic interactions
is that there is no obvious way for the intentionality of
action – its object directedness – to be manifest.” Hereby,
the authors neglect the possibility that an action performed
by another may be directed at oneself (as is often the case in
the ﬁrst 7–8 months of life, viewed from the perspective of
the infant) and that this may itself reveal intentionality and
elicit a basic form of intentional understanding. Further-
more, Moore & Paulus do not demonstrate that their stron-
ger claim is true. Indeed, the quote above seems to reveal a
relatively narrow conception of intentionality, which
appears to be conﬁned to intentional actions towards
objects, excluding many other manifestations of intention-
ality, as in love (emphasized by Brentano [1874/1973]) or
attention, which are both dyadic intentional relations.
This is surprising in light of their contention that intention-
ality comes in many different ﬂavors. Recent philosophical
debates have demonstrated that a more viable notion of
intentionality also includes – in addition to propositional
attitudes like belief and desire –more basic manifestations
of intentionality like sensorimotor or bodily intentionality
(cf. Merleau-Ponty 1958; Schlicht, forthcoming; Sinigaglia
2008). This basic form of intentionality is crucial in the
early stages of cognitive development and reveals itself in
dyadic intentional relations. The same line of argument
holds for their criticism of our emphasis on emotional
engagement. The point, again, was not to downgrade
other features of social cognition, but to emphasize the
role of emotional engagement in contrast to traditional
approaches.
Furthermore, Moore & Paulus charge the authors of
the target article for a lack of a positive account of “what
it means to understand mind.” Possibly, the philosophical
approach behind this was underemphasized in the target
article. Yet, we tried to make clear that an approach in
line with enactive and embodied approaches, based on
the notion of embodied sensorimotor know-how might be
one way to go (McGeer 2001; Schlicht, forthcoming).
This approach emphasizes that there is a form of social
understanding that is more basic, different in nature and
below (propositional) mentalizing as traditionally under-
stood. We are thankful to Rietveld et al. for elaborating
the relevant kind of “skilled intentionality” that is important
for such engagement and the pick-up of social affordances
in context. Rietveld et al. attempt to align social cognition
with “nonsocial engagements with the environment” by
embedding social affordances in a richer context of affor-
dances in general, based on the plausible claim that any
affordance has to be conceived of in a whole ﬁeld of
quite different affordances. However, although this is
true, social affordances are still quite different from
“object affordances” because they are much more
complex and transient elusive during an ongoing social
interaction. This is due to the fact that objects of the
environment are indifferent to our attempts to understand
them, while other people immediately react to such
attempts and thereby modulate the ﬁeld of social and
other affordances.
Cleret de Langavant et al. argue that a second-person
neuroscience should be able to explain communicative
triadic intentional relations. In order to emphasize the
difference between dyadic and triadic intentional relations,
they point to the pathological condition of heterotopagno-
sia, which suggests that brain networks for dyadic and
triadic relations may be different. We agree that this is an
important issue that deserves further investigation and in
our target article we have discussed studies of joint atten-
tion, which use virtual characters (Schilbach et al. 2010b)
and which have the potential of directly comparing the
neural correlates of dyadic and triadic relations. We are
thankful for the pointer provided by Cleret de Langavant
et al. that in cases such as heterotopagnosia, the use of
anthropomorphic virtual characters may be of limited use.
R5. Theoretical accounts of the second-person and
the role of the “mirror neuron system” (MNS)
Some commentaries emphasize the need for strong theor-
etical accounts that could promote the development of a
second-person neuroscience. We have already mentioned
Hamilton in this respect, who compares the applicability
of computational models such as game theory (see also
Gariépy et al.), dynamic models (see also Froese
et al.), and cognitive models. Furthermore, Hamilton
advances her proposal of the so-called STORM (social
top-down response modulation) model, which she
describes as a “socially engaged information processing
model” based upon the idea of the brain’s visuo-motor
stream being modulated by other “social brain systems.”
As mentioned earlier, all these models describe only part
of the social reality; for instance, computational models
and cognitive models are very useful at a non-dynamic
level (see the target article’s Fig. 2). However, these
models necessarily assume a causality reducible to one
agent, which may be the case in observational situations,
but not in interaction. This said, we acknowledge that
there is a component within a single individual that can
tell us something about how non-interactive social cogni-
tion works. The “modulation” that Hamilton describes in
STORM assumes that there is some sort of “generator”
that generates social behavior, which is then streamlined
according to context. Again, this falls into the trap of assum-
ing agent-internal drives that somehow must compete with
the context that has to be integrated in a uniﬁed account.
We suggest the reverse, namely that, despite some intrinsic
reward-related motivational component, the social context
is the initial drive in this process, making use of brain areas
that have developed sensitivities to contexts over prolonged
social learning. We are not denying such “modulation,” in
as much as it is simply the recruitment of stored infor-
mation on ongoing information processing. But the core
is that, in interaction, such modulations may only make
sense in the context of the other.
Gariépy et al. suggest game theoretical conceptions as a
suitable theoretical framework. We found it surprising that
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the authors call on Gintis (2009) to overcome critiques on
game theory, as Gintis (2009) himself states that game
theory alone is not a satisfactory account for a couple of
things, such as belief sharing. Speciﬁcally, Gintis (2009,
p. 243) writes:
The reason for this contrast between the natural and the
behavioral sciences is that living systems are generally
complex, dynamic adaptive systems with emergent proper-
ties that cannot be fully captured in analytical models that
attend only to local interactions. The hypothetico-deductive
methods of game theory, the Beliefs-Preferences-Constraints
(BPC) model, and even gene-culture co-evolutionary theory
must therefore be complemented by the work of behavioral
scientists, who adhere to more historical and interpretive
traditions, as well as that of researchers who use agent-
based programming techniques to explore the dynamic be-
havior of approximations to real-world complex adaptive
systems.
This sounds very much like a proposal that is in favor of
an expansion of game theory, rather than a justiﬁcation of
its use in all contexts. Gintis (2009) goes on:
A complex system consists of a large population of similar enti-
ties (in our case, human individuals) who interact through reg-
ularized channels (e.g., networks, markets, social institutions)
with signiﬁcant stochastic elements, without a system of centra-
lized organization and control (i.e., if there is a state, it controls
only a fraction of all social interactions and is itself a complex
system). A complex system is adaptive if it undergoes an evol-
utionary (genetic, cultural, agent-based, or other) process of
reproduction, mutation, and selection. To characterize a
system as complex adaptive does not explain its operation and
does not solve any problems. However, it suggests that
certain modeling tools are likely to be effective that have little
use in a noncomplex system. In particular, the traditional math-
ematical methods of physics and chemistry must be sup-
plemented by other modeling tools such as agent-based
simulation and network theory.
This, in fact, is exactly where we want to be heading (cf.
Froese et al.), although we acknowledge that at this point
a formal model including dynamics is lacking. Further-
more, game theory is essentially about decision-making,
preferably in a “game” context – that is, in a context in
which cooperation and/or competition play a central
role. Many human interactions are not about decision
making. In fact, they often do not contain a cooperative
or competitive context (Pfeiffer et al. 2011). It is impor-
tant to look at what motivates people outside of external
reward or otherwise “optimal decisions” (Engemann
et al. 2012).
Dezecache, Conty, & Grèzes (Dezecache et al.)
question whether “mirror neurons” are involved in the pro-
cessing of social affordances, understood as action possibi-
lities in the context of social interactions. Yet, they simply
assume a canonical interpretation of the function of
mirror neurons, namely, as facilitating simulation. This is
clear when they write that the affordance interpretation is
in conﬂict with “what MNs are known to do, that is, to
simulate an observed motor pattern.” In the light of
recent controversies about the “correct” interpretation of
the mirror mechanism (de Bruin & Gallagher 2012; Galla-
gher 2007; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011), that is, whether they
facilitate simulation or direct social perception, it is surpris-
ing – at least at this stage – that Dezecache et al. presume
that anything is supposedly “known” about the function
of mirror neurons. One may, however, suggest an
alternative interpretation of the “mirror neuron” activation
that has less to do with the understanding of another
person’s mental states. Several studies suggest that
“mirror neurons”may encode one’s own action possibilities
in the light of an observed action. Buccino et al. (2004)
showed that such neurons do not ﬁre upon observation of
a dog barking, presumably because barking is not in one’s
human motor repertoire. More to the point, Gazzola
et al. (2007) investigated aplasic patients, born without
either arms or hands, while they observed healthy subjects
perform hand actions. In addition, they recorded neural
activity correlated with the performance of actions with
mouth or feet. They found that the patients’ “mirror
neurons” ﬁred upon their observation of hand actions, yet
it was the set of neurons that was typically activated when
the patients’ themselves performed actions with their
mouth or feet. That suggests that they encode or transform
perceptual information about an intentional action in terms
of what they themselves can do. This interpretation is also
not in conﬂict with other existing studies. In contrast to
canonical neurons, “mirror neurons” are social in the
sense that they require observation or execution of an
action, they are not activated merely upon perception of
an object without an action being performed on it (Schlicht,
forthcoming).
Simpson & Ferrari similarly seem to conﬂate the
empirical discovery of the “mirror neuron” network with
ways of interpreting it when they suggest that the simu-
lation interpretation of the “mirror neuron” discovery is
“tightly linked” to the discovery. Against this way of
seeing things, it should be emphasized that the “simulation
theory” is not part of the discovery of “mirror neurons”
even though this may still be a widespread view. Moreover,
taken as a theoretical option in the explanation of social
cognition, simulation theory is patently circular because it
presupposes what it aims to explain, namely, an under-
standing of another person’s mental states (Newen &
Schlicht 2009). At the core of the “simulation theory” are
pretend mental states that are thought to be used as
input for a decision mechanism in order to attribute its
output to the other person. But in order to produce such
pretend mental states in oneself that bear a sufﬁcient
resemblance with the other person’s mental states, one
already needs to know what the other person feels or
thinks. This objection led Goldman (2006) to defend a
hybrid account containing elements of theory-theory.
Simpson & Ferrari claim that “nearly all work on single
cell recordings of mirror neurons involves second-person
interactions,” but they do not demonstrate that this is actu-
ally so. The example of perceiving someone else’s emotion-
al facial expression is clearly not an example characterized
by reciprocity and interaction dynamics. But it suggests
that the activation of “mirror neurons” is ﬁrst and foremost
tied to perception and the selection of adaptive behavioral
responses, not to simulation, which is in line with Deze-
cache et al.’s interpretation of data from a recent study
by Conty et al. (2012). This is in accordance with studies
of our group that suggest that the human mirror neuron
system is involved in early detection of potentially socially
salient signals, whereas the evaluation of actually socially
salient signals is then handed over to the medial prefrontal
cortex as part of the mentalizing system (Kuzmanovic et al.
2009; Santos et al. 2010). It is also in accordance with the
interpretation of “mirror neuron” activation as underlying
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the execution and observation of embodied skills. Whether,
in light of all this, one would like to continue calling these
sets of neurons, mirror neurons, is an entirely different
question.
In the context of accounts of “embodied simulation”
often closely associated with the discussion of “mirror
neurons,” Vermeulen et al. draw attention to the recently
described Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model by Nie-
denthal et al. (2010) and argue that we fail to discuss this
proposal in spite of it being “a direct and detailed second-
person theoretical model.” While we are sympathetic to
the ambitious SIMS account and the emphasis it puts on
personal involvement, for example, by means of eye-
contact, we also note important differences in comparison
to our account. As discussed at great length in the target
article, we, again, do not subscribe to the notion of “simu-
lation” both on conceptual as well as empirical grounds.
With regard to the putative “mirror neuron system”
(MNS) – often thought to underlie the respective “simu-
lations” – it seems plausible to us to assume that neural
activity in the relevant brain regions is modulated by sen-
sorimotor experience, which is often obtained through
interactions with others. Rather than providing “simu-
lations,” activity changes in these brain regions might,
therefore, be more closely related to perceiving possibilities
for (inter-) action (cf. Rietveld et al.). Furthermore, we
believe that the use of ecologically valid experimental para-
digms will help to further elucidate the contributions of
both the MNS and the mentalizing network of the brain
during social interaction (Becchio et al. 2012; Schilbach
2010; Wang et al. 2011).
R6. Clinical applications and individual differences
Finally, we address the set of commentaries which focuses
on the individual in terms of disorders (Nephew; Redcay
et al.; Rietveld et al.), in terms of the importance of indi-
vidual differences (Chakrabati;Moore & Iacoboni), and
in terms of the investigation of motivational, reward-related
components of cognition (Hamon-Hill & Gadbois; Swain
et al.).
Moore & Iacoboni argue for a residual utility of non-
interactive experimental scenarios, in the context of estab-
lishing individual differences, whereby one needs to be
able to separate one agent’s characteristics from the
other’s. While we acknowledge the importance of individ-
ual differences (see sect. 6 of the target article), we think
that looking at individual differences does not require
abandoning interaction. As suggested by Chakrabarti, it
is plausible to assume that social interactions, which
have characteristics in addition to those of the individual
interactors, are inﬂuenced by individual differences; for
example, the degree to which interactors may exhibit
autistic traits or carry genetic polymorphisms that can
modulate cerebral responses to different reward stimuli
(e.g., Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen 2011). We are thankful
to Chakrabarti for raising this important point and his con-
ﬁrmation that interactive paradigms might be particularly
well suited for the investigation of social reward sensi-
tivities, both in healthy controls, as well as cases of
pathology.
Similarly, Nephew and Vermeulen et al. point out that
standardized investigations of social interaction could be a
useful “tool” for the identiﬁcation and differential diagnosis
of psychiatric disorders (cf. Vogeley & Newen 2009). We
use the example of high-functioning autism as a case in
point, but it is certainly true that disorders such as schizo-
phrenia, and possibly also chronic depression and personal-
ity disorders, can be construed as disorders of social
interaction, rather than social observation. With regard to
autism and the question of reward-related neurocircuitry
contributing to an intrinsic motivation during social inter-
action, it is also noteworthy that prominent accounts of
autism suggest speciﬁc “social motivation” deﬁcits without
resorting – to the best of our knowledge – to interaction-
based paradigms to test these and their underlying neural
bases. Importantly, neural networks that do not involve
reward-related neurocircuitry, but have been implicated
in social cognition, appear to be relatively intact in autism
(Marsh & Hamilton 2011). In this line of thought, we are
grateful for the commentary provided by Redcay et al.,
who carefully describe relevant differences between inter-
action and observation and the challenges associated with
isolating the interaction component. Redcay et al. also
present their own experimental approach of using a live
face-to-face video feed in conjunction with neuroimaging
methodology, which resonates well with our proposal of
truly interactive paradigms. Also, the authors are in agree-
ment with our suggestion that the investigation of differ-
ences between interaction and observation could be
particularly relevant to the advancement of our under-
standing of autism, as spectatorial tests often fail to ﬁnd
differences between patients and controls (e.g., Nation &
Penny 2008). Also, Redcay et al. refer to exciting recent
neuroimaging evidence in autism, which capitalizes on
this distinction and demonstrates hypoactivity in patients’
brains for a real-time joint attention task and hyperactivity
during a control condition, which suggests a failure to
modulate brain responses according to whether the task
required a social interaction or not (Redcay et al. 2012).
This is completely in line with our suggestion of the trans-
lational potential of the second-person neuroscience
approach.
R7. Concluding remarks
In writing the target article our goal has been to highlight
that in spite of the remarkable progress made in the
young and emerging ﬁeld of social neuroscience, the
neural mechanisms that underlie real-time social encoun-
ters –which should be a the very heart of the ﬁeld’s
research interests – are only beginning to be studied. In
order to take on this challenge, social neuroscience may
be helped by drawing upon a second-person approach to
knowing other minds, which is based on interaction and
emotional engagements between people, rather than
mere observation. The commentaries we have received in
response to this proposal have provided important and
fruitful new aspects for the critical discussion and the poss-
ible conceptual improvement of the account, most of which
we have hopefully been able to engage with, more or less
directly. None of the challenges raised appear to be fatal
to our proposal, but, instead, may have helped to enrich
the sketched “landscape” of a second-person neuroscience
both in terms of relevant theoretical and empirical
questions.
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